qualities

But, we ask, how, possibly, can these affections pass from body to Soul? Body may communicate QUALITIES or conditions to another body: but – body to Soul? Something happens to A; does that make it happen to B? As long as we have agent and instrument, there are two distinct entities; if the Soul uses the body it is separate from it. Enneads I,1,3

Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these virtues of the social order but by those greater QUALITIES known by the same general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all? It is against reason, utterly to deny Likeness by these while admitting it by the greater: tradition at least recognizes certain men of the civic excellence as divine, and we must believe that these too had in some sort attained Likeness: on both levels there is virtue for us, though not the same virtue. Enneads I,2,1

First, then, let us examine those good QUALITIES by which we hold Likeness comes, and seek to establish what is this thing which, as we possess it, in transcription, is virtue but as the Supreme possesses it, is in the nature of an exemplar or archetype and is not virtue. Enneads I,2,2

To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: “Likeness to God,” he says, “is a flight from this world’s ways and things”: in dealing with the QUALITIES of good citizenship he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguishing word civic: and elsewhere he declares all the virtues without exception to be purifications. Enneads I,2,3

Thus we have indicated the dominant note in the life of the Sage; but whether his possession of the minor virtues be actual as well as potential, whether even the greater are in Act in him or yield to QUALITIES higher still, must be decided afresh in each several case. Enneads I,2,7

All these noble QUALITIES are to be reverenced and loved, no doubt, but what entitles them to be called beautiful? They exist: they manifest themselves to us: anyone that sees them must admit that they have reality of Being; and is not Real-Being, really beautiful? But we have not yet shown by what property in them they have wrought the Soul to loveliness: what is this grace, this splendour as of Light, resting upon all the virtues? Let us take the contrary, the ugliness of the Soul, and set that against its beauty: to understand, at once, what this ugliness is and how it comes to appear in the Soul will certainly open our way before us. Enneads I,6,5

There must, then, be some Undetermination-Absolute, some Absolute Formlessness; all the QUALITIES cited as characterizing the Nature of Evil must be summed under an Absolute Evil; and every evil thing outside of this must either contain this Absolute by saturation or have taken the character of evil and become a cause of evil by consecration to this Absolute. Enneads I,8,3

But if Matter is devoid of quality how can it be evil? It is described as being devoid of quality in the sense only that it does not essentially possess any of the QUALITIES which it admits and which enter into it as into a substratum. No one says that it has no nature; and if it has any nature at all, why may not that nature be evil though not in the sense of quality? Quality qualifies something not itself: it is therefore an accidental; it resides in some other object. Matter does not exist in some other object but is the substratum in which the accidental resides. Matter, then, is said to be devoid of Quality in that it does not in itself possess this thing which is by nature an accidental. If, moreover, Quality itself be devoid of Quality, how can Matter, which is the unqualified, be said to have it? Thus, it is quite correct to say at once that Matter is without Quality and that it is evil: it is Evil not in the sense of having Quality but, precisely, in not having it; give it Quality and in its very Evil it would almost be a Form, whereas in Truth it is a Kind contrary to Form. Enneads I,8,10

This borrowing, however, does not mean that the one thing taking-up from the other enters into a composition, becoming an element in a total of both: it is simply a consequence of the kosmic fellowship; the participant retains its own being and takes over not the thing itself but some property of the thing, not air but air’s yielding softness, not fire but fire’s incandescence: mixing is another process, a complete surrender with a resultant compound not, as in this case, earth – remaining earth, the solidity and density we know – with something of fire’s QUALITIES superadded. Enneads II,1,7

The belief is that the planets in their courses actually produce not merely such conditions as poverty, wealth, health and sickness but even ugliness and beauty and, gravest of all, vices and virtue and the very acts that spring from these QUALITIES, the definite doings of each moment of virtue or vice. We are to suppose the stars to be annoyed with men – and upon matters in which men, moulded to what they are by the stars themselves, can surely do them no wrong. Enneads II,3,1

Clay, for example, is matter to the potter but is not Matter pure and simple. Nothing of this sort is our object: we are seeking the stuff which underlies all alike. We must therefore refuse to it all that we find in things of sense – not merely such attributes as colour, heat or cold, but weight or weightlessness, thickness or thinness, shape and therefore magnitude; though notice that to be present within magnitude and shape is very different from possessing these QUALITIES. Enneads II,4,8

If we reject it, we must by the same reasoning reject QUALITIES and mass: for quality, or mass, or any such entity, taken by itself apart, might be said not to exist. But these do exist, though in an obscure existence: there is much less ground for rejecting Matter, however it lurk, discerned by none of the senses. Enneads II,4,12

But this notion reduces all existence to qualified things or QUALITIES: Quantity itself becomes a Quality and so does even Existence. Now this cannot be: if such things as Quantity and Existence are qualified, they are, by that very fact, not QUALITIES: Quality is an addition to them; we must not commit the absurdity of giving the name Quality to something distinguishable from Quality, something therefore that is not Quality. Enneads II,4,13

And are the distinct Qualities in the Authentic Realm to be explained in the same way? Are they differing Realities centred in one Reality or gathered round Being – differences which constitute Realities distinct from each other within the common fact of Reality? This is sound enough; but it does not apply to all the QUALITIES of this sphere, some of which, no doubt, are differentiations of Reality – such as the quality of two-footedness or four-footedness – but others are not such differentiations of Reality and, because they are not so, must be called QUALITIES and nothing more. Enneads II,6,1

