affection

Socrates : If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this AFFECTION that they would be beautiful. GREATER HIPPIAS
Hippias : And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some AFFECTION or other, that then both are affected by that AFFECTION by which neither is affected ? GREATER HIPPIAS
For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an AFFECTION by which neither of us is affected. GREATER HIPPIAS
And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some AFFECTION or reality which pertains to both of these together, [301c] but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both ; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind. GREATER HIPPIAS
Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this AFFECTION which they call “being overcome by pleasure,” and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. PROTAGORAS
When we say to them : Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply : Socrates and Protagoras, if this AFFECTION of the soul is not to be called “being overcome by pleasure,” pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it ? PROTAGORAS
Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting : that the AFFECTION of the patient answers to the AFFECTION of the agent ? GORGIAS
Take the case of any bodily AFFECTION : — a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia ? GORGIAS
And on the same principle he who gives himself to a lover because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his AFFECTION turn out to be a villain, and to have no virtue ; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. SYMPOSIUM
But my art further informs me that the double love is not merely an AFFECTION of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything, but is to be found in the bodies of all animals and in productions of the earth, and I may say in all that is ; such is the conclusion which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, whence I learn how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all things, divine as well as human. SYMPOSIUM
This is he who empties men of disaffection and fills them with AFFECTION, who makes them to meet together at banquets such as these : in sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord — who sends courtesy and sends away discourtesy, who gives kindness ever and never gives unkindness ; the friend of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods ; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him ; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace ; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil : in every word, work, wish, fear-saviour, pilot, comrade, helper ; glory of gods and men, leader SYMPOSIUM
For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love ; but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers — the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose AFFECTION takes one form only — they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.” “ SYMPOSIUM
In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the AFFECTION of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. PHAEDRUS
And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed ; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within become changed by any approximation or AFFECTION of any other thing. THEAETETUS
impression of both of you given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to fit this into its own print : if I succeed, recognition will take place ; but if I fad and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe — that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right to left, err by reason of some similar AFFECTION, then “heterodoxy” and false opinion ensues. THEAETETUS
But if the one had any other AFFECTION than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one ; which is impossible. PARMENIDES
In virtue of the AFFECTION by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one. PARMENIDES
Then in virtue of the AFFECTION by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing. PARMENIDES
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite AFFECTION to that which made it and this was the AFFECTION of otherness. PARMENIDES
And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite AFFECTION, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid ? PARMENIDES
Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort ; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such AFFECTION, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one. PARMENIDES
Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because participating in some AFFECTION from another, by the name of that other. SOPHIST
the pyramid], more than any other form, has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces (Kepmatizei), and thus naturally produces that AFFECTION which we call heat ; and hence the origin of the name (thepmos, Kepma). TIMAEUS
But things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war, and force themselves apart ; and to this war and convulsion the name of shivering and trembling is given ; and the whole AFFECTION and the cause of the AFFECTION are both termed cold. TIMAEUS
Let us imagine the causes of every AFFECTION, whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remembering that we have already distinguished between the nature which is easy and which is hard to move ; for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take. TIMAEUS
And there is the opposite AFFECTION arising from an opposite cause, when the mass of entering particles, immersed in the moisture of the mouth, is congenial to the tongue, and smooths and oils over the roughness, and relaxes the parts which are unnaturally contracted, and contracts the parts which are relaxed, and disposes them all according to their nature — that sort of remedy of violent affections is pleasant and agreeable to every man, and has the name sweet. TIMAEUS
