Plotino – Tratado 12,4 (II, 4, 4) — A matéria inteligível existe

4. Damos por supuesta ahora la existencia de las ideas, cosa que ya se ha demostrado en otro lugar. Si realmente hay varias ideas, habrá también necesariamente en cada una de ellas algo común y algo propio, por lo que cada una se diferencie de la otra. Ese carácter propio y esa diferencia que separan a una idea de otra constituyen su forma particular. Pero si existe esta forma, es claro que existe algo informado en lo cual se da la diferencia. Hay, por tanto, una materia que recibe la forma, que será siempre u» sujeto. Pero hay, además, un mundo inteligible, del cual este mundo es una imitación; y como este mundo que habitamos es un compuesto de materia y de forma, habrá en él, naturalmente, materia. ¿Cómo, por otra parte, íbamos a llamarle mundo, si no pensamos en su forma? ¿Y cómo considerar la forma si no pensamos en aquello de lo que es forma? Este mundo lo estimamos indivisible en un sentido absoluto, pero divisible, en cambio, en algún otro sentido; si sus partes pueden ser separadas unas de otras (la materia existe), porque el corte y la separación son fenómenos que afectan a la materia y es ella la que los experimenta. Si el mundo, aun siendo múltiple, es indivisible, su multiplicidad existente en la unidad, y en una materia, no es otra cosa que la multiplicidad de las formas; porque esta unidad sólo puede ser pensada en variedad cómo multiplicidad de formas, sin ella, su unidad carecería de forma. Pues privadle mentalmente de la variedad, de las formas, de las razones y de los pensamientos; todo lo que queda es ya informe e indefinido, sin que haya en él nada de lo que había en la unidad y con ella.

IV. Admettons maintenant l’existence des idées (εἴδη) dont nous avons ailleurs démontré la réalité, et tirons-en les conséquences qui en découlent. Les idées ont nécessairement quelque chose de commun, puisqu’elles sont multiples ; et quelque chose de propre, puisqu’elles différent les unes des autres. Or, le propre de chaque idée, la différence qui la sépare des autres, c’est sa forme particulière (μορφή). Mais la forme suppose un sujet qui la reçoive et qui soit déterminé par la différence. Il y a donc toujours une matière qui reçoit la forme, il y a toujours un sujet.

D’ailleurs, notre monde est l’image du monde intelligible ; or, il est composé de matière et de forme ; donc il doit y avoir aussi là-haut de la matière. Autrement, comment appellera-t-on le monde intelligible du nom de κόσμος [c’est-à-dire, de tout plein d’ordre et de beauté], si l’on n’y voit la matière recevoir la forme ? Comment y verra t-on la forme, si l’on n’y considère pas ce qui la reçoit ? Ce monde est indivisible absolument, divisible relativement. Or si ses parties sont distinctes les unes des autres, leur division, leur distinction est une modification passive de la matière : car c’est elle qui est divisée. Si la multitude des idées constitue un être indivisible, cette multitude, qui réside dans un être un, a cet être un pour sujet, pour matière, et en est les formes. Ce sujet un et varié se conçoit comme varié et revêtu de formes multiples ; il se conçoit donc comme informe avant de se concevoir comme varié. Ôtez-lui par la pensée la variété, les formes, les raisons, les caractères intelligibles, ce qui est antérieur est indéterminé et informe ; il ne reste plus dans ce sujet aucune des choses qui se trouvent en lui et avec lui.

THE NATURE OF IDEAS IMPLIES AN INDIVIDUAL FORM, WHICH AGAIN IMPLIES A SUBSTRATE.

4. Granting now the existence of ideas, whose reality has been demonstrated elsewhere, we must draw their legitimate consequences. Necessarily ideas have something in common, inasmuch as they are manifold; and since they differ from each other, they must also have something individual. Now the individuality of any idea, the difference that distinguishes it from any other, consists of its particular shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate, that might be determined by the difference. There is therefore always a matter that receives form, and there is always a substrate (even in ideas, whose matter is genus, and whose form is its difference).

RELYING ON THE PUN BETWEEN WORLD AND ADORNMENT, PLOTINOS CONCLUDES THAT IF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD BE THE IMAGE OF THIS, IT MUST ALSO BE A COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER.

Besides, our world is an image of the intelligible world. Now as our world is a composite of matter (and form), there must be matter also on high (that is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could we call the intelligible world “kosmos” (that is, either world, or adornment), unless we see matter (receiving) form therein? How could we find form there, without (a residence) that should receive it? That world is indivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but in a relative sense, is it divisible? Now if its parts be distinct from each other, their division or distinction is a passive modification of matter; for what can be divided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals constitute an indivisible being, this multitude, which resides in a single being, has this single being as substrate, that is, as matter and is its shapes. This single, yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless, before conceiving of itself as varied. If then by thought you abstract from it variety, forms, reasons, and intelligible characteristics, that which is prior is indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain in this (subject) none of the things that are in it and with it.

IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have demonstrated elsewhere ; and this being admitted we shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore, there are many forms, it is necessary, indeed, that there should be something common in them; and also that there should be something peculiar by which one is distinguished from another. This something peculiar, therefore, and separating difference, are the appropriate form. But if there is form, there is also that which is formed, about which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter [in intelligibles], which receives the form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intelligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and consists of matter [and form], it is necessary that there also there should be matter. Or how can you denominate it a world [or that which is adorned], unless you look to form ? And how can you look to form, unless you assume that in which form subsists ? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly every where impartible; but in a certain respect is also partible. And if the parts of it are divulsed from each other, the section and divulsion are the passions of matter; for it is matter which is divided. But if the many which are there, are one impartible being, the many subsisting in one, — if this be the case, they are in one matter, of which they are the forms. For this various one, is to be considered as having a multiform nature. It must, therefore, be considered as formless prior to its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away its variety, its forms, its productive principles, and intellections, that which is prior to these is formless and indefinite, and this is no one of the things which subsist together with and in it.

4. The present existence of the Ideal-Forms has been demonstrated elsewhere: we take up our argument from that point.

If, then, there is more than one of such forming Ideas, there must of necessity be some character common to all and equally some peculiar character in each keeping them distinct.

This peculiar characteristic, this distinguishing difference, is the individual shape. But if shape, then there is the shaped, that in which the difference is lodged.

There is, therefore, a Matter accepting the shape, a permanent substratum.

Further, admitting that there is an Intelligible Realm beyond, of which this world is an image, then, since this world-compound is based on Matter, there must be Matter there also.

And how can you predicate an ordered system without thinking of form, and how think of form apart from the notion of something in which the form is lodged?

No doubt that Realm is, in the strict fact, utterly without parts, but in some sense there is part there too. And in so far as these parts are really separate from each other, any such division and difference can be no other than a condition of Matter, of a something divided and differentiated: in so far as that realm, though without parts, yet consists of a variety of entities, these diverse entities, residing in a unity of which they are variations, reside in a Matter; for this unity, since it is also a diversity, must be conceived of as varied and multiform; it must have been shapeless before it took the form in which variation occurs. For if we abstract from the Intellectual-Principle the variety and the particular shapes, the Reason-Principles and the Thoughts, what precedes these was something shapeless and undetermined, nothing of what is actually present there.