XV. What these assertions, however, effect in the souls of those that hear them, persuading them to despise the world, and the things that are in it, ought not by any means to be concealed from us. For there are two sects of philosophers with respect to the attainment of the end of life, one of which places the pleasure of the body as the end ; but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the desire of which is derived and suspended from God. The manner, however, in which this is accomplished, must be elsewhere discussed. And Epicurus, indeed, taking away providence, exhorts us to pursue pleasure and delight, as the only things which then remain. But the doctrine of the Gnostics, as still more juvenile than this, blames the domination of providence, and providence itself, despises all human laws, and virtue which has existed in every age, and considers temperance. as ridiculous, in order that nothing beautiful and good may be seen to subsist among men. Together with temperance also it subverts justice which is connascent with it in manners, and which derives its perfection from reason and exercise ; and in short, it subverts every thing by which a man may become a worthy character. Hence, nothing else is left for them to pursue but pleasure, and their own concerns and utility, and not that which is common to other men ; unless some one among them happens to be superior to these assertions. For. none of the above-mentioned particulars are considered as beautiful by them, but something else whatever it may be which they pursue ; though they ought to endeavour to correct those with whom they are well acquainted, applying themselves from a divine nature to human concerns. For it is the province of this nature which despises the pleasure of the body, to know what is beautiful, and good. But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all excited to supernal natures. This is testified by their never saying any thing about virtue, and by their entirely omitting the discussion of things pertaining to it. Nor do they say what virtue is, or how many virtues there are, or direct their attention to the numerous and beautiful assertions which may he surveyed in the writings of the ancients, or to the means of acquiring and possessing virtue, and of cultivating and purifying the soul. For it is to no purpose to say, look to God, unless you also teach how we are to look to him. For what hinders, some one may say, but that a man may look to God who does not abstain from any one pleasure, and who suffers his anger to be without any restraint; such a one recollecting indeed the name of God, but being held in bondage by all the passions, and not at all endeavouring to ex-pel them ? Virtue, therefore, indeed proceeding to the end (i.e. to its perfection,^ and, being ingenerated in the soul in conjunction with wisdom, will present God to the view. But to speak of God without true virtue, is to utter nothing but a name.
XVI. Again, to despise the world, and the Gods, and other beautiful natures that are contained in it, is not to become a (food man. For, every bad man. trill in the first place despise the Gods; and. no one is completely bad till he does despise them.. Hence, if he is not bad in every thing else, from this very thing he null become so. For the honour which the Gnostics say is paid by them to the intelligible Gods, is utterly incongruous. For he who loves any thing, is delighted with every thing which is allied to the object of his love. For you also love the children of the father whom you love. But every soul is the daughter of the father of the universe. And the souls in the mundane spheres, are intellectual, and good, and are united to intelligible essences much more than ours. For how could this world be separated from the intelligible world; or the Gods in it, from the intelligible Gods ? But these things have been discussed by us before. Now, however, we must say, that those who despise things allied to the intelligible Gods, have no knowledge of those Gods, except what is merely verbal. For how can it be pious to assert as they do, that providence does not extend to terrene affairs, and to every thing whatever it may be ? How also is this consonant to their own doctrine ? For they say that divinity providentially attends to them alone. Whether, therefore, did he pay attention to them while they were with supernal natures, or does he also attend to them during their existence here ? For if the former, how came they to descend ? But if the latter, how is it that they are still upon the earth ? How. likewise, does it happen that divinity is not present in the earth’? For whence does he know that they are here, and that being here and revolting from him. they have become evil ? But if he has a knowledge of souls that have not become evil, he will also know those that have, in order that he may be able to distinguish the former from the latter. He will, therefore, be present to all things, and will be in this world, whatever the mode may be of his subsistence in it. So that the world will participate of him. But if he is absent from the world, he will also be absent from you ; and you will not have any thing to say either about him, or the natures posterior to him. But whether a certain providence proceeds from divinity to you, or whatever you may think fit to assert respecting it, the world certainly derives its subsistence from thence, and is not, nor ever will be, deserted by him. For the providence of divinity is in a much greater degree extended to wholes than to parts ; and the former of these participate of him more abundantly than the latter. And much more does he providentially attend to the soulsoul of the world. This is evident from the existence of the world, and from the wisdom of the mode in which it exists. For who among those that are stupidly proud, is so orderly and wise as the universe ? Indeed, to compare the one with the other is ridiculous, and is attended with great absurdity. Hence, when the comparison is made for any other purpose than that of argument, it is attended with impiety. Nor is it the province of a wise man