Plotino – Tratado 27,6 (IV, 3, 6) — Porque a Alma-do-Mundo fez o mundo?

6. ¿Por qué entonces el alma del universo, que es semejante a las demás almas, pudo haber hecho el mundo, y, en cambio, no han hecho nada las almas de los individuos particulares, las cuales, sin embargo, tienen todas las cosas en sí mismas? Porque ya se ha dicho que una misma cosa puede existir a la vez en otras muchas; ahora convendrá aclarar de qué modo. Tal vez lleguemos a saber así cómo una misma cosa, que se da en otras, puede actuar y sufrir, o cumplir a un tiempo ambas misiones.

Convendrá que examinemos esto en sí mismo, y para ello nos preguntaremos: ¿cómo y por qué (el alma del universo) creó el mundo, mientras que las almas particulares gobiernan tan sólo una parte de él? ¿No podría considerarse como algo extraordinario el que, de hombres que poseen el mismo conocimiento, unos gobiernan a un número mayor de ellos, y otros a un número menor? Pues la diferencia entre las almas, se añadiría, resulta todavía mayor: hay una que no se ha separado del alma universal y permanece con su cuerpo alrededor de ella; las otras, bajo el mando de esta alma universal, que es como su hermana y les ha preparado de antemano sus mansiones, se reparten al azar las partes del cuerpo existente. Posiblemente haya un alma que contemple la inteligencia en su totalidad, mientras las otras no ven más que la parte que les afecta. Y, tal vez, estas mismas almas hubieran podido crear algo, pero, como aquélla lo ha hecho ya, nada les queda a éstas por hacer, superadas como lo han sido por la primera. La misma dificultad existiría en el caso de que cualquier otra alma ocupase el primer lugar. Diremos con mejor fundamento que la creación corresponde al alma universal porque esta alma aparece más ligada al mundo inteligible; siempre es mayor, en efecto, el poder de las almas que se inclinan hacia la región inteligible. Pues dichas almas se conservan en seguridad y actúan fácilmente — pensemos que el poder mayor corresponde a los seres que no sufren con su acción — , ya que el poder proveniente del mundo inteligible no cesa jamás. El alma universal permanece en si misma y actúa sobre las cosas que se acercan a ella, mientras las otras almas prosiguen su marcha y se hunden en el abismo, O tal vez la pluralidad que se da en estas mismas almas tira de ellas hacia abajo y las arrastra junto con sus pensamientos.

Hay que suponer que cuando habla Platón de “las almas de segundo y tercer rango” se refiere a su mayor proximidad o lejanía con respecto al mundo inteligible. Ocurre aquí como con nuestras almas, que no guardan todas ellas una misma relación con las cosas de ese mundo; y así, mientras unas almas permanecen unidas a él, otras, en cambio, se mantienen cercanas y ansiosas de poseerle; pero aún hay otras que ni esto pueden hacer. No todas las almas disponen, efectivamente, de las mismas potencias y pueden servirse de ellas: unas usan de la primera facultad, otras de la que sigue a ésta, y otras, en fin, de la tercera, aunque todas las almas las posean todas.

VI. Si l’Âme universelle et les âmes particulières sont conformes, comment se fait-il que la première ait créé le monde et que les autres ne l’aient point créé, puisqu’elles contiennent aussi chacune toutes choses en elle-même, et que nous avons déjà montré que la puissance productrice peut exister à la fois en plusieurs êtres ? Expliquons-en la raison maintenant. Nous pourrons ainsi examiner et découvrir comment la même essence peut agir, ou pâtir, ou agir et pâtir, d’une manière différente en différents êtres.

