Categoria: Ética a Nicômaco

Repeating, therefore, what we have said, since all knowledge [gnosis] and deliberate choice [proairesis] aspires after a certain good [agathon], let us show what that is which we say the political science [politike] desires, and what the supreme good is of all actions [praktike]. By name, therefore, it is nearly acknowledged by most men; for…

Let us, however, return from whence we have digressed. For it seems that men do not unreasonably form an opinion of good and felicity from [the different kinds of] lives. The vulgar, indeed, and the most worthless part of mankind, place felicity in pleasure; and on this account they embrace the life which consists in…

Perhaps, however, it is better to consider universal good, and inquire how it is said to subsist, though such an inquiry as this will be arduous, because the men who have introduced ideas are our friends [VIDE]. But it may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary to the salvation of truth, to subvert…

Now, however, let us return to the investigated good [agathon], and show what it is. For it appears that there is a different good in a different action [praxis] and art [techne]; since there is one good in the medical art, another in the art of commanding an army, and in a similar manner in…

Every art [techne] and every method, and in like manner every action [praxis] and deliberate choice [proairesis], appear to aspire after a certain good [agathon]. Hence, it is well said, that the good is that which all things desire. Of ends [telos], however, there appears to be a certain difference; for some of them are…

Felicity [eudaimonia], therefore, must be considered by us, not only from the conclusion, and the particulars from which its definition consists, but also from the assertions of others concerning it. For every thing which is inherent in a thing accords with the truth [aletheia]; but what is true is rapidly dissonant with what is false…

If, therefore, there is a certain end [telos] of actions [praxis], which we wish [to obtain] for its own sake, but we desire other things on account of this, and our choice is not directed to all things for the sake of something else (for thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that…