Categoria: Enéada-V-9

XIV. Is this nature, therefore, which comprehends all things in the intelligible, to be considered as the first principle of things ? But how is this possible, since that which is truly the principle is one, and entirely simple, hut multitude subsists in beings ? After what manner, however, this all-comprehending nature subsists besides the…

XIII. It remains to consider whether what the sensible world alone contains is in the intelligible world, or whether as man himself is different from the sensible man, so with respect to soul, soul itself is different from the soul which is here, and intellect itself from the human intellect. In the first place, therefore,…

XII. If, however, the idea of man is there, the ideas of the rational and the artificial are also there, and likewise the arts which are the progeny of intellect. It is also requisite to assert, that the forms of universals are there, i.e. not of Socrates, but of man; though it must be considered…

XI With respect, therefore, to things pertaining to the arts, and the arts themselves, the arts that are imitative, such as painting, statuary, dancing and pantomine, since they derive their subsistence from sensibles, and employ and imitate a sensible paradigm, and also transfer [to their originals] the forms, motions and symmetries which they perceive, cannot…

IX. What then are the things in this one intellect, which we divide in our conceptions of it ? For it is necessary to exhibit them quiescent, and to survey them proceeding from thence, as if from science subsisting in unity. This world, therefore, being an animal comprehending in itself all animals, and possessing its…

VIII. If, therefore, intelligence is truly one, that form which is the object of its perception and idea itself are one. What therefore is this ? Intellect and an intellectual essence, each idea not being different from intellect, but each is intellect. And, in short, intellect is all forms; but each form is each intellect;…

VII. The sciences, however, of sensibles, which are in the rational soul, if it is proper to say that there are sciences of these, since the appellation adapted to them is that of opinion, in consequence of being posterior to sensible things, are the images of them. But the sciences of intelligibles, which are truly…

VI. Let, therefore, intellect be [real] beings, and possess all things in itself, not as in place but as itself, and as being one with them. But all things there subsist collectively at once, and yet nevertheless they are separated from each other; since the soul also which has many sciences in itself simultaneous, possesses…

V. It is necessary, however, to consider intellect truly so called neither as intellect in capacity, nor as proceeding from the privation to the possession of intellect. For if we do not, we must again investigate another intellect prior to this. But we must assume intellect in energy, and and which is always intellect. If…