Comment donc et pourquoi l’Âme universelle a-t-elle fait l’univers, tandis que les âmes particulières en administrent seulement chacune une partie ? Cela n’est pas plus étonnant que de voir des hommes qui possèdent la même science commander les uns à un plus grand nombre, les autres à un moindre. Mais pourquoi en est-il ainsi, dira-t-on ? C’est, pourra-t-on répondre, qu’il existe une grande différence entre les âmes : elle consiste en ce que les unes, au lieu de se séparer de l’Âme universelle, sont restées dans le monde intelligible et ont contenu le corps [de l’univers], tandis que les autres, lorsque le corps [de l’univers] existait déjà et que l’Âme, leur sœur, le gouvernait, ont pris les lots qui leur sont échus par le sort, comme si celle-ci leur avait préparé des demeures destinées à les recevoir. En outre, l’Âme universelle contemple l’Intelligence universelle, et les âmes particulières contemplent plutôt les intelligences particulières. Ces âmes eussent peut-être été capables aussi de faire l’univers ; mais cela ne leur est plus possible maintenant que l’Âme universelle l’a déjà fait et les a devancées. On aurait lieu d’ailleurs de faire la même question si toute autre âme eût fait l’univers la première. Peut-être est-il préférable d’admettre que, si l’Âme universelle a créé l’univers, c’est parce qu’elle est plus étroitement attachée aux choses intelligibles : car les âmes qui inclinent vers elles ont plus de puissance ; en se maintenant dans cette région tranquille, elles agissent avec plus de facilité ; or, c’est le signe d’une plus grande puissance d’agir sans pâtir. Ainsi, la puissance suspendue au monde intelligible demeure en elle-même, et, en demeurant en elle-même, elle produit. Les autres âmes, descendant vers les corps, s’éloignent du monde intelligible et tombent dans l’abîme [de la matière]. Peut-être aussi l’élément multiple qui est en elles, se trouvant porté vers les régions inférieures, y a entraîné les conceptions de ces âmes et les a fait descendre ici-bas. En effet, la distinction du second et du troisième rang pour les âmes doit s’entendre en ce sens que les unes sont plus près, les autres plus loin du monde intelligible. De même, parmi nous, toutes les âmes ne sont pas également disposées à l’égard de ce monde : les unes parviennent à s’y unir ; d’autres s’en rapprochent par leurs aspirations ; d’autres enfin y réussissent moins, parce qu’elles ne se servent pas des mêmes facultés et que les unes emploient la première, les autres la seconde, celles-là la troisième, quoiqu’elles possèdent également toutes ces puissances.

WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE HUMAN?

6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things within herself, and since we have already shown that the productive power can exist simultaneously in several beings? By explaining its “reason” we can thus examine and discover how the same nature (“being”) can act or experience, or act and experience, in a different manner in different beings.

THE WORLD-SOUL ALONE CREATES BECAUSE SHE REMAINS NEAREST THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

How and why did the universal Soul make the universe, while the individual souls only manage a part thereof? That is not more surprising than to see, among men who possess the same knowledge, some command a greater number, and others a lesser. This is the case because there is a great difference between souls. Some, instead of separating from the universal Soul, have remained in the intelligible world, and still contain the body (of the universal), while others, when the body (of the universe) already existed, and while the universal Soul, their sister, governed it, accepted destinies assigned them by fate, as if (the universal Soul) had prepared for them dwellings to receive them. Besides, the universal Soul contemplates universal Intelligence, and the individual souls rather contemplate individual intelligences. These souls might indeed possibly have also been capable of making the universe; but that is no longer possible to them now that the universal Soul has already done it, and has preceded them. Besides, the very same question would have arisen even if an entirely different soul had first made the universe. Perhaps it is better to state that if the universal Soul has created the universe, it is chiefly because she is more closely related to intelligible entities, for the souls that are nearest thereto are the most powerful. Maintaining themselves in this quiet region, they act with greater facility; for to act without suffering is the sign of a greater power. Thus the power depending on the intelligible world abides within itself, and by abiding within itself, produces. The other souls, descending towards the body, withdraw from the intelligible world, and fall into the abyss (of matter). Perhaps also the element of manifoldness within them, finding itself drawn towards the lower regions, along with it dragged the conceptions of those souls, and made them descend hither. Indeed the distinction of the second or third rank for souls must be understood in this sense that some are nearer, and some further from the intelligible world. Likewise, among us, all souls are not equally disposed in regard to this world. Some succeed in uniting with it, others approach it by their aspirations; others do not quite succeed, because they do not all use the same faculties, and some use the first, others the second, and some the third, though they all equally possess all faculties.

