Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it might be the COUPLEMENT of Soul and body: it might be a third and different entity formed from both. Enneads I,1,
Let us take first the COUPLEMENT of body and Soul. How could suffering, for example, be seated in this COUPLEMENT? It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation unexplained. Enneads I,1,
Another suggestion might be that all is due to an opinion or judgement: some evil seems to have befallen the man or his belongings and this conviction sets up a state of trouble in the body and in the entire Animate. But this account leaves still a question as to the source and seat of the judgement: does it belong to the Soul or to the COUPLEMENT? Besides, the judgement that evil is present does not involve the feeling of grief: the judgement might very well arise and the grief by no means follow: one may think oneself slighted and yet not be angry; and the appetite is not necessarily excited by the thought of a pleasure. We are, thus, no nearer than before to any warrant for assigning these affections to the COUPLEMENT. Enneads I,1,
Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty and, collectively, that all tendency is seated in the Appetitive-Faculty? Such a statement of the facts does not help towards making the affections common to the COUPLEMENT; they might still be seated either in the Soul alone or in the body alone. On the one hand if the appetite is to be stirred, as in the carnal passion, there must be a heating of the blood and the bile, a well-defined state of the body; on the other hand, the impulse towards The Good cannot be a joint affection, but, like certain others too, it would belong necessarily to the Soul alone. Enneads I,1,
Reason, then, does not permit us to assign all the affections to the COUPLEMENT. Enneads I,1,
But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the recipient of the Causing-Principle (i.e., the Soul) which brings life to the COUPLEMENT, this Cause must itself remain unaffected, all the experiences and expressive activities of the life being vested in the recipient, the Animate. Enneads I,1,
But this would mean that life itself belongs not to the Soul but to the COUPLEMENT; or at least the life of the COUPLEMENT would not be the life of the Soul; Sense-Perception would belong not to the Sensitive-Faculty but to the container of the faculty. Enneads I,1,
Once again, where is Sense-Perception seated? In the COUPLEMENT. Enneads I,1,
Yet how can the COUPLEMENT have sensation independently of action in the Sensitive-Faculty, the Soul left out of count and the Soul-Faculty? Enneads I,1,
The truth lies in the Consideration that the COUPLEMENT subsists by virtue of the Soul’s presence. Enneads I,1,
This, however, is not to say that the Soul gives itself as it is in itself to form either the COUPLEMENT or the body. Enneads I,1,
The first of these images is Sense-Perception seated in the COUPLEMENT; and from this downwards all the successive images are to be recognized as phases of the Soul in lessening succession from one another, until the series ends in the faculties of generation and growth and of all production of offspring – offspring efficient in its turn, in contradistinction to the engendering Soul which (has no direct action within matter but) produces by mere inclination towards what it fashions. Enneads I,1,
That Soul, then, in us, will in its nature stand apart from all that can cause any of the evils which man does or suffers; for all such evil, as we have seen, belongs only to the Animate, the COUPLEMENT. Enneads I,1,
When we have done evil it is because we have been worsted by our baser side – for a man is many – by desire or rage or some evil image: the misnamed reasoning that takes up with the false, in reality fancy, has not stayed for the judgement of the Reasoning-Principle: we have acted at the call of the less worthy, just as in matters of the sense-sphere we sometimes see falsely because we credit only the lower perception, that of the COUPLEMENT, without applying the tests of the Reasoning-Faculty. Enneads I,1,
Thus we have marked off what belongs to the COUPLEMENT from what stands by itself: the one group has the character of body and never exists apart from body, while all that has no need of body for its manifestation belongs peculiarly to Soul: and the Understanding, as passing judgement upon Sense-Impressions, is at the point of the vision of Ideal-Forms, seeing them as it were with an answering sensation (i.e, with consciousness) this last is at any rate true of the Understanding in the Veritable Soul. For Understanding, the true, is the Act of the Intellections: in many of its manifestations it is the assimilation and reconciliation of the outer to the inner. Enneads I,1,
But it has been observed that the COUPLEMENT, too – especially before our emancipation – is a member of this total We, and in fact what the body experiences we say We experience. This then covers two distinct notions; sometimes it includes the brute-part, sometimes it transcends the brute. The body is brute touched to life; the true man is the other, going pure of the body, natively endowed with the virtues which belong to the Intellectual-Activity, virtues whose seat is the Separate Soul, the Soul which even in its dwelling here may be kept apart. (This Soul constitutes the human being) for when it has wholly withdrawn, that other Soul which is a radiation (or emanation) from it withdraws also, drawn after it. Enneads I,1,
Those virtues, on the other hand, which spring not from contemplative wisdom but from custom or practical discipline belong to the COUPLEMENT: to the COUPLEMENT, too, belong the vices; they are its repugnances, desires, sympathies. Enneads I,1,
