Plotino – Tratado 26,1 (III, 6, 1) — Primeiras questões concernentes à impassibilidade

1. Dizendo que as sensações não são afecções, mas atividades e juízos sobre os afectos, uma vez que as afecções ocorrem em algo outro, tal como, digamos, o corpo determinado, ao passo que o juízo ocorre na alma e não é uma afecção – porque, nesse caso, seria preciso ocorrer outro juízo e remontar sempre até o infinito tínhamos também aqui a dificuldade, em nada menor, de se o juízo enquanto juízo não recebe nada do que é julgado. Ora, se recebe uma impressão, foi afectado. Contudo, era-nos possível dizer, também acerca das chamadas impressões, que seu modo é inteiramente distinto do que se supôs, mas similar ao que ocorre nas intelecções, que são também elas atividades capazes de conhecer sem serem afectadas de modo algum; em geral, nossa tese e nossa intenção eram não sujeitar a alma a modificações e alterações tais como os aquecimentos e esfriamentos dos corpos. Todavia, seria preciso observar a chamada parte afectiva da alma e examinar se admitiremos que também essa é imodificável ou se concederemos apenas a essa parte a possibilidade de ser afectada. Mas isso, depois, pois devemos examinar as dificuldades relativas às partes anteriores da alma.

Como, então, pode ser imodificável não só a parte anterior à afectiva, mas também a anterior à sensitiva e qualquer parte da alma em geral, se é nela em que se produzem o vício, as falsas opiniões e a ignorância? E também suas apropriações e aversões quando se compraz ou se entristece, se enfurece, tem inveja ou ciúme, quando deseja, enfim, quando não se mantém de modo algum em quietude, mas se move e altera com cada um dos incidentes. Ora, se a alma é um corpo e tem magnitude, não será fácil, ou melhor, será inteiramente impossível mostrar que ela é impassível e imodificável em qualquer uma das afecções que se diz nela ocorrerem; porém, se é uma essência sem magnitude e na qual deve estar presente também a incorruptibilidade, é preciso acautelarmo-nos contra atribuir a ela tais afecções, para que não nos passe desapercebido conceder que ela seja corruptível. Com efeito, como dissemos, seja sua essência número, seja razão, como pode uma afecção ocorrer em um número ou em uma razão? Antes, porém, deve-se pensar que o que sobrevêm à alma são razões irracionais e afecções inafectáveis, e cada um desses fenômenos, transferidos do corpo para a alma, e transferidos por analogia, deve ser entendido paradoxalmente, ou seja, no sentido de que a alma os tem sem tê-los e os sofre sem sofrê-los. Devemos investigar de que modo são essas coisas.

Decíamos que las sensaciones no eran estados pasivos, sino actos relativos a las afecciones, y más bien juicios. Tengamos en cuenta que los estados pasivos se producen en algo diferente, como por ejemplo el cuerpo, en tanto el juicio, que no es un estado pasivo, se produce en el alma; en consecuencia, tendríamos que pasar de un juicio a otro y proseguir así hasta el infinito. Contaríamos aquí, sin embargo, con una evidente dificultad, porque el juicio, como tal juicio, no retiene entonces nada de lo que juzga. Si lo retuviese, sería algo realmente pasivo.

Podríamos decir, no obstante, de las llamadas impresiones (por los estoicos) que su manera de ser es completamente distinta a lo que se cree; hay entre ellas a manera de pensamientos o actos, que pueden llegar a conocer sin necesidad de sufrir nada. En general, cuando se da en nosotros razón y voluntad, el alma no aparece sujeta a cambios y alteraciones, cual ocurre con la acción del calor y del frío sobre los cuerpos. E incluso el alma que se llama pasiva ha de ser vista y considerada, bien como algo inmóvil o como lo único a lo que se atribuye pasividad. Quede esto para despues y examinemos ahora. lo referente a los primeros puntos. ¿Cómo permanecen realmente sin cambio esas partes del alma anteriores a la parte pasiva y a la sensación? Y, en general, ¿cómo sigue siendo inmóvil una parte cualquiera del alma cuando en ésta se dan el vicio, las opiniones falsas y la misma ignorancia? A esto podrían añadirse las inclinaciones familiares, los sentimientos de hostilidad del alma embargada por el placer, el dolor, la irritación, la envidia, la emulación y el deseo, que la privan en absoluto de tranquilidad, si no es de por sí evidente que cada una de estas cosas produce un movimiento y un cambio en el alma. Si el alma es un cuerpo, y si tiene, por tanto, magnitud, no se puede mostrar fácilmente, o mejor es imposible mostrar, que permanezca impasible y sin sufrir cambio alguno entre todas estas cosas que, según se dice, se producen en ella. Pero, si es una sustancia inextensa a la que conviene la incorruptibilidad, hemos de guardamos de atribuirle tales estados pasivos; porque se nos escaparía entonces que la hacemos realmente corruptible. Y ya se trate de que su esencia sea un numero o una razón, según decimos, ¿cómo admitir ese estado pasivo en un número o en una razón? Mejor conviene pensar que se dan en ella razones irracionales y pasiones impasibles1, las cuales, sacadas de los cuerpos, son transferidas al alma, pero tomadas aquí en un sentido opuesto. Se dice, pues, del alma, por analogía, que tiene y no tiene pasiones, que sufre y no sufre a la vez. Hemos de considerar, naturalmente, cuál es el modo de ser de estos estados.

