Plotino – Tratado 10,11 (V, 1, 11) — A alma individual tem nela mesma o Intelecto e o Uno

11. El alma razonable debe ocuparse de las cosas justas y hermosas, y preguntarse a su vez si tal o cual cosa es justa y hermosa. Para ello habrá de tener una idea firme de la justicia, que sirva de base a su razonamiento, porque de otro modo, ¿cómo podría razonar? Y , si es verdad que el alma unas veces razona y otras no, no conviene que sea la parte razonable la que se ocupe de esto sino precisamente la inteligencia, que es la que conserva en nosotros la idea misma de la justicia. Pues se da en nosotros, en efecto, el principio y la causa (de la inteligencia), esto es Dios, pero un dios que no se divide, sino que subsiste inmóvil, y que aunque no permanezca en un determinado lugar, se aparece en los seres múltiples en la medida en que éstos pueden recibirlo y él diversificarse, sin dejar de ser el mismo. Tal es lo que ocurre con el centro del círculo, cada uno de cuyos puntos lo contiene como imagen suya, en tanto los rayos refieren también a él sus propiedades. Por ese principio que se da en nosotros mismos tocamos verdaderamente a Dios, convivimos con El y estamos suspendidos de El. Es decir estamos situados en El desde el momento que nos inclinamos decididamente hacia El.

[11] Puisque l’âme raisonnable porte des jugements sur le juste et Je beau et décide si tel objet est beau, si telle action est juste, il doit y avoir une justice et une beauté immuables d’où la raison discursive tire ses principes (57); sinon, comment pourrait-elle raisonner? Si l’âme tantôt raisonne sur la justice et sur la beauté, tantôt ne raisonne pas sur ces choses, il faut que nous ayons en nous l’Intelligence qui, au lieu de raisonner, possède toujours la justice et la beauté; enfin, il faut que nous ayons en nous la cause et le principe de l’Intelligence, Dieu, qui n’est point divisible, qui subsiste, non dans un lieu, mais en lui-même, qui est contemplé par une multitude d’êtres, par chacun des êtres aptes à le recevoir, mais qui reste distinct de ces êtres, de morne que le centre subsiste en lui-même, tandis que les rayons viennent tous aboutir à lui de tous les points de la circonférence (58). C’est ainsi que nous-mêmes, par une des parties de nous-mêmes, nous touchons à Dieu, nous nous y unissons, nous y sommes en quelque sorte suspendus (ἐφαπτόμεθα, σύνεσμεν, ἀνηερτήμεθα) ; or, nous sommes édifiés en lui [ἐνιδρύμεθα) quand nous nous tournons vers lui (59).

THERE MUST BE AN OBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND BEAUTY TO WHICH WE ARE INTIMATELY UNITED.

11. Since the rational soul makes judgments about what is just or beautiful, and decides whether some object is beautiful, whether such an action be just, there must exist an immutable justice and beauty from which discursive reason draws its principles. Otherwise, how could such reasonings take place? If the soul at times reasons about justice and beauty, but at times does not reason about them, we must possess within ourselves the intelligence which, instead of reasoning, ever possesses justice and beauty; further, we must within us possess the cause and Principle of Intelligence, the Divinity, which is not divisible, which subsists, not in any place, but in Himself; who is contemplated by a multitude of beings, by each of the beings fitted to receive Him, but which remains distinct from these beings, just as the centre subsists within itself, while all the radii come from the circumference to centre themselves in it. Thus we ourselves, by one of the parts of ourselves, touch the divinity, unite ourselves with Him and are, so to speak, suspended from Him; and we are founded upon Him (we are “edified” by Him) when we turn towards Him.

XI. Since, therefore, the soul reasons about things just and beautiful, and inquires by a reasoning process whether this thing is just, and that is beautiful, it is necessary there should be something stably just, from which the reasoning of the soul originates; or how could it reason ? And if the soul at one time reasons about these things, but at another time not, it is necessary there should be an intellect in us, which does not reason about, but always possesses the just. It is likewise necessary that we should contain the principle and cause of intellect, and God; the latter of these not being divisible, but abiding, yet not in place, [but in himself,] and again being surveyed in each of the multitude of things that are able to receive him. They receive him, however, as something different from themselves; just as the centre of a circle is in itself, but each of the lines in the circle has its summit terminating in the centre, and the several lines tend with their peculiarity to this. For by a thing of this kind which is in us, we also touch, associate with, and are suspended from deity. But we are established in it more or less according as we converge to it in a greater or less degree.

11. Since there is a Soul which reasons upon the right and good – for reasoning is an enquiry into the rightness and goodness of this rather than that – there must exist some permanent Right, the source and foundation of this reasoning in our soul; how, else, could any such discussion be held? Further, since the soul’s attention to these matters is intermittent, there must be within us an Intellectual-Principle acquainted with that Right not by momentary act but in permanent possession. Similarly there must be also the principle of this principle, its cause, God. This Highest cannot be divided and allotted, must remain intangible but not bound to space, it may be present at many points, wheresoever there is anything capable of accepting one of its manifestations; thus a centre is an independent unity; everything within the circle has its term at the centre; and to the centre the radii bring each their own. Within our nature is such a centre by which we grasp and are linked and held; and those of us are firmly in the Supreme whose collective tendency is There.