Categoria: Tratado 38 (VI,7)
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Tratado 38 (VI, 7) – HOW IDEAS MULTIPLIED, AND THE GOOD (Guthrie)
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A. HOW IDEAS MULTIPLY. 1. The eyes were implanted in man by divine foresight. Senses not given to man because of experience of misfortunes. Nor because of god’s foresight of these misfortunes. Foresight of creation is not the result of reasoning. Both reasoning and foresight are only figurative expressions. In god all things were simultaneous,…
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Tratado 38 (VI, 7) — Como a multiplicidade das formas-ideiais veio a ser: e sobre o Bem (MacKenna)
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The Sixth Ennead Seventh tractate. How the multiplicity of the ideal-forms came into being: and upon the Good.
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Tratado 38 (VI, 7) – Como a multiplicidade das ideias se estabeleceu e sobre o Bem
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Plotin Traités 38-41. Dir. Trad. Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau. GF-Flammarion, 2007 Neste longo tratado, Plotino examina a princípio a questão da relação de duas multiplicidades, aquela que caracteriza os objetos sensíveis e aquela que se encontra ao nível do Intelecto e no inteligível, antes de considerar em seguida esta multiplicidade inteligível em sua relação…
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Tratado 38 (VI, 7) – DE LA MULTITUDE DES IDÉES. — DU BIEN. (Bouillet)
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DES IDÉES (I) Quand l’homme crée, il a besoin de l’expérience et du raisonnement. Il ne saurait en être de même de l’Intelligence divine; elle a dû former le monde en embrassant dans un seul acte d’intuition l’ensemble et les détails. Tout en disposant les choses de manière à satisfaire la sagesse acquise par le…
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Tratado 38,14 (VI, 7, 14) – INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY (Guthrie)
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INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY AND AS FRIENDSHIP. 14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit any kind of difference. As example, consider the (“seminal) reason” of a plant, and that of an animal.…
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Tratado 38,13 (VI, 7, 13) – SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS (Guthrie)
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SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS HEIGHT OF SOURCE. 13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in…
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Tratado 38,12 (VI, 7, 12) – THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE (Guthrie)
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THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. 12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in…
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Tratado 38,11 (VI, 7, 11) – BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? (Guthrie)
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BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? 11. (The Timaeus of Plato) states that heaven has not scorned to receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the universality of things. Whence does it…
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Tratado 38,10 (VI, 7, 10) – APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION (Guthrie)
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APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. 10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense? To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if…
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Tratado 38,9 (VI, 7, 9) – MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT (Guthrie)
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MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. 9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since…
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Tratado 38,8 (VI, 7, 8) – INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD (Guthrie)
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INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE. 8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here…
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Tratado 38,7 (VI, 7, 7) – ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE (Guthrie)
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ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO THE SOUL HERSELF. 7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the (“seminal) reason” of…
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Tratado 38,6 (VI, 7, 6) – THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US (Guthrie)
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THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US. 6. What is the relation of the sense-power within the superior Soul (or, in the rational soul) ? Intelligible sensation perceives (intelligible) objects that, speaking strictly, are not sensible, and corresponds to the (intelligible) manner in which they are perceivable. Thus (by this intelligible sense-power) the Soul perceives…
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Tratado 38,5 (VI, 7, 5) – MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON (Guthrie)
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MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON. 5. Man must therefore have as “reason” (or, as essence), something else than the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite; that is, the soul would subsist in a particular “reason,” admitting that this “reason” was a certain actualization of the soul, though…
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Tratado 38,4 (VI, 7, 4) – SUCH QUESTIONS DEMAND SCRUTINY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN (Guthrie)
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SUCH QUESTIONS DEMAND SCRUTINY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN. 4. To answer these questions, we would have to go back to the nature of the intelligible Man. Before defining the latter, however, it would indeed be far better to begin by determining the nature of the sense-man, on the supposition that we know the latter very…
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Tratado 38,3 (VI, 7, 3) – INTELLIGENCE DID NOT DELIBERATE BEFORE MAKING SENSE-MAN (Guthrie)
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INTELLIGENCE DID NOT DELIBERATE BEFORE MAKING SENSE-MAN. 3. But why could Intelligence not have deliberated before producing the sense-man? The (man we know by our senses) was (created) by similitude to the (intelligible Man), nothing can be added to him, nothing subtracted. It is a mere supposition to say that Intelligence deliberates and reasons. The…
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Tratado 38,2 (VI, 7, 2) – IN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS FORM (Guthrie)
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IN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS FORM. 2. (By this process) we also know the nature of Intelligence, which we see still better than the other things, though we cannot grasp its magnitude. We admit, in fact, that it possesses the whatness (essence), of everything, but not its “whyness” (its…
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Tratado 38,1 (VI, 7, 1) – THE EYES WERE IMPLANTED IN MAN BY DIVINE FORESIGHT (Guthrie)
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THE EYES WERE IMPLANTED IN MAN BY DIVINE FORESIGHT. 1. When the (higher) Divinity, or (some lower) divinity, sent souls down into generation, He gave to the face of man eyes suitable to enlighten him, and placed in the body the other organs suited to the senses, foreseeing that (a living organism) would be able…
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Tratado 38,42 (VI,7,42) — A hierarquia do real (MacKenna)
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Resumo em português 42. Faced by the difficulty of placing these powers, you must in reason allocate to the secondaries what you count august: secondaries must not be foisted upon the First, or tertiaries upon the secondaries. Secondaries are to be ranged under the First, tertiaries under the secondaries: this is giving everything its place,…
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Tratado 38,41 (VI,7,41) — O Ato de Pensar (MacKenna)
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Resumo em português 41. Intellection seems to have been given as an aid to the diviner but weaker beings, an eye to the blind. But the eye itself need not see Being since it is itself the light; what must take the light through the eye needs the light because of its darkness. If, then,…