I. Les sensations ne sont pas des passions (πάθη), mais des actes, des jugements relatifs aux passions. Les passions se produisent dans ce qui est autre [que l’âme], c’est-à-dire dans le corps organisé, et le jugement, dans l’âme (car, si le jugement était une passion, il supposerait lui-même un autre jugement, et ainsi de suite à l’infini). En admettant cette vérité, nous avons cependant à examiner si le jugement lui-même, en tant que jugement, ne participe en rien à la nature de son objet : car s’il en reçoit l’empreinte (τύπος), il est passif. D’ailleurs, les images qui proviennent des sens (τυπώσεις), pour employer ici l’expression habituelle, se forment d’une tout autre manière qu’on ne le croit vulgairement. Il en est d’elles comme des conceptions intellectuelles (νοήσεις), qui sont des actes, et par lesquelles nous connaissons les objets sans être passifs. En général, notre raison et notre volonté ne nous permettent en aucune façon d’attribuer à l’âme des modifications et des changements tels que réchauffement et le refroidissement des corps)Enfin, il faut considérer si la partie de l’âme que l’on nomme la partie passive (τὸ παθητιϰὸν) doit être regardée aussi comme inaltérable (ἄτρεπτον) ou comme étant sujette à éprouver des passions. Mais nous aborderons cette question plus tard. Commençons par résoudre nos premiers doutes.

Comment la partie de l’âme qui est supérieure à la sensation et à la passion peut-elle rester inaltérable, quand elle admet en elle le vice, les fausses opinions, l’ignorance ; quand elle a des désirs ou des aversions), qu’elle se livre à la joie ou à la douleur, à la haine, à la jalousie, à la concupiscence ; quand, en un mot, elle ne reste jamais calme, mais que toutes les choses qui lui surviennent l’agitent et produisent en elle des changements ?

Si l’âme est corporelle, étendue, il est difficile, que dis-je ? il est impossible qu’elle reste impassible et inaltérable quand les faits dont nous venons de parler se produisent en elle. Si elle est au contraire une essence inétendue, incorruptible, il faut se garder de lui attribuer des passions qui impliqueraient qu’elle est périssable. Si elle est par son essence un nombre ou une raison, comme nous le disons habituellement, comment se produirait-il une passion dans un nombre, dans une raison ? Il faut donc n’attribuer à l’âme que des raisons irrationnelles, des passions sans passivité, c’est-à-dire regarder ces termes comme des métaphores qui sont tirées de la nature des corps, les prendre dans un sens opposé, n’y voir que de simples analogies, de telle sorte qu’on dise de l’âme qu’elle éprouve ces choses sans les éprouver, qu’elle est passive sans l’être réellement [comme le sont les corps].

Examinons donc comment ces faits ont lieu.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL

1. Sensations are not affections, but actualizations, and judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other (than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment in the soul. For if the judgment were an affection, it would itself presuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity. Though accepting this statement, we must, nevertheless, examine whether the judgment itself, as such, in nowise participates in the nature of its object; for if it receive the impression thereof, it is passive. Besides, the “images derived from the senses” — to use the popular language — are formed in a manner entirely different from what is generally believed. They are in the same case as the intellectual conceptions, which are actualizations, and through which, without being affected, we know objects. In general, neither our reason nor our will permit us, in any way, to attribute to the soul modifications and changes such as the heating or cooling of bodies. Further, we have to consider whether that part of the soul, that is called the passive (or affective, or irrational), must also be be considered as unalterable, or as being affectible.

But we will take up this question later; we must begin by solving our earlier problems.

HOW CAN THE SOUL REMAIN IMPASSIBLE, THOUGH GIVEN UP TO EMOTION?

