Categoria: Tratado 28 (IV,4)
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Tratado 28,24 (IV,4,24) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (2) (MacKenna)
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24. The next question is whether perception is concerned only with need. The soul, isolated, has no sense-perception; sensations go with the body; sensation itself therefore must occur by means of the body to which the sensations are due; it must be something brought about by association with the body. Thus either sensation occurs in…
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Tratado 28,23 (IV,4,23) — Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos (1) (MacKenna)
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23. A first principle is that the knowing of sensible objects is an act of the soul, or of the living conjoint, becoming aware of the quality of certain corporeal entities, and appropriating the ideas present in them. This apprehension must belong either to the soul isolated, self-acting, or to soul in conjunction with some…
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Tratado 28,22 (IV,4,22) — A terra pode ter sensações? (MacKenna)
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22. And as regards vegetal forms? Are we to imagine beneath the leading principle (the “Nature” phase) some sort of corporeal echo of it, something that would be tendency or desire in us and is growth in them? Or are we to think that, while the earth (which nourishes them) contains the principle of desire…
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Tratado 28,21 (IV,4,21) — O desejo (2) (MacKenna)
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21. That this is the phase of the human being in which desire takes its origin is shown by observation of the different stages of life; in childhood, youth, maturity, the bodily desires differ; health or sickness also may change them, while the (psychic) faculty is of course the same through all: the evidence is…
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Tratado 28,20 (IV,4,20) — O desejo (1) (MacKenna)
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20. As with bodily pain and pleasure so with the bodily desires; their origin, also, must be attributed to what thus stands midway, to that Nature we described as the corporeal. Body undetermined cannot be imagined to give rise to appetite and purpose, nor can pure soul be occupied about sweet and bitter: all this…
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Tratado 28,19 (IV,4,19) — O prazer e a dor (MacKenna)
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19. Thus what we know as pleasure and pain may be identified: pain is our perception of a body despoiled, deprived of the image of the soul; pleasure our perception of the living frame in which the image of the soul is brought back to harmonious bodily operation. The painful experience takes place in that…
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Tratado 28,17 (IV,4,17) — A questão da sucessão das razões na alma (MacKenna)
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17. But how comes it that the intuitions and the Reason-Principles of the soul are not in the same timeless fashion within ourselves, but that here the later of order is converted into a later of time – bringing in all these doubts? Is it because in us the governing and the answering principles are…
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Tratado 28,16 (IV,4,16) — A questão da sucessão: ela existe nos produtos da alma, mas não nela (MacKenna)
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16. But if in the soul thing follows thing, if there is earlier and later in its productions, if it engenders or creates in time, then it must be looking towards the future; and if towards the future, then towards the past as well? No: prior and past are in the things its produces; in…
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Tratado 28,15 (IV,4,15) — A questão da temporalidade: as almas não estão no tempo (MacKenna)
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15. But there is a difficulty affecting this entire settlement: Eternity is characteristic of the Intellectual-Principle, time of the soul – for we hold that time has its substantial being in the activity of the soul, and springs from soul – and, since time is a thing of division and comports a past, it would…
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Tratado 28,14 (IV,4,14) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (5) (MacKenna)
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14. Of the corporeal thus brought into being by Nature the elemental materials of things are its very produce, but how do animal and vegetable forms stand to it? Are we to think of them as containers of Nature present within them? Light goes away and the air contains no trace of it, for light…
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Tratado 28,13 (IV,4,13) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (4) (MacKenna)
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13. But what is the difference between the Wisdom thus conducting the universe and the principle known as Nature? This Wisdom is a first (within the All-Soul) while Nature is a last: for Nature is an image of that Wisdom, and, as a last in the soul, possesses only the last of the Reason-Principle: we…
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Tratado 28,12 (IV,4,12) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (3) (MacKenna)
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12. It may be urged that all the multiplicity and development are the work of Nature, but that, since there is wisdom within the All, there must be also, by the side of such natural operation, acts of reasoning and of memory. But this is simply a human error which assumes wisdom to be what…
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Tratado 28,11 (IV,4,11) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (2) (MacKenna)
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11. The administration of the kosmos is to be thought of as that of a living unit: there is the action determined by what is external, and has to do with the parts, and there is that determined by the internal and by the principle: thus a doctor basing his treatment on externals and on…
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Tratado 28,10 (IV,4,10) — Zeus enquanto alma do mundo (1) (MacKenna)
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10. The ordering principle is twofold; there is the principle known to us as the Demiurge and there is the Soul of the All; we apply the appellation “Zeus” sometimes to the Demiurge and sometimes to the principle conducting the universe. When under the name of Zeus we are considering the Demiurge we must leave…
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Tratado 28,9 (IV,4,9) — Zeus como demiurgo (MacKenna)
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9. But Zeus – ordering all, governor, guardian and disposer, possessor for ever of the kingly soul and the kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding over all things as they come, administering all under plan and system, unfolding the periods of the kosmos, many of which stand already accomplished –…
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Tratado 28,8 (IV,4,8) — Os astros (2) (MacKenna)
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8. But, we need not record in memory all we see; mere incidental concomitants need not occupy the imagination; when things vividly present to intuition, or knowledge, happen to occur in concrete form, it is not necessary – unless for purposes of a strictly practical administration – to pass over that direct acquaintance, and fasten…
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Tratado 28,7 (IV,4,7) — Os astros (1) (MacKenna)
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7. Well but can they not tell themselves that yesterday, or last year, they moved round the earth, that they lived yesterday or at any given moment in their lives? Their living is eternal, and eternity is an unchanging unity. To identify a yesterday or a last year in their movement would be like isolating…
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Tratado 28,5 (IV,4,5) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (5) (MacKenna)
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5. But this power which determines memory is it also the principle by which the Supreme becomes effective in us? At any time when we have not been in direct vision of that sphere, memory is the source of its activity within us; when we have possessed that vision, its presence is due to the…
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Tratado 28,4 (IV,4,4) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (4) (MacKenna)
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4. In that realm it has also vision, through the Intellectual-Principle, of The Good which does not so hold to itself as not to reach the soul; what intervenes between them is not body and therefore is no hindrance – and, indeed, where bodily forms do intervene there is still access in many ways from…
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Tratado 28,3 (IV,4,3) — A memória em sua relação à união da alma e do corpo (3) (MacKenna)
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3. But it leaves that conjunction; it cannot suffer that unity; it falls in love with its own powers and possessions, and desires to stand apart; it leans outward so to speak: then, it appears to acquire a memory of itself. In this self-memory a distinction is to be made; the memory dealing with the…