Categoria: Enéada-III-7
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,12 (III,7,12) — A temporalidade do mundo sensível
Eneada-III, 7, 12 12. We are brought thus to the conception of a Natural-Principle – Time – a certain expanse (a quantitative phase) of the Life of the Soul, a principle moving forward by smooth and uniform changes following silently upon each other – a Principle, then, whose Act is sequent. But let us conceive…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,11 (III,7,11) — O tempo resulta da descida da alma
Eneada-III, 7, 11 11. To this end we must go back to the state we affirmed of Eternity, unwavering Life, undivided totality, limitless, knowing no divagation, at rest in unity and intent upon it. Time was not yet: or at least it did not exist for the Eternal Beings, though its being was implicit in…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,10 (III,7,10) — Tempo como acompanhamento do movimento
Eneada-III, 7, 10 10. Time, again, has been described as some sort of a sequence upon Movement, but we learn nothing from this, nothing is said, until we know what it is that produces this sequential thing: probably the cause and not the result would turn out to be Time. And, admitting such a thing,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,9 (III,7,9) — Tempo como medida do movimento
Eneada-III, 7, 9 9. “A Number, a Measure, belonging to Movement?” This, at least, is plausible since Movement is a continuous thin; but let us consider. To begin with, we have the doubt which met us when we probed its identification with extent of Movement: is Time the measure of any and every Movement? Have…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,8 (III,7,8) — Exame e rejeição das definições de tempo
Eneada-III, 7, 8 8. Movement Time cannot be – whether a definite act of moving is meant or a united total made up of all such acts – since movement, in either sense, takes place in Time. And, of course, if there is any movement not in Time, the identification with Time becomes all the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,5 (III,7,5) — Determinações positivas da eternidade
Eneada-III, 7, 5 5. This Ever-Being is realized when upon examination of an object I am able to say – or rather, to know – that in its very Nature it is incapable of increment or change; anything that fails by that test is no Ever-Existent or, at least, no Ever-All-Existent. But is perpetuity enough…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,4 (III,7,4) — O ser e a eternidade
Eneada-III, 7, 4 4. We must, however, avoid thinking of it as an accidental from outside grafted upon that Nature: it is native to it, integral to it. It is discerned as present essentially in that Nature like everything else that we can predicate There – all immanent, springing from that Essence and inherent to…
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MacKenna: Tratado 45,2 (III,7,2) — Teorias platônicas que identificam a eternidade
Eneada-III, 7, 2 2. What definition are we to give to Eternity? Can it be identified with the (divine or) Intellectual Substance itself? This would be like identifying Time with the Universe of Heavens and Earth – an opinion, it is true, which appears to have had its adherents. No doubt we conceive, we know,…
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Enneads III,7
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in Enéada-III-7Tractate 45 Third Ennead. Seventh tractate. Time and eternity. 1. Eternity and Time; two entirely separate things, we explain “the one having its being in the everlasting Kind, the other in the realm of Process, in our own Universe”; and, by continually using the words and assigning every phenomenon to the one or the other…
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Ennead III,7
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in Enéada-III-7Of Time and Eternity. A. ETERNITY. INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES. (1.) When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what “becomes” (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however we try to define…