In childhood the main activity is in the COUPLEMENT and there is but little irradiation from the higher principles of our being: but when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme; they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point. Enneads I,1,
For man, and especially the Sage, is not the COUPLEMENT of soul and body: the proof is that man can be disengaged from the body and disdain its nominal goods. Enneads I,4,
In a word, life in the body is of itself an evil but the Soul enters its Good through Virtue, not living the life of the COUPLEMENT but holding itself apart, even here. Enneads I,7,
But, perhaps, this is treating too summarily a matter which demands minute investigation. It might be doubted whether that recollection, that memory, really belongs to the highest soul and not rather to another, a dimmer, or even to the COUPLEMENT, the Living-Being. And if to that dimmer soul, when and how has it come to be present; if to the COUPLEMENT, again when and how? We are driven thus to enquire into these several points: in which of the constituents of our nature is memory vested – the question with which we started – if in the soul, then in what power or part; if in the Animate or COUPLEMENT – which has been supposed, similarly to be the seat of sensation – then by what mode it is present, and how we are to define the COUPLEMENT; finally whether sensation and intellectual acts may be ascribed to one and the same agent, or imply two distinct principles. Enneads IV,3,
Now if sensations of the active order depend upon the COUPLEMENT of soul and body, sensation must be of that double nature. Hence it is classed as one of the shared acts: the soul, in the feeling, may be compared to the workman in such operations as boring or weaving, the body to the tool employed: the body is passive and menial; the soul is active, reading such impressions as are made upon the body or discerned by means of the body, perhaps entertaining only a judgement formed as the result of the bodily experiences. Enneads IV,3,
In such a process it is at once clear that the sensation is a shared task; but the memory is not thus made over to the COUPLEMENT, since the soul has from the first taken over the impression, either to retain or to reject. Enneads IV,3,
It might be ventured that memory, no less than sensation, is a function of the COUPLEMENT, on the ground that bodily constitution determines our memories good or bad; but the answer would come that, whether the body happens or not to be a hindrance, the act of remembering would still be an act of the soul. And in the case of matters learned (and not merely felt, as corporeal experiences), how can we think of the COUPLEMENT of soul and body as the remembering principle? Here, surely, it must be soul alone? We may be told that the living-being is a COUPLEMENT in the sense of something entirely distinct formed from the two elements (so that it might have memory though neither soul nor body had it). But, to begin with, it is absurd to class the living-being as neither body nor soul; these two things cannot so change as to make a distinct third, nor can they blend so utterly that the soul shall become a mere faculty of the animate whole. And, further, supposing they could so blend, memory would still be due to the soul just as in honey-wine all the sweetness will be due to the honey. Enneads IV,3,
Equally the Substantial Form is never a predicate, since it never acts as a modification of anything. Form is not an attribute of Matter hence, is not predicable of Matter it is simply a constituent of the COUPLEMENT. On the other hand, the Form of a man is not different from the man himself (and so does not “modify” the COUPLEMENT). Enneads VI,3,
It may be claimed as a common element in Matter, Form and the COUPLEMENT that they are all substrates. But the mode in which Matter is the substrate of Form is different from that in which Form and the COUPLEMENT are substrates of their modifications. Enneads VI,3,
The truth is, however, that the “Substance” of our enquiry may be apprehended in directly opposite ways: it may be determined by one of the properties we have been discussing, by more than one, by all at once, according as they answer to the notions of Matter, Form and the COUPLEMENT. Enneads VI,3,
Do we infer that fire and water are not Substance? They certainly are not Substance because they are visible. Why, then? Because they possess Matter? No. Or Form? No. Nor because they involve a COUPLEMENT of Matter and Form. Then why are they Substance? By existing. But does not Quantity exist, and Quality? This anomaly is to be explained by an equivocation in the term “existence.” Enneads VI,3,
But once concede that Form is higher in the scale of Being than Matter, and Matter can no longer be regarded as a common ground of both, nor Substance as a genus embracing Matter, Form and the COUPLEMENT. True, these will have many common properties, to which we have already referred, but their being (or existence) will nonetheless be different. When a higher being comes into contact with a lower, the lower, though first in the natural order, is yet posterior in the scale of Reality: consequently, if Being does not belong in equal degrees to Matter, to Form and to the COUPLEMENT, Substance can no longer be common to all three in the sense of being their genus: to their posteriors it will bear a still different relation, serving them as a common base by being bound up with all alike. Substance, thus, resembles life, dim here, clearer there, or portraits of which one is an outline, another more minutely worked. By measuring Being by its dim manifestation and neglecting a fuller revelation elsewhere, we may come to regard this dim existence as a common ground. Enneads VI,3,