Str. I ask whether anybody can understand all things.
Theaet. Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible !
Soc. But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows ?
Theaet. He cannot.
Str. Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power ?
Theaet. To what do you refer ?
Str. How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom ? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.
Theaet. They certainly would not.
Str. But they are willing.
Theaet. Yes, they are.
Str. Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And they dispute about all things ?
Theaet. True.
Str. And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But they are not ; for that was shown to be impossible.
Theaet. Impossible, of course.
Str. Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth ?
Theaet. Exactly ; no better description of him could be given.
Str. Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.
Theaet. What is it ?
Str. I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
Theaet. All things ?
Str. I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of “all.”
Theaet. No, I do not.
Str. Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.
Theaet. What do you mean ?
Str. Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
Theaet. What would he mean by “making” ? He cannot be a husbandman ; — for you said that he is a maker of animals.
Str. Yes ; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things ; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.
Theaet. That must be a jest.
Str. And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation ?
Theaet. Certainly not ; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter’s art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them ; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning ? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things ?
Theaet. Yes ; why should there not be another such art ?
Str. But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life ?
Theaet. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being ; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes ?
Theaet. But how can he, Stranger ? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children’s play ?
Str. Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.
Theaet. Certainly we must.
Str. And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.
Theaet. What is that ?
Str. The inference that he is a juggler.
Theaet. Precisely my own opinion of him.
Str. Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him ; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.
Theaet. Well said ; and let us do as you propose.
Str. Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.
Theaet. Will you tell me first what are two divisions of which you are speaking ?
Str. One is the art of likeness-making ; — generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate colour.
Theaet. Is not this always the aim of imitation ?
Str. Not always ; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception ; — for artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer ; and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.
Theaet. Quite true.
Str. And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness making ?
Theaet. Let that be the name.
Str. And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like ? May we not call these “appearances,” since they appear only and are not really like ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and in all imitation.
Theaet. Of course.
Str. And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art ?
Theaet. Most fairly.
Str. These then are the two kinds of image making — the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances ?
Theaet. True.
Str. I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly ; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.
Theaet. Yes, he has.
Str. Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer ?
Theaet. May I ask to what you are referring ?
Str. My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation — there can be no doubt of that ; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction ? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one.
Theaet. Why ?
Str. He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being ; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson — always repeating both in verse and out of verse :
Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.
Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves ?
Theaet. Never mind about me ; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you.
Str. Very good ; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word “not-being” ?
Theaet. Certainly we do.
Str. Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither in strife nor play : suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked, “To is the term ‘not-being’ to be applied ?” — do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer ?
Theaet. That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself.
Str. There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate “not-being” is not applicable to any being.
Theaet. None, certainly.
Str. And if not to being, then not to something.
Theaet. Of course not.
Str. It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.
Theaet. Impossible.
Str. You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. Some in the singular (ti) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (tine) of two, some in the plural (tines) of many ?
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. Then he who says “not something” must say absolutely nothing.
Theaet. Most assuredly.
Str. And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says “not-being” does not speak at all.
Theaet. The difficulty of the argument can no further go.
Str. Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word ; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.
Theaet. What do you mean ? Do not be afraid to speak.
Str. To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not ?
Theaet. Impossible.
Str. And all number is to be reckoned among things which are ?
Theaet. Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.
Str. Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural ?
Theaet. The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.
Str. But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number ?
Theaet. How indeed ?
Str. When we speak of things which are not attributing plurality to not-being ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. But, on the other hand, when we say “what is not,” do we not attribute unity ?
Theaet. Manifestly.
Str. Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being ?
Theaet. Most true.
Str. Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable ?
Theaet. Quite true.
Str. But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.
Theaet. What ! is there a greater still behind ?
Str. Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.
Theaet. What do you mean ? Speak more clearly.
Str. Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one ; for I say “not-being.” Do you understand ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable : do you follow ?
Theaet. I do after a fashion.
Str. When I introduced the word “is,” did I not contradict what I said before ?
Theaet. Clearly.
Str. And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined as one or many, and should not even be called “it,” for the use of the word “it” would imply a form of unity.
Theaet. Quite true.
Str. How, then, can any one put any faith in me ? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being ; but come, let us try the experiment with you.
Theaet. What do you mean ?
Str. Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality.
Theaet. It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited.
Str. Say no more of ourselves ; but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.
Theaet. Most true.
Str. And if we say to him that he professes an art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon ourselves ; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, “Pray what do you mean at all by an image ?” — and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker’s question ?
Theaet. We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors ; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.
Str. I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.
Theaet. Why do you think so ?
Str. He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.
Theaet. What do you mean ?
Str. When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all ; he will say that he is asking about an idea.
Theaet. What can he mean ?
Str. The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him ?
Theaet. How. Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true ?
Str. And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean ?
Theaet. Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance.
Str. And you mean by true that which really is ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true ?
Theaet. Exactly.
Str. A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true ?
Theaet. Nay, but it is in a certain sense.
Str. You mean to say, not in a true sense ?
Theaet. Yes ; it is in reality only an image.
Str. Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal.
Theaet. In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved !
Str. Strange ! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being.
Theaet. Yes, indeed, I see.
Str. The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.
Theaet. How do you mean ? And where does the danger lie ?
Str. When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean ?
Theaet. There is nothing else to be said.
Str. Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth : — You would assent ?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not ?
Theaet. Of course.
Str. Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are ?
Theaet. Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible.
Str. And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all ?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And here, again, is falsehood ?
Theaet. Falsehood — yes.
Str. And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to be one which are, the nonexistence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.
Theaet. There is no other way in which a false proposition can arise.
Str. There is not ; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable ? Do you see his point, Theaetetus ?
Theaet. Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words ; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility.
Str. How well you remember ! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist ; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious.
Theaet. They are indeed.
Str. We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.
Theaet. If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist.
Str. Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up ?
Theaet. Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest hold upon him.
Str. Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument ?
Theaet. To be sure I will.
Str. I have a yet more urgent request to make.
Theaet. Which is — ?
Str. That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.
Theaet. And why ?
Str. Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force, that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.
Theaet. Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.
Str. Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images or imitations or appearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them ; can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.
Theaet. Most true.
Str. And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father’s argument ; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the matter up.
Theaet. Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.
Str. I have a third little request which I wish to make.
Theaet. What is it ?
Str. You heard me — say what — I have always felt and still feel — that I have no heart for this argument ?
Theaet. I did.
Str. I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings ; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you.
Theaet. There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof ; take heart, therefore, and proceed.