Thus the same entities are represented at once as being not QUALITIES but constituents of Reality and not constituents but QUALITIES. Enneads II,6,1

And this is the starting-point of an error we constantly make: in our enquiries into things we let realities escape us and fasten on what is mere quality. Thus fire is not the thing we so name from the observation of certain QUALITIES present; fire is a Reality (not a combination of material phenomena); the phenomena observed here and leading us to name fire call us away from the authentic thing; a quality is erected into the very matter of definition – a procedure, however, reasonable enough in regard to things of the realm of sense which are in no case realities but accidents of Reality. Enneads II,6,1

Rejecting its warmth, its glow, its lightness – all which certainly do seem to be QUALITIES – and its resistance, there is left only its extension by three dimensions: in other words, its Matter is its Reality. Enneads II,6,2

And the outcome of this Reason-Principle entering into the underlying Matter, what is that? Certainly not what is seen and burns, for that is the something in which these QUALITIES inhere. Enneads II,6,2

Such completions of a Reality cannot be called QUALITIES since they are its Acts emanating from the Reason-Principles and from the essential powers. A quality is something persistently outside Reality; it cannot appear as Reality in one place after having figured in another as quality; its function is to bring in the something more after the Reality is established, such additions as virtue, vice, ugliness, beauty, health, a certain shape. On this last, however, it may be remarked that triangularity and quadrangularity are not in themselves QUALITIES, but there is quality when a thing is triangular by having been brought to that shape; the quality is not the triangularity but the patterning to it. The case is the same with the arts and avocations. Enneads II,6,2

The Whiteness, therefore, in a human being is, clearly, to be classed not as a quality but as an activity – the act of a power which can make white; and similarly what we think of as QUALITIES in the Intellectual Realm should be known as activities; they are activities which to our minds take the appearance of quality from the fact that, differing in character among themselves, each of them is a particularity which, so to speak, distinguishes those Realities from each other. Enneads II,6,3

All, then, that is accident and not Act; all but what is Idea-form of the Reality; all that merely confers pattern; all this is Quality: QUALITIES are characteristics and modes other than those constituting the substratum of a thing. Enneads II,6,3

But the Archetypes of all such QUALITIES, the foundation in which they exist primarily, these are Activities of the Intellectual Beings. Enneads II,6,3

But there are those who, admitting coalescence, confine it to the QUALITIES: to them the material substances of two bodies are in contact merely, but in this contact of the matter they find footing for the QUALITIES of each. Enneads II,7,1

When there is an increase in the space occupied, nothing refutes the explanation – however unsatisfying – that this is a necessary consequence of two bodies bringing to a common stock their magnitude equally with their other attributes: size is as permanent as any other property; and, exactly as from the blending of QUALITIES there results a new form of thing, the combination of the two, so we find a new magnitude; the blending gives us a magnitude representing each of the two. But at this point the others will answer, “If you mean that substance lies side by side with substance and mass with mass, each carrying its quantum of magnitude, you are at one with us: if there were complete transfusion, one substance sinking its original magnitude in the other, we would have no longer the case of two lines joined end to end by their terminal points and thus producing an increased extension; we would have line superimposed upon line with, therefore, no increase.” Enneads II,7,1

When water runs through wool or when papyrus-pulp gives up its moisture why is not the moist content expressed to the very last drop or even, without question of outflow, how can we possibly think that in a mixture the relation of matter with matter, mass with mass, is contact and that only the QUALITIES are fused? The pulp is not merely in touch with water outside it or even in its pores; it is wet through and through so that every particle of its matter is drenched in that quality. Now if the matter is soaked all through with the quality, then the water is everywhere in the pulp. Enneads II,7,2

But let it be understood how we came to say that body passing through and through another body must produce disintegration, while we make QUALITIES pervade their substances without producing disintegration: the bodilessness of QUALITIES is the reason. Matter, too, is bodiless: it may, then, be supposed that as Matter pervades everything so the bodiless QUALITIES associated with it – as long as they are few – have the power of penetration without disintegration. Anything solid would be stopped either in virtue of the fact that a solid has the precise quality which forbids it to penetrate or in that the mere coexistence of too many QUALITIES in Matter (constitutes density and so) produces the same inhibition. Enneads II,7,2

If, then, what we call a dense body is so by reason of the presence of many QUALITIES, that plenitude of QUALITIES will be the cause (of the inhibition). Enneads II,7,2

This would mean that the QUALITIES of two substances do not bring about the mixing by merely being QUALITIES but by being apt to mixture; nor does Matter refuse to enter into a mixing as Matter but as being associated with a quality repugnant to mixture; and this all the more since it has no magnitude of its own but only does not reject magnitude. Enneads II,7,2

We have thus covered our main ground, but since corporeity has been mentioned, we must consider its nature: is it the conjunction of all the QUALITIES or is it an Idea, or Reason-Principle, whose presence in Matter constitutes a body? Now if body is the compound, the thing made up of all the required QUALITIES plus Matter, then corporeity is nothing more than their conjunction. Enneads II,7,3

