Categoria: Tratado 38 (VI,7)
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,14 (VI,7,14) — Multiplicidade das formas de todos os viventes
Resumo em português 14. On the nature of the Intellectual-Principle we get light from its manifestations; they show that it demands such diversity as is compatible with its being a monad. Take what principle you will, that of plant or animal: if this principle were a pure unity and not a specifically varied thing, it…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,16 (VI,7,16) — Em que sentido o inteligível é uma imagem do Bem?
Resumo em português 16. But even there we are not to remain always, in that beauty of the multiple; we must make haste yet higher, above this heaven of ours and even that; leaving all else aside we ask in awe “Who produced that realm and how?” Everything There is a single Idea in an…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,17 (VI,7,17) — O Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem
Resumo em português 17. But in what mode are these secondaries, and Intellectual-Principle itself, within the First? They are not in the Filling Principle; they are not in the filled since before that moment it did not contain them. Giving need not comport possessing; in this order we are to think of a giver as…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,18 (VI,7,18) — O Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem
Resumo em português 18. But in what way is the content of Intellectual-Principle participant in good? Is it because each member of it is an Idea or because of their beauty or how? Anything coming from The Good carries the image and type belonging to that original or deriving from it, as anything going back…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,19 (VI,7,19) — Em qual sentido o Bem é um objeto de desejo para a alma?
Resumo em português 19. Are we to rest all on pursuit and on the soul? Is it enough to put faith in the soul’s choice and call that good which the soul pursues, never asking ourselves the motive of its choice? We marshal demonstration as to the nature of everything else; is the good to…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,20 (VI,7,20) — Em qual sentido o Bem é um objeto de desejo para a alma?
Resumo em português 20. Since we are not entitled to make desire the test by which to decide on the nature and quality of the good, we may perhaps have recourse to judgement. We would apply the opposition of things – order, disorder; symmetry, irregularity; health, illness; form, shapelessness; real-being, decay: in a word continuity…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,21 (VI,7,21) — A alma deseja o Intelecto
Resumo em português 21. Now what in all these objects of desire is the fundamental making them good? We must be bold: Intellectual-Principle and that life are of the order of good and hold their desirability, even they, in virtue of belonging to that order; they have their goodness, I mean, because Life is an…
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MacKenna: Tratado 38,22 (VI,7,22) — O Intelecto é uma imagem do Bem
Resumo em português 22. That light known, then indeed we are stirred towards those Beings in longing and rejoicing over the radiance about them, just as earthly love is not for the material form but for the Beauty manifested upon it. Every one of those Beings exists for itself but becomes an object of desire…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,7 (VI, 7, 7) – ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE
ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO THE SOUL HERSELF. 7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the (“seminal) reason” of…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,8 (VI, 7, 8) – INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD
INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE. 8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,9 (VI, 7, 9) – MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT
MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. 9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,10 (VI, 7, 10) – APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION
APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. 10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense? To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,11 (VI, 7, 11) – BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS?
BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? 11. (The Timaeus of Plato) states that heaven has not scorned to receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the universality of things. Whence does it…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,12 (VI, 7, 12) – THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE
THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. 12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,13 (VI, 7, 13) – SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS
SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS HEIGHT OF SOURCE. 13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,14 (VI, 7, 14) – INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY
INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY AND AS FRIENDSHIP. 14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit any kind of difference. As example, consider the (“seminal) reason” of a plant, and that of an animal.…
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Plotino – Tratado 38,42 (VI, 7, 42) — A hierarquia do real
42. Así, pues, cuando os surja alguna dificultad en esta cuestión y cuando os preguntéis dónde conviene colocar esas realidades a las que os conduce el pensamiento, dejadlas que recaigan en los seres de segundo rango que estimáis venerables y no atribuyáis al Ser Primero cosas que van bien con los seres que le siguen,…
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Plotino – Tratado 38,41 (VI, 7, 41) — O Ato de Pensar
41. Pues, al parecer, el pensamiento es una especie de auxilio que se otorga a naturalezas que son divinas pero de calidad inferior; estas naturalezas por sí mismas serían ciegas. Ahora bien, nos preguntamos, ¿qué necesidad tiene el ojo de ver si él es ya la luz misma? El ser que utiliza los ojos busca…
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Plotino – Tratado 38,40 (VI, 7, 40) — A condição do Bem, que é absolutamente um, primeiro e autárcico
40. Todos aquellos que se han acercado a él saben de cierto que no conviene atribuirle el pensamiento. Sin embargo, deberán añadirse otras argumentaciones a lo que ya se ha dicho, si es que procede seguir sirviéndose del lenguaje. Oportuno será unir al convencimiento la fuerza de la demostración. Desde luego, ha de tenerse por…
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Plotino – Tratado 38,39 (VI, 7, 39) — A doutrina platônica do ser e do conhecimento
39. Si no guarda distancia ni diferencia consigo mismo, ¿quién sino él mismo tendrá esta intuición? Es por ello por lo que (Platón) descubre la alteridad allí donde se da la inteligencia y la esencia. Porque la Inteligencia, en cuanto piensa, debe hacer aparecer siempre lo mismo y lo otro 1 . No hay otra…