Hippias : Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. [289e] So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him : “This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold,” he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
Socrates : You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
Hippias : What of that, then, Socrates ? For he must perforce accept what is correct, [290a] or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.
Socrates : This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say : “You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman ?” And I shall say, “Not in the least.”
Hippias : And you will be right, Socrates.
Socrates : Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, [290b] “Well, then,” he will say, “do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of ?” “Why do you ask that ?” I shall say. “Because,” he will say, “he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory ; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added.” When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias ?
[290c] Hippias : That is easy ; for we shall say that Pheidias did right ; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.Socrates : “Why, then,” he will say, “did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory ? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful ?” Shall we say that it is, Hippias ?
Hippias : Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.
Socrates : “But ugly when not appropriate ?” Shall I agree, or not ?
Hippias : Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.
[290d] Socrates : “What then ? Do not gold and ivory,” he will say, “when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly ?” Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct ?Hippias : We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.
Socrates : “Well, then,” he will say, “when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood ?”
Hippias : Heracles ! What a fellow this is that you speak of ! [290e] Won’t you tell me who he is ?
Socrates : You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
Hippias : But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
Socrates : He is a great nuisance, Hippias, but yet, what shall we say ? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot ? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood ? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup ; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things, [291a] so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
Hippias : No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates ; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
Socrates : Quite right, my friend ; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks ; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow ; [291b] so instruct me and for my sake answer him. “For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one,” the fellow will say, “would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate ?” Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden ?
Hippias : Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion ?
[291c] Socrates : Certainly ; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.Hippias : Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.
Socrates : Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is ?