Categoria: Tratado 39 (VI,8)

Resumo em português 13. Our enquiry obliges us to use terms not strictly applicable: we insist, once more, that not even for the purpose of forming the concept of the Supreme may we make it a duality; if now we do, it is merely for the sake of conveying conviction, at the cost of verbal…

8. But it is not, in our view, as an attribute that this freedom is present in the First. In the light of free acts, from which we eliminate the contraries, we recognise There self-determination, self-directed and, failing more suitable terms, we apply to it the lesser terms brought over from lesser things and so…

ALL SUCH LANGUAGE ABOUT THE DIVINITY IS METAPHORICAL. 13. Although the above expressions, when applied to the (divinity), are really not exact, we are nevertheless forced to use them in connection with this disquisition. We therefore repeat what was above rightly stated, that no doubleness, not even if merely logical, should be admitted to our…

Resumo e tradução em português 1. Can there be question as to whether the gods have voluntary action? Or are we to take it that, while we may well enquire in the case of men with their combination of powerlessness and hesitating power, the gods must be declared omnipotent, not merely some things but all…

Resumo e tradução em português 3. All this calls for examination; the enquiry must bring us close to the solution as regards the gods. We have traced self-disposal to will, will to reasoning and, next step, to right reasoning; perhaps to right reasoning we must add knowledge, for however sound opinion and act may be…

Resumo e tradução em português 4. It will be asked how act rising from desire can be voluntary, since desire pulls outward and implies need; to desire is still to be drawn, even though towards the good. Intellectual-Principle itself comes under the doubt; having a certain nature and acting by that nature can it be…

Resumo e tradução em português 5. Are we, however, to make freedom and self-disposal exclusive to Intellectual-Principle as engaged in its characteristic Act, Intellectual-Principle unassociated, or do they belong also to soul acting under that guidance and performing act of virtue? If freedom is to be allowed to soul in its Act, it certainly cannot…

Resumo e tradução em português 6. How then did we come to place freedom in the will when we made out free action to be that produced – or as we also indicated, suppressed – at the dictate of will? If what we have been saying is true and our former statement is consistent with…

Resumo em português 7. Soul becomes free when it moves, through Intellectual-Principle, towards The Good; what it does in that spirit is its free act; Intellectual-Principle is free in its own right. That principle of Good is the sole object of desire and the source of self-disposal to the rest, to soul when it fully…

Resumo em português 9. If we cannot but speak of Happening we must not halt at the word but look to the intention. And what is that? That the Supreme by possession of a certain nature and power is the Principle. Obviously if its nature were other it would be that other and if the…

Resumo em português 10. The upholder of Happening must be asked how this false happening can be supposed to have come about, taking it that it did, and haw the happening, then, is not universally prevalent. If there is to be a natural scheme at all, it must be admitted that this happening does not…

Resumo em português 11. But this Unoriginating, what is it? We can but withdraw, silent, hopeless, and search no further. What can we look for when we have reached the furthest? Every enquiry aims at a first and, that attained, rests. Besides, we must remember that all questioning deals with the nature of a thing,…

Resumo em português 14. Another approach: Everything to which existence may be attributed is either one with its essence or distinct from it. Thus any given man is distinct from essential man though belonging to the order Man: a soul and a soul’s essence are the same – that is, in case of soul pure…

The Sixth Ennead Eighth tractate. On free-will and the will of the One.

B. OF THE FREE WILL OF THE SUPREME. (Let us now consider the free will of the Good.) THE GOOD IS THE DESIRABLE IN ITSELF. 8. The nature of the Good is that which is desirable for its own sake. It is by the Good that the Soul and Intelligence exercise liberty when the Soul…

SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. Of the Will of the One. A. OF HUMAN FREE WILL, DOES FREE WILL BELONG TO GOD ONLY. OR TO OTHERS ONLY? 1. Do the divinities themselves possess free will, or is this limited to human beings, because of their many weaknesses and uncertainties? (For we assume that) the divinities possess…

Resumo em português 21. Could He then have made Himself otherwise than as He did? If He could we must deny Him the power to produce goodness for He certainly cannot produce evil. Power, There, is no producer of the inapt; it is that steadfast constant which is most decidedly power by inability to depart…