How could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and passion remain unalterable, while admitting vice, false opinions, and ignorance (or folly); when it has desires or aversions; when it yields itself to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when, in one word, it never remains calm, but when all the things that happen to it agitate it, and produce changes within it?

ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE SOUL CANNOT REMAIN IMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE ONLY FIGURATIVE.

If, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal), it would be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within her. If, on the contrary, she be a “being” that is unextended, and incorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections that might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her “being” be a number or a reason, as we usually say, how could an affection occur within a number or a reason ? We must therefore attribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without passivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite sense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say that the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that she is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us examine how all this occurs.

I. If we should say that the senses are not passions, but energies and judgments about the passions, the passions indeed subsisting about something else, as for instance about a body affected in a certain manner, but judgment about the soul; judgment not being passion, for if it were, another judgment would again be necessary, and thus we should be obliged to proceed in an infinite ascent; — if we should thus speak, it would nevertheless be here dubious, whether judgment itself has nothing in it of the subject of its decision, or whether if it has an impression of it, it is not passively affected. At the same time, however, let us speak about these impressions as they are called, and show that the mode of their subsistence is entirely different from what it is apprehended to be, and is such as that of intellections, which being energies are able to know without passivity. And in short, neither our reason, nor our will permits us to subject the soul to such conversions and changes in quality, as are the calefactions and refrigerations of bodies. With respect to what is called the passive part of the soul also, it is requisite to see and consider, whether we must admit this likewise to be immutable, or grant that passivity belongs to this alone. This however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let us now direct our attention to the doubts pertaining to the former particulars. For it is dubious how that part of the soul, whatever it may be, is immutable, which is prior to the passive part, and to sense, since depravity is ingenerated in it, and false opinions and ignorance ; and besides these, familiarity and alienation, when it is pleased and pained, is angry and envious, is emulous and desirous; and in short, which is never quiescent, but is moved and changed by every incidental circumstance. If, indeed, the soul is body and has magnitude, it is not easy, or rather is wholly impossible to show that it is impassive and immutable in any one of the particulars, which are said to take place about it. But if it is an essence void of magnitude, and it is necessary that the incorruptible should be present with it, we should take care not to ascribe to it passions of this kind, lest we should also ignorantly grant that it is corruptible. Whether, likewise, the essence of it is number or reason, as we say it is, how can passion be ingenerated in number or reason ? But we ought rather to think that irrational reasons, and impassive passions are produced in it. And these being transferred to it from bodies, are each of them to be oppositely assumed, and according to analogy, so that the soul [after a manner] possessing these, does not [really] possessthem,and being passive to them does not suffer. And it must be considered what the mode is of such like affections.

1. In our theory, feelings are not states; they are action upon experience, action accompanied by judgement: the states, we hold, are seated elsewhere; they may be referred to the vitalized body; the judgement resides in the Soul, and is distinct from the state – for, if it is not distinct, another judgement is demanded, one that is distinct, and, so, we may be sent back for ever.

Still, this leaves it undecided whether in the act of judgement the judging faculty does or does not take to itself something of its object.

If the judging faculty does actually receive an imprint, then it partakes of the state – though what are called the Impressions may be of quite another nature than is supposed; they may be like Thought, that is to say they may be acts rather than states; there may be, here too, awareness without participation.

For ourselves, it could never be in our system – or in our liking – to bring the Soul down to participation in such modes and modifications as the warmth and cold of material frames.

What is known as the Impressionable faculty of the soul – to pathetikon – would need to be identified: we must satisfy ourselves as to whether this too, like the Soul as a unity, is to be classed as immune or, on the contrary, as precisely the only part susceptible of being affected; this question, however, may be held over; we proceed to examine its preliminaries.

Even in the superior phase of the Soul – that which precedes the impressionable faculty and any sensation – how can we reconcile immunity with the indwelling of vice, false notions, ignorance? Inviolability; and yet likings and dislikings, the Soul enjoying, grieving, angry, grudging, envying, desiring, never at peace but stirring and shifting with everything that confronts it!

If the Soul were material and had magnitude, it would be difficult, indeed quite impossible, to make it appear to be immune, unchangeable, when any of such emotions lodge in it. And even considering it as an Authentic Being, devoid of magnitude and necessarily indestructible, we must be very careful how we attribute any such experiences to it or we will find ourselves unconsciously making it subject to dissolution. If its essence is a Number or as we hold a Reason-Principle, under neither head could it be susceptible of feeling. We can think, only, that it entertains unreasoned reasons and experiences unexperienced, all transmuted from the material frames, foreign and recognized only by parallel, so that it possesses in a kind of non-possession and knows affection without being affected. How this can be demands enquiry.