to investigate things of this kind (as if he was dubious about them), but of one who is mentally blind, who is entirely destitute both of sense and intellect, and who being very remote from a knowledge of the intelligible world does not look to the sensible universe. For what musician is there, who on perceiving the harmony in the intelligible world, is not moved when he hears the harmony arising from sensible sounds ? Or who that is skilled in geometry and numbers, when he beholds through Ins eyes that which is commensurate, analogous and orderly, is not delighted with the view ? For those who view through the eyes the productions of art, in pictures, do not behold them in the same way as they do the originals of which they are the resemblances. But the geometrician and arithmetician, knowing in the sensible object the imitation of that which subsists in intellection, they are as it were agitated, and brought to the recollection of reality. And from this passion also, love is excited. He however, who sees beauty resplendent in the face, tends thither. But his mind must, be dull and sluggish in the extreme, and incapable of being incited to any thing else, who on seeing all the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this symmetry and great arrangement of things, and the form apparent in the stars though so remote, is not from this view mentally agitated, and does not venerate them as admirable productions of still more admirable causes. For he who is not thus affected, will neither direct his attention to the one, nor have a knowledge of the other.
XVII. If also, they are induced to hate the nature of body, because they have heard that Plato greatly blames it as being an impediment to the soul, and says, that the whole of a corporeal nature is inferior to the soul, vet separating this by the discursive energy of reason, it is requisite to survey what remains, viz. the intelligible sphere, comprehending in itself the form of the world, souls in an orderly series without bodies, imparting magnitude according to the intelligible, and producing it into interval; so that the magnitude of that which is generated, may as much as possible be adequate to the impartibilitv of the paradigm. For that which is there great in power, is here great in bulk. And whether they wish to understand this sphere as circularly moved by a divine power, which contains the beginning, middle, and end of the whole sphere, or whether they consider it as stable, and not yet governing any thing else, they wili thus be led to form a proper conception of the soul which governs this universe. They ought likewise to connect body with this soul in such a manner that soul may not be at all passive, but may impart something to the body, which it is able to receive, because it is not lawful there should be envy in the Gods. They should likewise ascribe such a power to the soulsoul of the world, as is able to render the nature of body which is not of itself beautiful, a participant of beauty as far as it is capable of being adorned; which beauty also excites divine souls. Unless, indeed, the Gnostics should say that their souls are not excited by beauty, and that they do not in a different manner survey deformed and beautiful bodies. If, however, this be the case, neither are they differently affected by base and beautiful studies, nor by beautiful disciplines and the contraries to these. Hence neither do they perceive the transcendency of the contemplative energy, nor of God himself. For on account of first natures the above-mentioned particulars subsist. If, therefore, the latter are not beautiful, neither are the former. Hence, the latter are beautiful after the former. When, however, they say that they despise the beauty which is here, they would do well to despise the beauty in boys and women, so as not to be vanquished by lust. But it is requisite to know that they ought not to boast, if they despise what is base, but if they despise what they before had acknowledged to be beautiful, and by which they were in a certain respect affected. In the next place it must be observed, that there is not the same beauty in a part and the whole, in all individuals and the universe. And in the third place, that there is so great a beauty even in sensibles, and partial natures such as daemons, as to cause us to admire the maker of these, and to believe that they are derived from him. Hence, when we are not detained by these lower beauties, but proceed from these without reviling them to supernal natures, we then proclaim that the beauty of the latter is immense. And if, indeed, we are inwardly as well as outwardly beautiful, we must say that the one accords with the other. But if we are internally bad, we ought then to acknowledge that we suffer a diminution in things of a more excellent nature. Nothing, however, that is truly beautiful externally, is internally deformed. For every thing which is externally beautiful, is so in consequence of the domination of inward beauty. But those who are said to be beautiful, and are at the same time internally deformed, have a false external beauty. And if some one should say that he has seen those who are outwardly truly beautiful, but are inwardly base, I am of opinion that he has not seen such persons, but has mistaken others for them; or if he has seen them, their inward deformity has been adventitious to them, they being naturally beautiful. For there are many impediments here which prevent our arriving at the end. But what is there to prevent the universe which is externally beautiful from being so internally? Moreover, those to whom nature has not given perfection from the beginning, are perhaps incapable of arriving at the end; so that it is possible for them to become depraved. The universe, however, was never once a child so as to be imperfect; nor does it acquire any thing new by proceeding, and which is added to its body. For whence could it acquire this ? Since it already possessed all things. Nor can any addition to the soul of it be devised. But even if some one should grant the Gnostics that there can, yet nothing evil can be added to it.