This AFFECTION is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright and flashing. TIMAEUS
In this way every animal is overcome and decays, and this AFFECTION is called old age. TIMAEUS
When it is mingled with black bile and dispersed about the courses of the head, which are the divinest part of us, the attack if coming on in sleep, is not so severe ; but when assailing those who are awake it is hard to be got rid of, and being an AFFECTION of a sacred part, is most justly called sacred. TIMAEUS
And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the AFFECTION of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them ; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him ; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed ; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him ? LAWS
In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of AFFECTION and good-will towards one another ; and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases ; and from their pasture-land they would obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh ; moreover they would procure other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. LAWS III
And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation ; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest — I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having AFFECTION and desire in their train. LAWS III
The AFFECTION both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. LAWS VII
For the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would fain satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved ; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness ; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his AFFECTION. LAWS VIII
For Dion, who rapidly assimilated my teaching as he did all forms of knowledge, listened to me with an eagerness which I had never seen equalled in any young man, and resolved to live for the future in a better way than the majority of Italian and Sicilian Greeks, having set his AFFECTION on virtue in preference to pleasure and self-indulgence. LETTERS 7
That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them ; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the AFFECTION of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. THE REPUBLIC I
And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie ; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous AFFECTION of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. THE REPUBLIC II
When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character ; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools ; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them : they profess every sort of AFFECTION for them ; but when they have gained their point they know them no more. THE REPUBLIC IX
And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through AFFECTION of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own ? THE REPUBLIC X

To refute this error, we have to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of AFFECTION, a Stoic characteristic of a living being,) and juxtaposition. Tratado 2, 3
Some Stoics might deny that form was a “being,” asserting the soul to be a mere AFFECTION (or, manner of being) of matter. Tratado 2, 3
From whence then did matter acquire this AFFECTION and animating life? Tratado 2, 3
As tension produces in the lyre-strings an AFFECTION (or, manner of being, or state) that is called harmony, likewise, as contrary elements are mingled in our body, an individual mixture produces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an individual AFFECTION of this mixture. Tratado 2, 8
What then can be the nature of the soul, if she is neither a body, nor a corporeal AFFECTION, while, nevertheless, all the active force, the productive power and the other faculties reside in her, or come from her? Tratado 2, 8
It is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the universe experiences an AFFECTION, the latter be clearly felt by the All. Tratado 8, 2
In this case (if the essence of the soul consisted in her form) the soul would be something incorporeal, and as she would consist in an AFFECTION of the body, there would be nothing astonishing in that a single quality, emanating from a single principle, might be in a multitude of subjects simultaneously. Tratado 8, 4
Last, if the essence of the soul consisted in being both things (being simultaneously a part of a homogeneous body and an AFFECTION of the body), there would be nothing surprising (if there were a unity of essence in a multitude of subjects). Tratado 8, 4
Although (by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community of AFFECTION which constitutes sympathy, because to identity is added difference. Tratado 21, 1
For if the judgment were an AFFECTION, it would itself presuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity. Tratado 26, 1
If, on the contrary, her “being” be a number or a reason, as we usually say, how could an AFFECTION occur within a number or a reason? Tratado 26, 1
Amidst these affections, some are born of opinion; thus, we feel fear or joy, according as we expect to die, or as we hope to attain some good; then the “opinion” is in the soul, and the “AFFECTION” in the body. Tratado 26, 4
Now a form cannot undergo an AFFECTION or a passion, but must remain what it is. Tratado 26, 4
It is the matter (of a body) which is capable of being affected by a “passion” (an AFFECTION), when this AFFECTION is produced by the presence of the power which is its principle. Tratado 26, 4