And if it is a Reason-Principle, one whose incoming constitutes the body, then clearly this Principle contains embraced within itself all the QUALITIES. If this Reason-Principle is to be no mere principle of definition exhibiting the nature of a thing but a veritable Reason constituting the thing, then it cannot itself contain Matter but must encircle Matter, and by being present to Matter elaborate the body: thus the body will be Matter associated with an indwelling Reason-Principle which will be in itself immaterial, pure Idea, even though irremoveably attached to the body. It is not to be confounded with that other Principle in man – treated elsewhere – which dwells in the Intellectual World by right of being itself an Intellectual Principle. Enneads II,7,3

But the manner and motive of their teaching have been sufficiently exhibited; and this was the main purpose of the discussion here upon their Spirit-Powers. I leave it to yourselves to read the books and examine the rest of the doctrine: you will note all through how our form of philosophy inculcates simplicity of character and honest thinking in addition to all other good QUALITIES, how it cultivates reverence and not arrogant self-assertion, how its boldness is balanced by reason, by careful proof, by cautious progression, by the utmost circumspection – and you will compare those other systems to one proceeding by this method. You will find that the tenets of their school have been huddled together under a very different plan: they do not deserve any further examination here. Enneads II,9,14

The Reason-Principle within a seed contains all the parts and QUALITIES concentrated in identity; there is no distinction, no jarring, no internal hindering; then there comes a pushing out into bulk, part rises in distinction with part, and at once the members of the organism stand in each other’s way and begin to wear each other down. Enneads III,2,2

A further evidence is in our speaking of a fire being burned out, when it has passed over into another element; we do not say that the Matter has been burned out: in other words, modification affects what is subject to dissolution; the acceptance of modification is the path towards dissolution; susceptibility to modification and susceptibility to dissolution go necessarily together. But Matter can never be dissolved. What into? By what process? Still: Matter harbours heat, cold, QUALITIES beyond all count; by these it is differentiated; it holds them as if they were of its very substance and they blend within it – since no quality is found isolated to itself – Matter lies there as the meeting ground of all these QUALITIES with their changes as they act and react in the blend: how, then, can it fail to be modified in keeping? The only escape would be to declare Matter utterly and for ever apart from the QUALITIES it exhibits; but the very notion of Substance implies that any and every thing present in it has some action upon it. Enneads III,6,8

Mirrors and transparent objects, even more, offer a close parallel; they are quite unaffected by what is seen in or through them: material things are reflections, and the Matter on which they appear is further from being affected than is a mirror. Heat and cold are present in Matter, but the Matter itself suffers no change of temperature: growing hot and growing cold have to do only with quality; a quality enters and brings the impassible Substance under a new state – though, by the way, research into nature may show that cold is nothing positive but an absence, a mere negation. The QUALITIES come together into Matter, but in most cases they can have no action upon each other; certainly there can be none between those of unlike scope: what effect, for example, could fragrance have on sweetness or the colour-quality on the quality of form, any quality on another of some unrelated order? The illustration of the mirror may well indicate to us that a given substratum may contain something quite distinct from itself – even something standing to it as a direct contrary – and yet remain entirely unaffected by what is thus present to it or merged into it. Enneads III,6,9

We may take it, then, that while all the QUALITIES and entities that appear upon Matter group to produce each the effect belonging to its nature, yet Matter itself remains immune, even more definitely immune than any of those QUALITIES entering into it which, not being contraries, are not affected by each other. Enneads III,6,9

It is in fact strange at sight that Matter should remain itself intact, unaffected by Ideal-forms present within it, especially seeing that these are affected by each other. It is surprising, too, that the entrant Forms should regularly expel preceding shapes and QUALITIES, and that the modification (which cannot touch Matter) should affect what is a compound (of Idea with Matter) and this, again, not a haphazard but precisely where there is need of the incoming or outgoing of some certain Ideal-form, the compound being deficient through the absence of a particular principle whose presence will complete it. Enneads III,6,11

In beings of soul and body, the affection occurs in the body, modified according to the QUALITIES and powers presiding at the act of change: in all such dissolution of constituent parts, in the new combinations, in all variation from the original structure, the affection is bodily, the Soul or Mind having no more than an accompanying knowledge of the more drastic changes, or perhaps not even that. (Body is modified: Mind knows) but the Matter concerned remains unaffected; heat enters, cold leaves it, and it is unchanged because neither Principle is associated with it as friend or enemy. Enneads III,6,19

So far we have the primarily indivisible – supreme among the Intellectual and Authentically Existent – and we have its contrary, the Kind definitely divisible in things of sense; but there is also another Kind, of earlier rank than the sensible yet near to it and resident within it – an order, not, like body, primarily a thing of part, but becoming so upon incorporation. The bodies are separate, and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a permanent identity; we may think of colour, QUALITIES of all kinds, some particular shape, which can be present in many unrelated objects at the one moment, each entire and yet with no community of experience among the various manifestations. In the case of such ideal-forms we may affirm complete partibility. Enneads IV,2,1

This is the deeper meaning of the profound passage (in the Timaeus), where we read “By blending the impartible, eternally unchanging essence with that in division among bodies, he produced a third form of essence partaking of both QUALITIES.” Enneads IV,2,2

As for our souls being entrained in the kosmic circuit, and taking character and condition thence; this is no indication that they are parts: soul-nature may very well take some tincture from even the QUALITIES of place, from water and from air; residence in this city or in that, and the varying make-up of the body may have their influence (upon our human souls which, yet, are no parts of place or of body). Enneads IV,3,7