XVIII. Perhaps, however, they will say that they by their arguments cause those who believe in them, to fly far from, and hate the body, but that our doctrines detain the soul in body. But this is just as if two persons dwelling in the same house, one of them should blame the furniture and the builder of it, and yet nevertheless stay in it; but the other should not blame either of these, but assert that the builder of it had constructed it in a most artificial manner, and should wait for the time as long as he dwells in it, in which he may be liberated, and may no longer be in want of a house. The former of these, however, is thought to be the wiser of the two, and more prepared to depart, because he knows that the house is composed of inanimate stones and wood, and is very far from being a true edifice, though he is ignorant of the great difference between bearing (properly), and not bearing things of a necessary nature; since he would not be indignant if he was moderately pleased with the beauty of the stones. It is necessary, however, that those who have a body should remain in the habitations which are fabricated by a sister beneficent soul, and who possesses an abundant power of fabricating without labour. Indeed the Gnostics think fit to call the vilest men their brethren, but refuse thus to denominate the sun, and the other stars; and with an insane mouth separate the soul of the world from an alliance with ours. While, therefore, we are bad, it is not indeed lawful to conjoin us with supernal natures; but then only this can take place, when we become worthy, since we are not bodies, but souls resident in bodies, and capable of dwelling in them in such a manner, as to approximate very nearly to the mode in which the soul of the universe inhabits the whole body of the world. This however, consists in being free from impulsion, in not yielding to externally-acceding pleasures, or visible objects, and in not being disturbed at any severe occurrence. The soul of the world, therefore, is not impelled ; for there is not any thing by which it can be. And we dwelling in this region of sense, may indeed by virtue repel the percussions of external objects, so as by magnitude and strength of decision, to diminish some of the percussions, and prevent others from taking place. But when we proximately accede to that which cannot be impelled, then we shall imitate the soul of the universe, and the soul of the stars, and becoming near through similitude, we shall hasten to be one and the same with them. Then also those things which were the objects of their vision from the first, will be ours, in consequence of being well prepared for this (felicitous event) both by nature and study. The Gnostics, however, will not, by saying that they alone are able to survey (divine natures) behold more of them on this account; nor because they assert that when they die they shall entirely lay aside the body, though this is not permitted to the souls that always adorn the heavens. For they say this through ignorance of the meaning of being out of the body, and of the manner in which the whole soulsoul of the universe pays attention to that which is inanimate. It is possible therefore, not to be a lover of body, to become pure, to despise death, to have a knowledge of more excellent natures, and to make them the objects of pursuit; and also not to envy those who are able to pursue them, and always do so, as if they did not. Nor should we be affected in the same manner as those who fancy that the stars do not move, because sense announces to them that they stand still. For on this account also, the Gnostics fancy, that the nature of the stars does not survey the intelligibles that are as it were external to them, because they themselves do not see the soul of them externally subsisting.