Soc. Very good then ; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned : I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not ?), with the making of garments ?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies ?
Gor. It is.
Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.
Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
Soc. I am glad to hear it ; answer me in like manner about rhetoric : with what is rhetoric concerned ?
Gor. With discourse.
Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias ? — such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well ?
Gor. No.
Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse ?
Gor. Certainly not.
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak ?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. And to understand that about which they speak ?
Gor. Of course.
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick ?
Gor. Certainly.
Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse ?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases ?
Gor. Just so.
Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body ?
Gor. Very true.
Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts : — all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.
Gor. Clearly.
Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric ?
Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand ; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon know better ; please to answer me a question : — you would allow that there are arts ?
Gor. Yes.
Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking ; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence ; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.
Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts ; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater — they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power : and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort ?
Gor. Exactly.
Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric ; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse ; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, “And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.” But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.
Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.