But Zeus – ordering all, governor, guardian and disposer, possessor for ever of the kingly soul and the kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding over all things as they come, administering all under plan and system, unfolding the periods of the kosmos, many of which stand already accomplished – would it not seem inevitable that, in this multiplicity of concern, Zeus should have memory of all the periods, their number and their differing QUALITIES? Contriving the future, co-ordinating, calculating for what is to be, must he not surely be the chief of all in remembering, as he is chief in producing? Even this matter of Zeus’ memory of the kosmic periods is difficult; it is a question of their being numbered, and of his knowledge of their number. A determined number would mean that the All had a beginning in time (which is not so); if the periods are unlimited, Zeus cannot know the number of his works. Enneads IV,4,9

Still: the shape is merely a configuration, like the lie of the hands clenched or spread; the colour is no such accidental but is more like, for example, sweetness: when a material substance breaks up, the sweetness of what was sweet in it, and the fragrance of what was fragrant, may very well not be annihilated, but enter into some other substance, passing unobserved there because the new habitat is not such that the entrant QUALITIES now offer anything solid to perception. Enneads IV,4,29

May we not think that, similarly, the light belonging to bodies that have been dissolved remains in being while the solid total, made up of all that is characteristic, disappears? It might be said that the seeing is merely the sequel to some law (of our own nature), so that what we call QUALITIES do not actually exist in the substances. Enneads IV,4,29

But this is to make the QUALITIES indestructible and not dependent upon the composition of the body; it would no longer be the Reason-Principles within the sperm that produce, for instance, the colours of a bird’s variegated plumage; these principles would merely blend and place them, or if they produced them would draw also on the full store of colours in the sky, producing in the sense, mainly, of showing in the formed bodies something very different from what appears in the heavens. Enneads IV,4,29

We take the question back to the initial act of causation. It cannot be admitted that either heat or cold and the like what are known as the primal QUALITIES of the elements – or any admixture of these QUALITIES, should be the first causes we are seeking; equally inacceptable, that while the sun’s action is all by heat, there is another member of the Circuit operating wholly by cold – incongruous in the heavens and in a fiery body – nor can we think of some other star operating by liquid fire. Enneads IV,4,31

Love is given in Nature; the QUALITIES inducing love induce mutual approach: hence there has arisen an art of magic love-drawing whose practitioners, by the force of contact implant in others a new temperament, one favouring union as being informed with love; they knit soul to soul as they might train two separate trees towards each other. The magician too draws on these patterns of power, and by ranging himself also into the pattern is able tranquilly to possess himself of these forces with whose nature and purpose he has become identified. Supposing the mage to stand outside the All, his evocations and invocations would no longer avail to draw up or to call down; but as things are he operates from no outside standground, he pulls knowing the pull of everything towards any other thing in the living system. Enneads IV,4,40

If by the presence of such a body, then there will be vision though there be no intervenient; if the intervenient is the sole attractive agent, then we are forced to think of the visible object as being a Kind utterly without energy, performing no act. But so inactive a body cannot be: touch tells us that, for it does not merely announce that something is by and is touched: it is acted upon by the object so that it reports distinguishing QUALITIES in it, QUALITIES so effective that even at a distance touch itself would register them but for the accidental that it demands proximity. Enneads IV,5,4

Now if, thus, it enters into other substances from something gleaming, could it exist in the absence of its container? There is a distinction to be made: if it is a quality, some quality of some substance, then light, equally with other QUALITIES, will need a body in which to lodge: if, on the contrary, it is an activity rising from something else, we can surely conceive it existing, though there be no neighbouring body but, if that is possible, a blank void which it will overleap and so appear on the further side: it is powerful, and may very well pass over unhelped. If it were of a nature to fall, nothing would keep it up, certainly not the air or anything that takes its light; there is no reason why they should draw the light from its source and speed it onwards. Enneads IV,5,6

Obviously, if the sympathetic relationship depends upon the fact that percipients and things perceived are all members of one living being, no acts of perception could take place: that far body could be known only if it were a member of this living universe of ours – which condition being met, it certainly would be. But what if, without being thus in membership, it were a corporeal entity, exhibiting light and colour and the QUALITIES by which we perceive things, and belonging to the same ideal category as the organ of vision? If our supposition (of perception by sympathy) is true, there would still be no perception – though we may be told that the hypothesis is clearly untenable since there is absurdity in supposing that sight can fail in grasping an illuminated object lying before it, and that the other senses in the presence of their particular objects remain unresponsive. Enneads IV,5,8

All bodies are in ceaseless process of dissolution; how can the kosmos be made over to any one of them without being turned into a senseless haphazard drift? This pneuma – orderless except under soul – how can it contain order, reason, intelligence? But: given soul, all these material things become its collaborators towards the coherence of the kosmos and of every living being, all the QUALITIES of all the separate objects converging to the purposes of the universe: failing soul in the things of the universe, they could not even exist, much less play their ordered parts. Enneads IV,7,3

Body is either warm or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, and so on through all the QUALITIES by which one is different from another; and, again, if a body is warm it diffuses only warmth, if cold it can only chill, if light its presence tells against the total weight which if heavy it increases; black, it darkens; white, it lightens; fire has not the property of chilling or a cold body that of warming. Enneads IV,7,4