We might further consider whether, inasmuch as opinion originates in a higher principle (of the soul), this principle does not remain immovable because it is the form of harmony, while the cause of the movement plays the role of the musician, and the parts caused to vibrate by the AFFECTION, that of the strings; for it is not the harmony, but the string that experiences the AFFECTION; and even if the musician desired it, the string would not vibrate unless it were prescribed by the harmony. Tratado 26, 4
The reason is that when an image is produced in the soul by the affective part, there results in the body an AFFECTION and a movement; and to this agitation is related the image of the evil which is foreseen by opinion. Tratado 26, 5
It is this AFFECTION that reason commands us to annihilate, and whose occurrence even we are to forestall, because when this AFFECTION occurs, the soul is sick, and healthy when it does no occur. Tratado 26, 5
If matter could be affected, it would have to preserve some of the AFFECTION, retaining either the AFFECTION itself, or remain in a state different from the one in which it was before it was affected. Tratado 26, 10
He wishes to convince us that in being endued with these figures, matter undergoes neither AFFECTION nor alteration. Tratado 26, 12
The theory that when the body is divided matter also must be divided, would have to answer the question, How could matter on being divided, escape the AFFECTION undergone by the composite (of form and matter)? Tratado 26, 12
What is called inevitable necessity and divine justice consists in the sway of nature which causes each soul to proceed in an orderly manner into the bodily image which has become the object of her AFFECTION, and of her predominating disposition. Tratado 27, 13
The attribute of being a substrate is a mere AFFECTION, like a color, or a figure; but the soul is separable from the body. Tratado 27, 20
In this case, for instance, it will be sight, and not appetite, which will perceive sense-objects; but appetite will be later wakened by sensation which will be “relayed,” (as the Stoics would say); and though it does not judge of sensation, it will unconsciously feel the characteristic AFFECTION. Tratado 27, 28
It certainly is appetite which experiences pleasure, and which keeps a trace of it; but this trace constitutes an AFFECTION or disposition, and not a memory. Tratado 27, 28
In the image of the soul (the irrational soul) these memories will be accompanied by a passive AFFECTION; but in the man (the rational soul) they will not be so accompanied. Tratado 27, 31
This AFFECTION seems therefore to have been given to us by nature to make us, according to the dictates of our reasons, repel and threatens us. ( Tratado 28, 28
The parts that seem distant are not any the less near, as, in each animal, the horns, nails, fingers, the organs at distance from each other, feel, in spite of the interval which separates them, the AFFECTION experienced by any other one of them. Tratado 28, 32
Every part of the universe is subject to experiencing an AFFECTION caused in it by another part or by the universe itself (with the exception of the wise man, who remains impassible); without there being anything contrary to nature it can also feel this AFFECTION only at the end of some time. Tratado 28, 43
(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives and then transmits the AFFECTION, and impression. Tratado 29, 1
For instance, if some one stand in front of us, and directs his gaze at some color, he also sees it; but the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced the AFFECTION. Tratado 29, 1
To this it may be answered that there is no necessity for the affections to be experienced by the medium, inasmuch as the AFFECTION is already experienced by the eye, whose function consists precisely in being affected by color; or at least, if the medium be affected, its AFFECTION differs from that of the eye. Tratado 29, 1
That, by virtue of its nature, one being can be sympathetically affected by some other being, does not necessarily imply that the medium, if different, shares that AFFECTION; at least (it is certain that) it is not affected in the same manner. Tratado 29, 1
In such a case, the organ destined to experience the AFFECTION experiences it far better when there is no medium, even when the medium itself is susceptible to some AFFECTION. Tratado 29, 1
The AFFECTION will be weakened according to the nature of the medium, because such a medium would hinder excess of AFFECTION, unless indeed that which is transmitted (by one part to another) is not such as to fail to affect the medium. Tratado 29, 2
If these images do not reach us by some sort of effluence, why should the air be affected, and why should we ourselves be affected only as a result of the AFFECTION experienced by the air? Tratado 29, 2
If the air were affected, it would experience a material AFFECTION, similar to the figure impressed on wax. Tratado 29, 3
This cannot be explained by any corporeal AFFECTION, but by higher laws, suitable to the soul, and to the (universal) organism which everywhere responds to itself. Tratado 29, 3
Light itself, however, is an unaffected medium, for there is no necessity here for an AFFECTION, but only for a medium; consequently, if light be not a body, there is no need of a body (to act as medium). Tratado 29, 4
Sight resembles touch; it operates in light by somehow transferring itself to the object, without the medium experiencing any AFFECTION. Tratado 29, 4
This is however impossible; not only does touch announce and experience the neighboring object but, by the AFFECTION it experiences, it proclaims the differences of the tangible object, and even perceives it from a distance, if nothing oppose it; for we perceive the fire at the same time as the air that surrounds us, and before this air has been heated by the fire. Tratado 29, 4
