Categoria: Tratado 2 (IV,7)
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — Se a alma não é simples matéria, deve ser uma forma substancial
IF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL FORM. 4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she must be constituted by a substantial form.) Those who claim that the soul is a body are, by the very force of the truth, forced to recognize the existence, before and…
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — Mais três provas da incorporeidade da alma
THREE MORE PROOFS OF THE INCORPOREITY OF THE SOUL. 5. (h.) (The body has but a single kind of motion, while the soul has different ones.) If the soul is a body, how does it happen that she has different kinds of motion instead of a single one, as is the case with the body?…
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — O corpo não pode possuir sensação
THE BODY COULD NOT POSSESS SENSATION. 6. (k.) (The body could not possess either sensation, thought, or virtue.) If the soul were a body, she would not possess either sensation, thought, science, virtue, nor any of the perfections that render her more beautiful. Here follows the proof. IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE BODY TO HAVE SENSATION. The…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — A alma não é nem sopro nem uma “maneira de ser”
4. Our opponents themselves are driven by stress of fact to admit the necessity of a prior to body, a higher thing, some phase or form of soul; their “pneuma” (finer-body or spirit) is intelligent, and they speak of an “intellectual fire”; this “fire” and “spirit” they imagine to be necessary to the existence of…
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Nenhuma agregação atômica poderia produzir uma unidade
NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY. 3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.) To refute this error, we have…
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,9 (IV,7,9) — Corpos são ativos só por meio de poderes incorpóreos
BODIES ARE ACTIVE ONLY BY MEANS OF INCORPOREAL POWERS. (9.) There are men who locate the soul in the body, so as to give her a foundation in some sphere of activity, to account for the various phenomena in the body, such as getting hot or cold, pushing on or stopping, (and the like). They…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
3. Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very coherence of the constituents. Bodily materials, in nature repugnant to unification and to sensation, could…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,9 (IV,7,9) — A alma é princípio de vida: ela tem o ser e a vida por ela mesma
8. A. (sometimes appearing as 9) There are those who insist on the activities observed in bodies – warming, chilling, thrusting, pressing – and class soul with body, as it were to assure its efficacy. This ignores the double fact that the very bodies themselves exercise such efficiency by means of the incorporeal powers operating…
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Igal: Tratado 2,3 (IV, 7, 3) — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
3. Si no se admite esto y se afirma en cambio que la reunión de átomos o indivisibles es la que crea al alma, habrá que invocar como contrapartida la unión y la simpatía de las partes del alma, ya que no se produce ninguna intromisión y simpatía entre cuerpos que son impasibles e incapaces…
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Igal: Tratado 2,9 (IV, 7, 9) — A alma é princípio de vida: ela tem o ser e a vida por ela mesma
9. Pero existe otra naturaleza que, por sí misma, posee el ser y constituye el ser verdadero, que ni nace ni perece. Pues si pereciese, todas las cosas desaparecerían con ella y, finalmente, ya no podrían renacer. Porque es ese ser el que les procura su conservación, y no sólo a ellas sino también a…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by similitude of passion, and by apposition; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,9 (IV,7,9) — A alma é princípio de vida: ela tem o ser e a vida por ela mesma
IX. There must, therefore, be another nature which possesses existence from itself, and such is every thing which is truly being, and which is neither generated, nor destroyed. For without the subsistence of this, all things would vanish into non-entity, and this perishing, would not afterwards be generated; since this imparts safety to all other…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,1 (IV,7,1) — Somos inteiramente ou parcialmente imortais?
1. Whether every human being is immortal or we are wholly destroyed, or whether something of us passes over to dissolution and destruction, while something else, that which is the true man, endures for ever – this question will be answered here for those willing to investigate our nature. We know that man is not…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — A alma não é um corpo e ela não é corporal
2. But of what nature is this sovereign principle? If material, then definitely it must fall apart; for every material entity, at least, is something put together. If it is not material but belongs to some other Kind, that new substance must be investigated in the same way or by some more suitable method. But…
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Guthrie: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — A sensação não pode ser acionada de órgão de sentido para princípio diretor
SENSATION CANNOT BE RELAYED FROM SENSE-ORGAN TO DIRECTING PRINCIPLE. 7. The same reflections may be made about pain, and one’s feeling of it. When a man’s finger is said to give him pain, this, no doubt, is a recognition that the seat of the pain is in the finger, and that the feeling of pain…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — O corpo não pode ser o princípio nem da existência nem do movimento
5. Again, there is movement: all bodily movement is uniform; failing an incorporeal soul, how account for diversity of movement? Predilections, reasons, they will say; that is all very well, but these already contain that variety and therefore cannot belong to body which is one and simplex, and, besides, is not participant in reason –…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação
6. It is easy to show that if the Soul were a corporeal entity, there could be no sense-perception, no mental act, no knowledge, no moral excellence, nothing of all that is noble. There can be no perception without a unitary percipient whose identity enables it to grasp an object as an entirety. The several…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação (2)
7. We come to the same result by examining the sense of pain. We say there is pain in the finger: the trouble is doubtless in the finger, but our opponents must admit that the sensation of the pain is in the centre of consciousness. The suffering member is one thing, the sense of suffering…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,8 (IV,7,8) — Se a alma fosse um corpo não teria pensar
8. It can be shown also that the intellectual act would similarly be impossible if the soul were any form of body. If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul’s employment of the body, intellection cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation. If then intellection is…
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MacKenna: Tratado 2,10 (IV,7,10) — Mistura, associação ou combinação de alma e corpo
8. B. (10) If the soul is body and permeates the entire body-mass, still even in this entire permeation the blending must be in accord with what occurs in all cases of bodily admixing. Now: if in the admixing of bodies neither constituent can retain its efficacy, the soul too could no longer be effective…