Again, there is movement: all bodily movement is uniform; failing an incorporeal soul, how account for diversity of movement? Predilections, reasons, they will say; that is all very well, but these already contain that variety and therefore cannot belong to body which is one and simplex, and, besides, is not participant in reason – that is, not in the sense here meant, but only as it is influenced by some principle which confers upon it the QUALITIES of, for instance, being warm or cold. Enneads IV,7,5

In transferring to bodies the powers of the unembodied, this school leaves nothing to that higher order. And yet that it is precisely in virtue of bodiless powers that bodies possess their efficiency is clear from certain reflections: It will be admitted that quality and quantity are two different things, that body is always a thing of quantity but not always a thing of quality: matter is not qualified. This admitted, it will not be denied that quality, being a different thing from quantity, is a different thing from body. Obviously quality could not be body when it has not quantity as all body must; and, again, as we have said, body, any thing of mass, on being reduced to fragments, ceases to be what it was, but the quality it possessed remains intact in every particle – for instance the sweetness of honey is still sweetness in each speck – this shows that sweetness and all other QUALITIES are not body. Enneads IV,7,8

Further: if the powers in question were bodies, then necessarily the stronger powers would be large masses and those less efficient small masses: but if there are large masses with small while not a few of the smaller masses manifest great powers, then the efficiency must be vested in something other than magnitude; efficacy, thus, belongs to non-magnitude. Again; Matter, they tell us, remains unchanged as long as it is body, but produces variety upon accepting QUALITIES; is not this proof enough that the entrants (with whose arrival the changes happen) are Reason-Principles and not of the bodily order? They must not remind us that when pneuma and blood are no longer present, animals die: these are necessary no doubt to life, but so are many other things of which none could possibly be soul: and neither pneuma nor blood is present throughout the entire being; but soul is. Enneads IV,7,8

Hence, too, any one of us that exhibits these QUALITIES will differ but little as far as soul is concerned from the Supernals; he will be less than they only to the extent in which the soul is, in him, associated with body. Enneads IV,7,10

Thus we rob it of its very being as The Absolute Good if we ascribe anything to it, existence or intellect or goodness. The only way is to make every denial and no assertion, to feign no quality or content there but to permit only the “It is” in which we pretend to no affirmation of non-existent attribute: there is an ignorant praise which, missing the true description, drags in QUALITIES beneath the real worth and so abases; philosophy must guard against attaching to the Supreme what is later and lower: moving above all that order, it is the cause and source of all these, and is none of them. Enneads V,5,13

All, then, that is present in the sense realm as Idea comes from the Supreme. But what is not present as Idea, does not. Thus of things conflicting with nature, none is There: the inartistic is not contained in the arts; lameness is not in the seed; for a lame leg is either inborn through some thwarting of the Reason-principle or is a marring of the achieved form by accident. To that Intellectual Kosmos belong QUALITIES, accordant with Nature, and quantities; number and mass; origins and conditions; all actions and experiences not against nature; movement and repose, both the universals and the particulars: but There time is replaced by eternity and space by its intellectual equivalent, mutual inclusiveness. Enneads V,9,10

Perhaps, however, QUALITIES are conditioned by powers which are posterior to the substances as such (and so do not interfere with their essential activities). Boxing, for example, is not a power of man qua man; reasoning is: therefore reasoning, on this hypothesis, is not quality but a natural possession of the mature human being; it therefore is called a quality only by analogy. Thus, Quality is a power which adds the property of being qualia to substances already existent. Enneads VI,1,10

The differences distinguishing substances from each other are called QUALITIES only by analogy; they are, more strictly, Acts and Reason-Principles, or parts of Reason-Principles, and though they may appear merely to qualify the substance, they in fact indicate its essence. Enneads VI,1,10

But how can they all be powers? Beauty or health of soul or body, very well: but surely not ugliness, disease, weakness, incapacity. In a word, is powerlessness a power? It may be urged that these are QUALITIES in so far as qualia are also named after them: but may not the qualia be so called by analogy, and not in the strict sense of the single principle? Not only may the term be understood in the four ways (of Aristotle), but each of the four may have at least a twofold significance. Enneads VI,1,10

In the first place, Quality is not merely a question of action and passion, involving a simple distinction between the potentially active (quality) and the passive: health, disposition and habit, disease, strength and weakness are also classed as QUALITIES. It follows that the common ground is not power, but something we have still to seek. Enneads VI,1,10

Again, not all QUALITIES can be regarded as Reason-Principles: chronic disease cannot be a Reason-Principle. Perhaps, however, we must speak in such cases of privations, restricting the term “Quantities” to Ideal-Forms and powers. Thus we shall have, not a single genus, but reference only to the unity of a category. Knowledge will be regarded as a Form and a power, ignorance as a privation and powerlessness. Enneads VI,1,10

Even beauty would seem to have a power of its own. Does this apply to triangularity? Perhaps, after all, it is not a power we must consider, but a disposition. Thus, QUALITIES will be determined by the forms and characteristics of the object qualified: their common element, then, will be Form and ideal type, imposed upon Substance and posterior to it. Enneads VI,1,10

But it is not necessary that all QUALITIES involve a Reason-Principle; it suffices that over and above the various kinds of disposition there exist a common element distinct from Substance, and it is what comes after the substance that constitutes Quality in an object. Enneads VI,1,10

But if these considerations are sound, why has Quality more than one species? What is the ground for distinguishing between habit and disposition, seeing that no differentia of Quality is involved in permanence and non-permanence? A disposition of any kind is sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence is a mere external addition. It might however be urged that dispositions are but incomplete “forms” – if the term may pass – habits being complete ones. But incomplete, they are not QUALITIES; if already QUALITIES, the permanence is an external addition. Enneads VI,1,11

