Categoria: Tratado 27 (IV,3)
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)
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SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. 8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We have already shown that there is one Soul (the…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. 7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by some. It only means what Plato desired to assert…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human? (Guthrie)
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WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE HUMAN? 6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things within herself, and…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels. (Guthrie)
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SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS. 5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such a doctrine would be equivalent…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings. (Guthrie)
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INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS. 4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences of this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the universal Soul’s simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings? How does it happen that some souls are…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness? (Guthrie)
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CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS? 3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of the entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force us to the conclusion either that…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte (Guthrie)
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CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER. 2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that souls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects, and the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that they are parts (of the universal Soul). We…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo (Guthrie)
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PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. 1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 24) — WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH? (Guthrie)
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THE SOUL AFTER DEATH GOES TO THE PLACE SUITED TO IT BY RETRIBUTION. 24. Whither will the soul pass when she shall have left the body? She will not go where there is nothing suitable to receive her. She could not pass into what is not naturally disposed to receive her, unless there be something…
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Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (2) (MacKenna)
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32. But the memory of friends, children, wife? Country too, and all that the better sort of man may reasonably remember? All these, the one (the lower man) retains with emotion, the authentic man passively: for the experience, certainly, was first felt in that lower phase from which, however, the best of such impressions pass…
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Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (1) (MacKenna)
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31. But if each of the two phases of the soul, as we have said, possesses memory, and memory is vested in the imaging faculty, there must be two such faculties. Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes…
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Tratado 27,30 (IV,3,30) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (3) (MacKenna)
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30. But what of the memory of mental acts: do these also fall under the imaging faculty? If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may well believe that this image, fixed and like a picture of the thought, would explain how we remember the object of knowledge once entertained. But if there…
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Tratado 27,29 (IV,3,29) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (2) (MacKenna)
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29. Are we, then, to refer memory to the perceptive faculty and so make one principle of our nature the seat of both awareness and remembrance? Now supposing the very Shade, as we were saying in the case of Hercules, has memory, then the perceptive faculty is twofold. ((And if (on the same supposition) the…
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Tratado 27,28 (IV,3,28) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (1) (MacKenna)
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28. Is memory vested in the faculty by which we perceive and learn? Or does it reside in the faculty by which we set things before our minds as objects of desire or of anger, the passionate faculty? This will be maintained on the ground that there could scarcely be both a first faculty in…
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Tratado 27,27 (IV,3,27) — A memória não pertence ao vivente (MacKenna)
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27. But of what soul; of that which we envisage as the more divine, by which we are human beings, or that other which springs from the All? Memory must be admitted in both of these, personal memories and shared memories; and when the two souls are together, the memories also are as one; when…
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Tratado 27,26 (IV,3,26) — A memória não pertence ao vivente (MacKenna)
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26. Now if sensations of the active order depend upon the Couplement of soul and body, sensation must be of that double nature. Hence it is classed as one of the shared acts: the soul, in the feeling, may be compared to the workman in such operations as boring or weaving, the body to the…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3) — Sobre as dificuldades relativas à alma (1) (MacKenna)
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The Fourth Ennead Third tractate. Problems of the soul (1).
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Tratado 27,24 (IV,3,24) — A saída da alma fora do corpo (MacKenna)
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24. Now comes the question of the soul leaving the body; where does it go? It cannot remain in this world where there is no natural recipient for it; and it cannot remain attached to anything not of a character to hold it: it can be held here when only it is less than wise,…
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Tratado 27,23 (IV,3,23) — Como as faculdades da alma se exercem localmente (MacKenna)
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23. I explain: A living body is illuminated by soul: each organ and member participates in soul after some manner peculiar to itself; the organ is adapted to a certain function, and this fitness is the vehicle of the soul-faculty under which the function is performed; thus the seeing faculty acts through the eyes, the…
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Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 2-8) — SOBRE LAS DIFICULTADES ACERCA DEL ALMA I (Igal)
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2. Con respecto a esto hemos de responder lo siguiente: admiten (quienes así hablan) que las almas individuales son homogéneas con las del universo, mostrando que alcanzan los mismos objetos y que son de su mismo linaje, lo que equivale a negar que sean partes de él. Mejor podríamos decir que la misma alma es…