Under this hypothesis (which asserts that the air receives and transmits an AFFECTION) it would be difficult to explain why during the night we see the stars and, in general, any kind of fire. Tratado 29, 4
The hypothesis that the light contiguous to the visible object is affected, and transmits this AFFECTION by relays from point to point into the eye, is essentially identical with that theory which supposes that the medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible object; a hypothesis that has already been discussed above. Tratado 29, 4
The perception of audition, like that of vision, therefore consists in a repercussion (an AFFECTION sympathetically felt) in the universal organism. Tratado 29, 5
It is certain that if the other things were affected because the air itself was affected, and if light were nothing more than an AFFECTION of the air, that is, its substance; then indeed this AFFECTION could not exist without the experiencing subject (the air). Tratado 29, 6
If its nature be to fall, it will spontaneously descend; for neither the air nor any illuminated body will make it issue from the illuminating body, nor can force it to advance, since it is neither an accident that implies a subject, nor an AFFECTION that implies an affected object. Tratado 29, 6
In this case light would not be the quality of a subject, but the actualization that emanates from a subject, but which does not pass into any other subject (as a kind of undulation); but if another subject be present, it will suffer an AFFECTION. Tratado 29, 6
The AFFECTION belongs only to that which has been affected. Tratado 29, 6
If there were a body outside of our world, and if an eye observed it from here without any obstacle, it is doubtful that the eye could see that body, because the eye would have no AFFECTION common to it; for community of AFFECTION is caused by the coherence of the single organism (that is, the unity of the world). Tratado 29, 8
Since this community of AFFECTION (or, sympathy), supposes that sense-objects and that the senses belong to the single organism, a body located outside of the world would not be felt, unless it were part of the world. Tratado 29, 8
For when one loves a being, he loves all that attaches thereto; he extends to the children the AFFECTION for the parent. Tratado 33, 16
Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for the right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position when it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also sees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not experience there an AFFECTION that is vain, and it does not affirm unity without some foundation. Tratado 34, 13
As to those who consider unity as relative, they might be told that unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of the AFFECTION experienced by some other being without itself being affected. Tratado 34, 14
If that be not admitted, we shall be reduced to asserting that whiteness, beauty and justice are nothing real, and that their only causes are simple relations; that justice consists in some particular relation with some particular being; that beauty has no foundation other than the AFFECTION that we feel; that the object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting this AFFECTION either by nature, or by acquirement. Tratado 34, 14
If we are to trust this AFFECTION of the soul, we shall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good; but we would not be seeking why the Good is desired. Tratado 38, 19
Now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple AFFECTION, existing only in him who feels it; for he who mistakes this AFFECTION for the Good remains unsatisfied, he has nothing but an AFFECTION that somebody else might equally feel in presence of the Good. Tratado 38, 26
When (Plato) seems to believe that the good is composed of intelligence, as subject, and also of AFFECTION which wisdom makes the soul experience, he is not asserting that this blend (of intelligence and pleasure) is either the goal (of the soul), or the Good in itself. Tratado 38, 30
What does it matter that certain qualities are derived from an AFFECTION, and that others are not derived therefrom? Tratado 42, 11
If certain qualities be derived from an AFFECTION, and if others do not derive therefrom, how could they be classified as one kind? Tratado 42, 11
For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced AFFECTION, this AFFECTION must already be good before the occurrence of the knowledge. Tratado 46, 2
What need then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being be defined as sensation and knowledge (of an AFFECTION or state of the soul) rather than in the latter AFFECTION and state of the soul itself? Tratado 46, 2
Now judgment is superior to AFFECTION; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an AFFECTION, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. Tratado 46, 2
We ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of Providence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our acts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in the universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an AFFECTION conformed to the intentions of Providence. Tratado 48, 5
Just as fire in us is much degenerated from that in the heaven, so sympathy, degenerating within the receiving person, begets an unworthy AFFECTION. Tratado 52, 11
The theory that the AFFECTION of the body modifies it so as to produce a sensation which itself would end in the soul, leaves unexplained the origin of sensation. Tratado 53, 5
On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common AFFECTION; it is an AFFECTION peculiar to the soul, as are several others. Tratado 53, 5