How do physical powers form a distinct species? If they are classed as QUALITIES in virtue of being powers, power, we have seen, is not a necessary concomitant of QUALITIES. If, however, we hold that the natural boxer owes his quality to a particular disposition, power is something added and does not contribute to the quality, since power is found in habits also. Enneads VI,1,11

Another point: why is natural ability to be distinguished from that acquired by learning? Surely, if both are QUALITIES, they cannot be differentiae of Quality: gained by practice or given in nature, it is the same ability; the differentia will be external to Quality; it cannot be deduced from the Ideal Form of boxing. Whether some QUALITIES as distinguished from others are derived from experience is immaterial; the source of the quality makes no difference – none, I mean, pointing to variations and differences of Quality. Enneads VI,1,11

A further question would seem to be involved: If certain QUALITIES are derived from experience but here is a discrepancy in the manner and source of the experience, how are they to be included in the same species? And again, if some create the experience, others are created by it, the term Quality as applied to both classes will be equivocal. Enneads VI,1,11

Rough and smooth, tenuous and dense may rightly be classed as QUALITIES. It is true that they are not determined by distances and approximations, or in general by even or uneven dispositions, of parts; though, were they so determined, they might well even then be QUALITIES. Enneads VI,1,11

If then we do not propose to divide Quality in this (fourfold) manner, what basis of division have we? We must examine whether QUALITIES may not prove to be divisible on the principle that some belong to the body and others to the soul. Those of the body would be subdivided according to the senses, some being attributed to sight, others to hearing and taste, others to smell and touch. Those of the soul would presumably be allotted to appetite, emotion, reason; though, again, they may be distinguished by the differences of the activities they condition, in so far as activities are engendered by these QUALITIES; or according as they are beneficial or injurious, the benefits and injuries being duly classified. This last is applicable also to the classification of bodily QUALITIES, which also produce differences of benefit and injury: these differences must be regarded as distinctively qualitative; for either the benefit and injury are held to be derived from Quality and the quale, or else some other explanation must be found for them. Enneads VI,1,12

It may however be urged that while the possession of that character makes it a quale, it is a relative in so far as it directs upon an external object the power indicated by its name. Why, then, is not “boxer” a relative, and “boxing” as well? Boxing is entirely related to an external object; its whole theory pre-supposes this external. And in the case of the other arts – or most of them – investigation would probably warrant the assertion that in so far as they affect the soul they are QUALITIES, while in so far as they look outward they are active and as being directed to an external object are relatives. They are relatives in the other sense also that they are thought of as habits. Enneads VI,1,12

But what is the function of the active in connection with those non-living powers which we have classed as QUALITIES? Doubtless to recruit any object it encounters, making the object a participant in its content. Enneads VI,1,12

This is the place for enquiring also whether the QUALITIES of the Sensible and Intellectual realms can be included under one head – a question intended only for those who ascribe QUALITIES to the higher realm as well as the lower. And even if Ideal Forms of QUALITIES are not posited, yet once the term “habit” is used in reference to Intellect, the question arises whether there is anything common to that habit and the habit we know in the lower. Enneads VI,1,12

Qualities must be for this school distinct from Substrates. This in fact they acknowledge by counting them as the second category. If then they form a distinct category, they must be simplex; that is to say they are not composite; that is to say that as QUALITIES, pure and simple, they are devoid of Matter: hence they are bodiless and active, since Matter is their substrate – a relation of passivity. Enneads VI,1,29

If however they hold Qualities to be composite, that is a strange classification which first contrasts simple and composite QUALITIES, then proceeds to include them in one genus, and finally includes one of the two species (simple) in the other (composite); it is like dividing knowledge into two species, the first comprising grammatical knowledge, the second made up of grammatical and other knowledge. Enneads VI,1,29

Now in the case of composite substances – those constituted from diverse elements – number and QUALITIES provide a means of differentiation: the QUALITIES may be detached from the common core around which they are found to group themselves. But in the primary genera there is no distinction to be drawn between simples and composites; the difference is between simples and those entities which complete not a particular substance but Substance as such. A particular substance may very well receive completion from Quality, for though it already has Substance before the accession of Quality, its particular character is external to Substance. But in Substance itself all the elements are substantial. Enneads VI,2,14

Nevertheless, we ventured to assert elsewhere that while the complements of Substance are only by analogy called QUALITIES, yet accessions of external origin and subsequent to Substance are really QUALITIES; that, further, the properties which inhere in substances are their activities (Acts), while those which are subsequent are merely modifications (or Passions): we now affirm that the attributes of the particular substance are never complementary to Substance (as such); an accession of Substance does not come to the substance of man qua man; he is, on the contrary, Substance in a higher degree before he arrives at differentiation, just as he is already “living being” before he passes into the rational species. Enneads VI,2,14

But perhaps we may think Substance validly defined as that which is not predicated of anything else. White and black are predicated of an object having one or other of these QUALITIES; double presupposes something distinct from itself – we refer not to the half, but to the length of wood of which doubleness is affirmed. father qua father is a predicate; knowledge is predicated of the subject in whom the knowledge exists; space is the limit of something, time the measure of something. Fire, on the other hand, is predicated of nothing; wood as such is predicated of nothing; and so with man, Socrates, and the composite substance in general. Enneads VI,3,4

