Categoria: Tratado 45 (III,7)

Eneada-III, 7, 10 10. Time, again, has been described as some sort of a sequence upon Movement, but we learn nothing from this, nothing is said, until we know what it is that produces this sequential thing: probably the cause and not the result would turn out to be Time. And, admitting such a thing,…

Eneada-III, 7, 13 13. The Spheral Circuit, then, performed in Time, indicates it: but when we come to Time itself there is no question of its being “within” something else: it must be primary, a thing “within itself.” It is that in which all the rest happens, in which all movement and rest exist smoothly…

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. Of Time and Eternity. B. TIME. THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED. If those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their views about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity what we have to say of the idea of time, and…

The Third Ennead Seventh tractate. Time and eternity.

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. Of Time and Eternity. A. ETERNITY. INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES. (1.) When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what “becomes” (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however…

Eneada-III, 7, 12 12. We are brought thus to the conception of a Natural-Principle – Time – a certain expanse (a quantitative phase) of the Life of the Soul, a principle moving forward by smooth and uniform changes following silently upon each other – a Principle, then, whose Act is sequent. But let us conceive…

Eneada-III, 7, 1 I. With respect to eternity and time, we say that each of these is different from the other, and that one of them indeed is conversant with a perpetual nature, but the other about that which is generated. We also think that we have a certain clear perception of these in our…

Eneada-III, 7, 9 9. “A Number, a Measure, belonging to Movement?” This, at least, is plausible since Movement is a continuous thin; but let us consider. To begin with, we have the doubt which met us when we probed its identification with extent of Movement: is Time the measure of any and every Movement? Have…

Eneada-III, 7, 8 8. Movement Time cannot be – whether a definite act of moving is meant or a united total made up of all such acts – since movement, in either sense, takes place in Time. And, of course, if there is any movement not in Time, the identification with Time becomes all the…

Eneada-III, 7, 6 6. Now the Principle this stated, all good and beauty, and everlasting, is centred in The One, sprung from It, and pointed towards It, never straying from It, but ever holding about It and in It and living by Its law; and it is in this reference, as I judge, that Plato…

Eneada-III, 7, 5 5. This Ever-Being is realized when upon examination of an object I am able to say – or rather, to know – that in its very Nature it is incapable of increment or change; anything that fails by that test is no Ever-Existent or, at least, no Ever-All-Existent. But is perpetuity enough…

Eneada-III, 7, 4 4. We must, however, avoid thinking of it as an accidental from outside grafted upon that Nature: it is native to it, integral to it. It is discerned as present essentially in that Nature like everything else that we can predicate There – all immanent, springing from that Essence and inherent to…

Eneada-III, 7, 3 3. What, then, can this be, this something in virtue of which we declare the entire divine Realm to be Eternal, everlasting? We must come to some understanding of this perpetuity with which Eternity is either identical or in conformity. It must at once, be at once something in the nature of…

Eneada-III, 7, 2 2. What definition are we to give to Eternity? Can it be identified with the (divine or) Intellectual Substance itself? This would be like identifying Time with the Universe of Heavens and Earth – an opinion, it is true, which appears to have had its adherents. No doubt we conceive, we know,…

Eneada-III, 7, 1 1. Eternity and Time; two entirely separate things, we explain “the one having its being in the everlasting Kind, the other in the realm of Process, in our own Universe”; and, by continually using the words and assigning every phenomenon to the one or the other category, we come to think that,…

Eneada-III, 7, 2 II. What, therefore, will that be according to which we say, the whole world which is there is eternal and perpetual? And what is perpetuity ? Whether it is the same with eternity, or eternity subsists according to perpetuity. Shall we say, therefore, that it is necessary to conceive of eternity as…

Eneada-III, 7, 7 VII. It is not, indeed, possible, that time should be motion, neither if all motions are assumed, and one as it were is produced from all of them, nor if that motion is assumed which is orderly. For each of these motions is in time. If, however, some one should say that…