VI. Why, however, did the soul of the world being of a uniform nature make the world, but not the soul of each individual, though it likewise contains all things in itself? For we have before shown that productive power may exist at one and the same time in many things. Now, however, the reason of this must be assigned. For perhaps the manner may be known by us in which the same thing in different subjects either does or suffers a certain thing, or is with respect to it both an agent and a patient. Or rather let us consider how and why the soul of the universe made the world, but other souls govern a certain part of the world. Perhaps, however, it is not at all wonderful, that of those who possess the same science, some should rule over many, but others over few. But why, it may be said, is this the case ? To this it may be answered, that the difference of souls is greater, so far as one of them does not depart from the soul of the universe, but abiding there has a body surrounding it; but other souls, body now existing, and their sister soul having dominion, are alloted an appropriate destiny, this soul preparing for them proper habitations. It may also be said, that the soul of the universe beholds that intellect which ranks as a whole, but that other souls rather behold their own intellects which are of a partial nature. Perhaps, however, these souls also are able to make the universe ; but the soul of the world having made it, this is no longer possible to other souls, productive energy having commenced from the first soul. But the same doubt will arise if any other soul first began to fabricate. It is better, however, to say that the soul of the world rather than other souls fabricated the universe, . because it in a greater degree adheres to iutelligibles. For the power of those souls is greater that more vigorously tend to the intelligible world. For, preserving themselves in that secure region, they fabricate with facility; since it is the property of a greater power, not to suffer· in the things which it produces. But power remains suspended from the supernal region. Abiding, therefore, in itself, it produces [other things] acceding. But other souls which proceed from the one<one soul, depart from it into the profundity [of a material nature]. Perhaps, also, that which is most abundant in them, being drawn downward, draws them likewise into an inferior condition, their own decisions conspiring with the downward impulse. What, however, is said in the “ Timaeus ” of mixture in a second and third degree, must be considered as signifying that some souls are nearer to, but others more remote from the soul of the world; just as in our souls, all of them are not similarly disposed with reference to supernal natures, but some are united to them, others through [ardent] desire accede near, and others accomplish this in a less degree, because they do not energize with the same powers. For some, indeed, energize with a first, others with a second, and others with a third power, all souls nevertheless possessing all powers.

6. But how comes it that while the All-Soul has produced a kosmos, the soul of the particular has not, though it is of the one ideal Kind and contains, it too, all things in itself?

We have indicated that a thing may enter and dwell at the same time in various places; this ought to be explained, and the enquiry would show how an identity resident simultaneously here and there may, in its separate appearances, act or react – or both – after distinct modes; but the matter deserves to be examined in a special discussion.

To return, then: how and why has the All-Soul produced a kosmos, while the particular souls simply administer some one part of it?

In the first place, we are not surprised when men of identical knowledge differ greatly in effective power.

But the reason, we will be asked.

The answer might be that there is an even greater difference among these souls, the one never having fallen away from the All-Soul, but dwelling within it and assuming body therein, while the others received their allotted spheres when the body was already in existence, when their sister soul was already in rule and, as it were, had already prepared habitations for them. Again, the reason may be that the one [the creative All-Soul] looks towards the universal Intellectual-Principle [the exemplar of all that can be], while the others are more occupied with the Intellectual within themselves, that which is already of the sphere of part; perhaps, too, these also could have created, but that they were anticipated by that originator – the work accomplished before them – an impediment inevitable whichsoever of the souls were first to operate.

But it is safer to account for the creative act by nearer connection with the over-world; the souls whose tendency is exercised within the Supreme have the greater power; immune in that pure seat they create securely; for the greater power takes the least hurt from the material within which it operates; and this power remains enduringly attached to the over-world: it creates, therefore, self gathered and the created things gather round it; the other souls, on the contrary, themselves go forth; that can mean only that they have deserted towards the abyss; a main phase in them is drawn downward and pulls them with it in the desire towards the lower.

The “secondary and tertiary souls,” of which we hear, must be understood in the sense of closer or remoter position: it is much as in ourselves the relation to the Supreme is not identical from soul to soul; some of us are capable of becoming Uniate, others of striving and almost attaining, while a third rank is much less apt; it is a matter of the degree or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined – the first degree dominant in the one person, the second, the third [the merely animal life] in others while, still, all of us contain all the powers.