What then can this “part” be? Matter may be suggested. But are we actually to maintain that the particular sensible substance consists of a conglomeration of QUALITIES and Matter, while Sensible Substance as a whole is merely the sum of these coagulations in the uniform Matter, each one separately forming a quale or a quantum or else a thing of many QUALITIES? Is it true to say that everything whose absence leaves subsistence incomplete is a part of the particular substance, while all that is accidental to the substance already existent takes independent rank and is not submerged in the mixture which constitutes this so-called substance? I decline to allow that whatever combines in this way with anything else is Substance if it helps to produce a single mass having quantity and quality, whereas taken by itself and divorced from this complementary function it is a quality: not everything which composes the amalgam is Substance, but only the amalgam as a whole. Enneads VI,3,8

Differentiation by form or shape is no more out of place than a division based on QUALITIES – heat, cold and the like. If it be objected that QUALITIES go to make bodies what they are, then, we reply, so do blendings, colours, shapes. Since our discussion is concerned with Sensible Substance, it is not strange that it should turn upon distinctions related to sense-perception: this Substance is not Being pure and simple, but the Sensible Being which we call the Universe. Enneads VI,3,10

We have remarked that its apparent subsistence is in fact an assemblage of Sensibles, their existence guaranteed to us by sense-perception. But since their combination is unlimited, our division must be guided by the Form-Ideas of living beings, as for example the Form-Idea of Man implanted in Body; the particular Form acts as a qualification of Body, but there is nothing unreasonable in using QUALITIES as a basis of division. Enneads VI,3,10

But the beauty in the germ, in the particular Reason-Principle – is this the same as the manifested beauty, or do they coincide only in name? Are we to assign this beauty – and the same question applies to deformity in the soul – to the Intellectual order, or to the Sensible? That beauty is different in the two spheres is by now clear. If it be embraced in Sensible Quality, then virtue must also be classed among the QUALITIES of the lower. But merely some virtues will take rank as Sensible, others as Intellectual QUALITIES. Enneads VI,3,16

It may even be doubted whether the arts, as Reason-Principles, can fairly be among Sensible QUALITIES; Reason-Principles, it is true, may reside in Matter, but “matter” for them means Soul. On the other hand, their being found in company with Matter commits them in some degree to the lower sphere. Take the case of lyrical music: it is performed upon strings; melody, which may be termed a part of the art, is sensuous sound – though, perhaps, we should speak here not of parts but of manifestations (Acts): yet, called manifestations, they are nonetheless sensuous. The beauty inherent in body is similarly bodiless; but we have assigned it to the order of things bound up with body and subordinate to it. Enneads VI,3,16

This procedure, if approved, will entail a distinction between psychic and bodily QUALITIES, the latter belonging specifically to body. Enneads VI,3,17

If we decide to refer all souls to the higher, we are still at liberty to perform for Sensible QUALITIES a division founded upon the senses themselves – the eyes, the ears, touch, taste, smell; and if we are to look for further differences, colours may be subdivided according to varieties of vision, sounds according to varieties of hearing, and so with the other senses: sounds may also be classified qualitatively as sweet, harsh, soft. Enneads VI,3,17

Here a difficulty may be raised: we divide the varieties of Substance and their functions and activities, fair or foul or indeed of any kind whatsoever, on the basis of Quality, Quantity rarely, if ever, entering into the differences which produce species; Quantity, again, we divide in accordance with QUALITIES of its own: how then are we to divide Quality itself into species? what differences are we to employ, and from what genus shall we take them? To take them from Quality itself would be no less absurd than setting up substances as differences of substances. Enneads VI,3,17

How, then, are we to distinguish black from white? how differentiate colours in general from tastes and tangible QUALITIES? By the variety of sense-organs? Then there will be no difference in the objects themselves. Enneads VI,3,17

But, waiving this objection, how deal with QUALITIES perceived by the same sense-organ? We may be told that some colours integrate, others disintegrate the vision, that some tastes integrate, others disintegrate the tongue: we reply that, first, it is the actual experiences (of colour and taste, and not the sense-organs) that we are discussing and it is to these that the notions of integration and disintegration must be applied; secondly, a means of differentiating these experiences has not been offered. Enneads VI,3,17

It may be suggested that we divide them by their powers, and this suggestion is so far reasonable that we may well agree to divide the non-sensuous QUALITIES, the sciences for example, on this basis; but we see no reason for resorting to their effects for the division of QUALITIES sensuous. Even if we divide the sciences by their powers, founding our division of their processes upon the faculties of the mind, we can only grasp their differences in a rational manner if we look not only to their subject-matter but also to their Reason-Principles. Enneads VI,3,17

But, granted that we may divide the arts by their Reason-Principles and theorems, this method will hardly apply to embodied QUALITIES. Even in the arts themselves an explanation would be required for the differences between the Reason-Principles themselves. Besides, we have no difficulty in seeing that white differs from black; to account for this difference is the purpose of our enquiry. Enneads VI,3,17

