Categoria: Tratado 26 (III,6)
-
Tratado 26,3 (III,6,3) — Discussão sobre as paixões: qual é a parte do corpo? da alma? (MacKenna)
—
3. But how do we explain likings and aversions? Sorrow, too, and anger and pleasure, desire and fear – are these not changes, affectings, present and stirring within the Soul? This question cannot be ignored. To deny that changes take place and are intensely felt is in sharp contradiction to obvious facts. But, while we…
-
Tratado 26 (III, 6) – Sobre a impassibilidade dos incorporais
—
O tratado 26 poderia como os tratados 22 e 23 levar um título paradoxal: como o que parece sofrer não sofre. Trata-se com efeito para Plotino de retificar dois erros que se apoiam sobre nossos “hábitos de linguagem”: aquele que nos faz falar de “paixões da alma” e aquele, mais diretamente associado à escola peripatética,…
-
Tratado 26,6-19 (III, 6, 6-19) – Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Matter) (Guthrie)
—
THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter). B. OF MATTER. INTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN FRAGMENT. 6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible “being” which is entirely comprised within the genus of form. But as matter also, though in another manner, is an incorporeal entity, we…
-
Tratado 26,6 (III,6,6) — Refutação da tese estoica segundo a qual o ser é corporal (MacKenna)
—
6. the Intellectual Essence, wholly of the order of Ideal-form, must be taken as impassive has been already established. But Matter also is an incorporeal, though after a mode of its own; we must examine, therefore, how this stands, whether it is passive, as is commonly held, a thing that can be twisted to every…
-
Tratado 26,16 (III,6,16) — A matéria e a dimensão: o problema da grandeza (MacKenna)
—
16. An Ideal-Principle approaches and leads Matter towards some desired dimension, investing this non-existent underlie with a magnitude from itself which never becomes incorporate – for Matter, if it really incorporated magnitude, would be a mass. Eliminate this Ideal-Form and the substratum ceases to be a thing of magnitude, or to appear so: the mass…
-
Tratado 26,1 (III,6,1) — Primeiras questões concernentes à impassibilidade (MacKenna)
—
1. In our theory, feelings are not states; they are action upon experience, action accompanied by judgement: the states, we hold, are seated elsewhere; they may be referred to the vitalized body; the judgement resides in the Soul, and is distinct from the state – for, if it is not distinct, another judgement is demanded,…
-
Tratado 26,2 (III,6,2) — O vício é uma alteração da alma? (MacKenna)
—
2. Let us begin with virtue and vice in the Soul. What has really occurred when, as we say, vice is present? In speaking of extirpating evil and implanting goodness, of introducing order and beauty to replace a former ugliness, we talk in terms of real things in the Soul. Now when we make virtue…
-
Tratado 26,4 (III,6,4) — O que é a potência passiva (pathetikon)? (MacKenna)
—
4. We have, however, still to examine what is called the affective phase of the Soul. This has, no doubt, been touched upon above where we dealt with the passions in general as grouped about the initiative phase of the Soul and the desiring faculty in its effort to shape things to its choice: but…
-
Tratado 26,5 (III,6,5) — Impassibilidade e purificação (MacKenna)
—
5. But why have we to call in Philosophy to make the Soul immune if it is thus immune from the beginning? Because representations attack it at what we call the affective phase and cause a resulting experience, a disturbance, to which disturbance is joined the image of threatened evil: this amounts to an affection…
-
Tratado 26,7 (III,6,7) — A matéria não é um corpo, mas o “verdadeiramente não-ser” (MacKenna)
—
7. We are thus brought back to the nature of that underlying matter and the things believed to be based upon it; investigation will show us that Matter has no reality and is not capable of being affected. Matter must be bodiless – for body is a later production, a compound made by Matter in…
-
Tratado 26,8 (III,6,8) — Em diálogo com Aristóteles: uma realidade não sofre a não ser de seu contrário (MacKenna)
—
8. It is a general principle that, to be modified, an object must be opposed in faculty, and in quality to the forces that enter and act upon it. Thus where heat is present, the change comes by something that chills, where damp by some drying agency: we say a subject is modified when from…
-
Tratado 26,9 (III,6,9) — Sequência da discussão com o tratado “Da geração e da corrupção” de Aristóteles (MacKenna)
—
9. In answer: It must, first, be noted that there are a variety of modes in which an object may be said to be present to another or to exist in another. There is a “presence” which acts by changing the object – for good or for ill – as we see in the case…
-
Tratado 26,10 (III,6,10) — A matéria não sofre alteração (MacKenna)
—
10. Further: If Matter were susceptible of modification, it must acquire something by the incoming of the new state; it will either adopt that state, or, at least, it will be in some way different from what it was. Now upon this first incoming quality suppose a second to supervene; the recipient is no longer…
-
Tratado 26,11 (III,6,11) — Em que sentido a matéria má, participa do Bem (MacKenna)
—
11. I think, in fact, that Plato had this in mind where he justly speaks of the Images of Real Existents “entering and passing out”: these particular words are not used idly: he wishes us to grasp the precise nature of the relation between Matter and the Ideas. The difficulty on this point is not…
-
Tratado 26,12 (III,6,12) — Sequência da reflexão sobre a “participação impassível” (MacKenna)
—
12. This is Plato’s conception: to him participation does not, in the case of Matter, comport any such presence of an Ideal-form in a Substance to be shaped by it as would produce one compound thing made up of the two elements changing at the same moment, merging into one another, modified each by the…
-
Tratado 26 (III, 6) – Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul) (Guthrie)
—
THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter). A. OF THE SOUL. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL 1. Sensations are not affections, but actualizations, and judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other (than the soul); that is, in the organized body,…
-
Tratado 26,13 (III,6,13) — Em que sentido a matéria “foge da forma” (MacKenna)
—
13. Further, they must explain in what sense they hold that Matter tends to slip away from its form (the Idea). Can we conceive it stealing out from stones and rocks or whatever else envelops it? And of course they cannot pretend that Matter in some cases rebels and sometimes not. For if once it…
-
Tratado 26 (III, 6, 16-19) — ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. (Thomas Taylor)
—
XVI. Moreover, a certain reason acceding and extending matter as far as it proceeds into it, causes it to be great, investing it from itself with greatness, which is not in matter. But matter does not through this become quantity ; for if it did, that which is great in it would be magnitude. If,…
-
Tratado 26 (III, 6, 6-15) — ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. (Thomas Taylor)
—
VI. That the intelligible essence, indeed, the whole of which is arranged according to form, is necessarily impassive, has been already shown. Since, however, matter also is something incorporeal, though after another manner (than the intelligible,) concerning this likewise it must be considered after what manner it subsists; whether it is passive, as it is…
-
Tratado 26 (III, 6) — ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. (Thomas Taylor)
—
I. If we should say that the senses are not passions, but energies and judgments about the passions, the passions indeed subsisting about something else, as for instance about a body affected in a certain manner, but judgment about the soul; judgment not being passion, for if it were, another judgment would again be necessary,…