Categoria: Enéada-V-7
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Bouillet: Tratado 18 (V, 7) – Y A-T-IL DES IDÉES DES INDIVIDUS?
(I) Pour expliquer l’existence des différences essentielles qui constituent l’individualité de chaque être animé, il faut admettre que chaque âme individuelle est éternelle. Autant il y a d’individus dans le monde sensible, autant il doit y avoir de raisons séminales dans l’Âme universelle et d’idées dans l’Intelligence divine. Il ne s’ensuit pas d’ailleurs que le…
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Individualidade
V. 7. 1 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) [There are Forms of individuals; our personalities have eternal principles in the intelligible world. Arguments drawn from reincarnation and the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence do not serve to disprove this. We are made individuals by form, not matter. We must not be afraid of…
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MacKenna: Tratado 18,3 (V,7,3) — O caso particular dos gêmeos
3. In the case of twin birth among human beings how can we make out the Reason-Principles to be different; and still more when we turn to the animals and especially those with litters? Where the young are precisely alike, there is one Reason-Principle. But this would mean that after all there are not as…
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MacKenna: Tratado 18,1 (V,7,1) — Há uma Ideia dos seres individuais?
1. We have to examine the question whether there exists an ideal archetype of individuals, in other words whether I and every other human being go back to the Intellectual, every [living] thing having origin and principle There. If Socrates, Socrates’ soul, is external then the Authentic Socrates – to adapt the term – must…
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MacKenna: Tratado 18,2 (V,7,2) — Dificuldades relativas ao nascimento das crianças
2. But individuals are brought into being by the union of the Reason-Principles of the parents, male and female: this seems to do away with a definite Reason-Principle for each of the offspring: one of the parents – the male let us say – is the source; and the offspring is determined not by Reason-Principles…
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Enéada V, 7, 3 — O caso particular dos gêmeos
3. ¿Cómo llegaremos a decir, sin embargo, que las razones de dos seres gemelos son virtualmente diferentes? ¿Y si acudimos al ejemplo de los animales y, sobre todo, al de los extraordinariamente fecundos? Porque, si no presentan ninguna diferencia, cuentan desde luego con una razón única. Y si esto es así, no puede haber ya…
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Enéada V, 7, 2 — Dificuldades relativas ao nascimento das crianças
2. Con todo, si las combinaciones de las razones del macho y de la hembra producen razones diferentes, no de a existir una razón para cada uno de los seres que nace. Y, por otra parte, cada uno de los generadores, como por ejemplo el macho, no produce según razones diferentes sino de acuerdo con…
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Enéada V, 7, 1 — Há uma Ideia dos seres individuais?
1. ¿Existen ideas de las cosas particulares? Porque si yo cada uno de nosotros podemos elevarnos a lo inteligible que mi principio y el de cada uno se encuentran presente ahí. Si Sócrates y el alma de Sócrates existiesen siempre, tendría que existir en el mundo inteligible, tal como se dice, un verdadero Sócrates en…
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Enéada V, 7 – Se há mesmo ideias dos seres individuais
Plotin Traités 7-21. Dir. Trad. Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau. GF-Flammarion, 2003. Plano detalhado do tratado. Capítulo 1. Há uma Ideia dos seres individuais? 1-5: Existe um “Sócrates em si” no mundo inteligível 6-16: Como evitar que haja um número ilimitado de modelos? A solução do retorno dos “períodos determinados” e a metensomatose 17-27: O…
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Guthrie: Tratado 18 (V, 7) – Do Ideas of Individuals Exist?
FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. Do Ideas of Individuals Exist? TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS. 1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals), exist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to trace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find separate individual…