These problems at any rate all serve to show that, while in general it is necessary to look for differences by which to separate things from each other, to hunt for differences of the differences themselves is both futile and irrational. We cannot have substances of substances, quantities of quantities, QUALITIES of QUALITIES, differences of differences; differences must, where possible, be found outside the genus, in creative powers and the like: but where no such criteria are present, as in distinguishing dark-green from pale-green, both being regarded as derived from white and black, what expedient may be suggested? Sense-perception and intelligence may be trusted to indicate diversity but not to explain it: explanation is outside the province of sense-perception, whose function is merely to produce a variety of information; while, as for intelligence, it works exclusively with intuitions and never resorts to explanations to justify them; there is in the movements of intelligence a diversity which separates one object from another, making further differentiation unnecessary. Enneads VI,3,18

Do all QUALITIES constitute differentiae, or not? Granted that whiteness and colours in general and the QUALITIES dependent upon touch and taste can, even while they remain species (of Quality), become differentiae of other things, how can grammar and music serve as differentiae? Perhaps in the sense that minds may be distinguished as grammatical and musical, especially if the QUALITIES are innate, in which case they do become specific differentiae. Enneads VI,3,18

It remains to decide whether there can be any differentia derived from the genus to which the differentiated thing belongs, or whether it must of necessity belong to another genus? The former alternative would produce differentiae of things derived from the same genus as the differentiae themselves – for example, QUALITIES of QUALITIES. Virtue and vice are two states differing in quality: the states are QUALITIES, and their differentiae QUALITIES – unless indeed it be maintained that the state undifferentiated is not a quality, that the differentia creates the quality. Enneads VI,3,18

In the case of virtue and vice, whole must be compared with whole, and the differentiation conducted on this basis. As for the differentia being derived from the same genus as themselves, namely, Quality, and from no other genus, if we proceed on the principle that virtue is bound up with pleasure, vice with lust, virtue again with the acquisition of food, vice with idle extravagance, and accept these definitions as satisfactory, then clearly we have, here too, differentiae which are not QUALITIES. Enneads VI,3,18

What view, then, shall we take of privations? If they are privations of QUALITIES, they will themselves be QUALITIES: “toothless” and “blind,” for example, are QUALITIES. “Naked” and “dothed,” on the other hand, are neither of them QUALITIES but states: they therefore comport a relation to something else. Enneads VI,3,19

(With regard to passive QUALITIES🙂 Enneads VI,3,19

We shall accordingly maintain that states alone, and not dispositions, constitute QUALITIES: thus, “hot” is a quality but not “growing hot,” “ill” but not “turning ill.” Enneads VI,3,19

That we are accustomed to act upon these assumptions is obvious enough; but the following considerations may perhaps commend themselves: White and yellow are entirely different from each other – a statement which applies to any colour whatsoever as compared with any other; they are accordingly contrary QUALITIES. Their contrariety is independent of the presence of intermediates: between health and disease no intermediate intrudes, and yet they are contraries. Enneads VI,3,20

As for Degree (subsisting in Quality), it was given as our opinion that it exists in the objects participating in Quality, though whether it enters into QUALITIES as such – into health and justice – was left open to question. If indeed these QUALITIES possess an extension quite apart from their participants, we must actually ascribe to them degrees: but in truth they belong to a sphere where each entity is the whole and does not admit of degree. Enneads VI,3,20

Again, can we use integration and disintegration to explain blackness and whiteness? But to doubt the independent existence of these QUALITIES means that, beginning with colours, we may end by annihilating almost all QUALITIES, or rather all without exception; for if we identify every alteration, or qualitative change, with integration and disintegration, we allow nothing whatever to come into existence; the same elements persist, nearer or farther apart. Enneads VI,3,25

But if soul spread thus wide before material extension existed, then as covering all space it would seem to be of itself a thing of magnitude, and in what mode could it exist in the All before the All was in being, before there was any All? And who can accept a soul described as partless and massless and yet, for all that absence of extension, extending over a universe? We may perhaps be told that, though extended over the corporeal, it does not itself become so: but thus to give it magnitude as an accidental attribute leaves the problem still unsolved: precisely the same question must in all reason arise: How can the soul take magnitude even in the move of accident? We cannot think of soul being diffused as a quality is, say sweetness or colour, for while these are actual states of the masses affected so that they show that quality at every point, none of them has an independent existence; they are attributes of body and known only as in body; such quality is necessarily of a definite extension. Further, the colour at any point is independent of that at any other; no doubt the Form, White, is the same all over, but there is not arithmetical identity; in soul there is; it is one soul in foot and in hand, as the facts of perception show. And yet in the case of QUALITIES the one is observably distributed part for part; in the soul the identity is undistributed; what we sometimes call distribution is simply omnipresence. Enneads VI,4,1

To ask how those forms of life come to be There is simply asking how that heaven came to be; it is asking whence comes life, whence the All-Life, whence the All-Soul, whence collective Intellect: and the answer is that There no indigence or impotence can exist but all must be teeming, seething, with life. All flows, so to speak, from one fount not to be thought of as one breath or warmth but rather as one quality englobing and safeguarding all QUALITIES – sweetness with fragrance, wine – quality and the savours of everything that may be tasted, all colours seen, everything known to touch, all that ear may hear, all melodies, every rhythm. Enneads VI,7,12

When, with all their differences, things may be affirmed to have a measure of identity, the matter of the identity may very well be established in their very essence and yet be mentally abstracted; thus life in man or horse yields the notion of animal; from water or fire we may get that of warmth; the first case is a definition of Kind, the other two cite QUALITIES, primary and secondary respectively. Both or one part of Intellect, then, would be called by the one term good. Enneads VI,7,18