Categoria: Enéada VI
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Crouzel (OP:19-20) – Uno, princípio de tudo
Dans le neuvième traité, le dernier de la 6e Ennéade selon l’ordre établi par Porphyre (VI, 9, 3) [14-22], l’Un est toujours désigné comme le principe de tout, le Bien et le Premier : c’est pourquoi pour parvenir à sa connaissance il faut se rapprocher de lui, loin du sensible et de toute malice, s’unifier…
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sphaira
Assim como o universo é na forma de uma esfera, todas as extremidades, sendo equidistantes do centro, são igualmente extremidades, e o centro, que está distante delas, é igualmente visto como opostas a todas elas. Assim sendo a natureza do mundo, quando uma pessoa dizendo que quaisquer uns destes pontos é acima o abaixo, não…
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tolma
gr. τόλμα, tolma = audácia; o principal motivo da descida da alma no pensamento de Plotino. Le terme tólma, « audace », et les mots qui en sont dérivés, peuvent avoir chez Plotin deux fonctions opposées qui apparaissent d’ailleurs toutes deux dans ce traité. L’audace peut, comme ici, avoir une fonction positive : il s’agit…
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O’Meara: Como a alma está presente no corpo
Dada a distinção de Plotino entre alma e corpo, pode-se questionar porque a alma, se é tão diferente do corpo, encontra-se ele mesmo em um corpo, e de fato como a alma poderia jamais estar presente em um corpo. Os Tratados 22 e 23, demonstram como Plotino tentou responder a Porfírio sobre esta questão. A…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,14 (VI, 7, 14) – INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY
INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY AND AS FRIENDSHIP. 14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit any kind of difference. As example, consider the (“seminal) reason” of a plant, and that of an animal.…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,13 (VI, 7, 13) – SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS
SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS HEIGHT OF SOURCE. 13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,12 (VI, 7, 12) – THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE
THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. 12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,11 (VI, 7, 11) – BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS?
BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? 11. (The Timaeus of Plato) states that heaven has not scorned to receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the universality of things. Whence does it…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,10 (VI, 7, 10) – APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION
APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. 10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense? To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,9 (VI, 7, 9) – MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT
MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. 9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since…