Platão e platonismo

Categoria: Enéada-IV-6

  • Bouillet: Tratado 41 (IV, 6) – DES SENS ET DE LA MÉMOIRE

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    (I-II) La Sensation n’est pas une image imprimée à l’âme et semblable à l’empreinte d’un cachet sur la cire, mais un acte relatif aux objets qui sont de son domaine. Il faut ici distinguer la passion et la connaissance de la passion : la première est propre au corps, la seconde appartient à l’âme et…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 41,3 (IV,6,3) — A Memória

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    3. With this prologue we come to our discussion of Memory. That the soul, or mind, having taken no imprint, yet achieves perception of what it in no way contains need not surprise us; or rather, surprising though it is, we cannot refuse to believe in this remarkable power. The Soul is the Reason-Principle of…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 41,2 (IV,6,2) — Percepção e outros sentidos

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    2. But if perception does not go by impression, what is the process? The mind affirms something not contained within it: this is precisely the characteristic of a power – not to accept impression but, within its allotted sphere, to act. Besides, the very condition of the mind being able to exercise discrimination upon what…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 41,1 (IV,6,1) — Sensação, Memória e Visão

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    1. Perceptions are no imprints, we have said, are not to be thought of as seal-impressions on soul or mind: accepting this statement, there is one theory of memory which must be definitely rejected. Memory is not to be explained as the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in…

  • Enéada IV, 6, 3 — A Memória

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    3. Ahora nos toca hablar de la memoria. Y hemos de considerar como nada sorprendente, o mejor como verdaderamente sorprendente y, con todo, digno de crédito, que el alma cuente con una potencia tal que, aun sin recibir cosa alguna en sí misma, alcance a percibir los objetos que no posee. Porque el alma es,…

  • Enéada IV, 6, 2 — Percepção e outros sentidos

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    2. ¿Cómo, si no es así, se produce la sensación? Digamos que se refiere en realidad a objetos que ella no posee, porque es propio de toda facultad del alma no sufrir impresiones sino utilizar su poder con objetos para los que esté dispuesta. En este sentido, puede distinguirse perfectamente por el alma el objeto…

  • Enéada IV, 6, 1 — Sensação, Memória e Visão

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    1. No podrá decirse de las sensaciones que son huellas o improntas que se producen en el alma. Ni tampoco deberá afirmarse de los recuerdos que son de modo absoluto retenciones de conocimientos y de sensaciones, que se conservan en el alma por la persistencia de las improntas. Pues es evidente que las improntas no…

  • Enéada IV, 6 – Sobre a sensação e a memória

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    Plotin Traités 38-41. Dir. Trad. Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau. GF-Flammarion, 2007 Plano detalhado do tratado Capítulos 1-2: A sensação Cap 1, 1-11: A concepção da memória depende da concepção da sensação Cap 1,11-40: Explicação da visão. Não vemos, em nós, uma marca do visível, mas o vemos diretamente e fora de nós Cap 2,…

  • Guthrie: Tratado 41 (IV, 6) — Of Sensation and Memory.

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    FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. Of Sensation and Memory. STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER. If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar to the impression of a seal, we shall also, for the sake of consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations preserved in the soul…

  • 8 FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. Of Sensation and Memory.

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    OF SENSATION. VIDE Eneada-IV-6 24. (3) The soul contains the reasons of all things. The soul operates according to these reasons, whether incited to activity by some exterior object, or whether the soul be turned towards these reasons by folding back on herself. When the soul is incited to this activity by some exterior object,…