Categoria: Neoplatonismo
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source.
SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. 8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We have already shown that there is one Soul (the…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. 7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by some. It only means what Plato desired to assert…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human?
WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE HUMAN? 6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things within herself, and…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels.
SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS. 5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such a doctrine would be equivalent…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings.
INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS. 4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences of this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the universal Soul’s simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings? How does it happen that some souls are…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness?
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS? 3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of the entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force us to the conclusion either that…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte
CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER. 2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that souls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects, and the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that they are parts (of the universal Soul). We…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo
PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. 1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by…
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2 FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. Of Suicide.
OF THE SEPARATION OF THE SOUL AND BODY. VIDE ENEADA-I-9 2. Nature releases what nature has bound. The soul releases what the soul has bound. Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from…
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3 SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. Of Matter. (Da Matéria)
OF THE CONCEPTION OF MATTER. VIDE Eneada-II-4 While separating ourselves from existence we by thought beget nonentity (matter). While remaining united with existence, we also conceive of nonentity (the one). Consequently, when we separate ourselves from existence, we do not conceive of the nonentity which is above existence (the one), but we beget by thought…
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4 THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things.
OF THE INCORPOREAL. (3) VIDE Eneada-III-6 5. The name “incorporeal” does not designate one and the same genus, as does the word “body.” Incorporeal entities derive their name from the fact that they are conceived of by abstraction from the body. Consequently, some of them (like intelligence and discursive reason) are genuine beings, existing as…
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6 FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. Of the Nature of the Soul.
VIDE Eneada-IV-II 15. (1) Every body is in a place; the incorporeal in itself is not in a place, any more than the things which have the same nature as it. 16. (1) The incorporeal in itself, by the mere fact of its being superior to every body and to every place, is present everywhere…
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7 FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. Problems About the Soul.
UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. VIDE Eneada-IV-III 21. (20) The hypostatic substance of the body does not hinder the incorporeal in itself from being where and as it wishes; for just as that which is non-extended cannot be contained by the body, so also that which has extension forms no obstacle for the…
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9 FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. Of Generation and of the Order of Things that Follow the First.
OF THE PROCESSION OF BEINGS. VIDE Eneada-V-II 26. When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the individual. When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and their power intensifies. 27. In the life of incorporeal entities, the procession operates in a manner such…
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10 FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. Of the Hypostases that Mediate Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle.
INTELLIGENCE KNOWS ITSELF BY A CONVERSION TO HERSELF. VIDE Eneada-V-III 31. (1) When one being subsists by dependence on any other, and not by self-dependence and withdrawal from any other, it could not turn itself towards itself to know itself by separating from (the substrate) by which it subsists. By withdrawing from its own existence…
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11 SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. The One and Identical Being Is Everywhere Present As a Whole.
VIDE Eneada-VI-4 OF THE INCORPOREAL. 35. The incorporeal is that which is conceived of by abstraction of the body; that is the derivation of its name. To this genus, according to ancient sages, belong matter, sense-form, when conceived of apart from matter, natures, faculties, place, time, and surface. All these entities, indeed, are called incorporeal…
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Hierocles de Alexandria
Hierocles de Alejandría (s. V).—Discípulo de Plutarco en Atenas. Sucedió a Olimpiodoro y enseñó hacia el año 420. Fue pagano, pero revela influencias cristianas. Se conserva su comentario a los Versos áureos y fragmentos de su tratado Sobre la providencia y el destino y la conciliación entre la libertad de nuestros actos y el gobierno…
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Enéada I, 8, 1: Questões sobre o mal
1 Los que investigan de dónde provienen los males, sea que sobrevengan a los seres, sea que conciernan a una clase de seres, comenzarían su investigación adecuadamente si la basaran en el estudio previo de qué es el mal y cuál la naturaleza del mal. Porque de ese modo se conocería también de dónde proviene,…
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Enéada I, 8, 2: A natureza do bem
2 De momento, expliquemos cuál sea la naturaleza del Bien en la. medida en que convenga a la presente discusión. El Bien es aquello de que están suspendidas todas las cosas y aquello que desean todos los seres teniéndolo por principio y estando necesitados de aquél. Él, en cambio, no está falto de nada, se…