Platonismo

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====== Jowett: Epinomis 973b-976c — Onde buscar a Sabedoria? ======




Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Athenian : My dear Cleinias, you are quite right, yet I think you are about to hear a strange statement ; and, in a sense, one that is not so strange either. For many on becoming acquainted with life (973c) have the same account to give — that the human race will not be blessed or happy. So follow me now and apprehend if you conceive me, as well as them, to be giving a proper account of this matter. I say it is impossible for men to be blessed and happy, except a few ; that is, so long as we are living : I limit it to that. But one may rightly hope to attain after death all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can and in death to find a noble end. What I say is (973d) no subtle doctrine, but a thing that all of us, Greeks and foreigners alike, in some way perceive — that from the beginning existence is difficult for every live creature : first, partaking of the state of things conceived, then again, being born, and further, being reared and educated — all these processes involve a vast amount of toil, (974a) we all agree. And our time must be a short one, I do not say in the reckoning of the wretched, but on any supposition of what is tolerable. It does seem to give just a breathing-space about the middle of human life : yet swiftly old age is upon us, and must make any of us loth ever to live our life again, when one reckons over the life one has lived — unless one happens to be a bundle of childish notions.

And what, pray, is my evidence for this ? It is that such is the nature of the matter now under inquiry (974b) in our discussion. We are inquiring, you know, in what way we shall become wise, presuming that each of us has this power in some sort or other : but it evades and escapes us as soon as we attempt any knowledge of reputed arts or knowledges or any of the ordinary sciences, as we suppose them to be ; for none of them is worthy to be called by the title of the wisdom that pertains to these human affairs. Yet the soul firmly believes and divines that in some fashion she has it, (974c) but what it is that she has, or when, or how, she is quite unable to discover. Is not this a fair picture of our puzzle about wisdom and the inquiry that we have to make — a greater one than any of us could expect who are found able to examine ourselves and others intelligently and consistently by every kind and manner of argument ? Is the case not so, or shall we agree that so it is ?

Cleinias : We shall probably agree with you on that, my good sir, (974d) in the hope which in time you will surely give us of forming hereafter the truest opinion on these matters.

Athenian : Then first we must go through the other sciences, which are reputed as such, but do not render him wise who acquires and possesses them ; in order that, having put them out of the way, we may try to bring forward those that we require, and having brought them forward, to learn them.First, therefore, let us observe that while the sciences which are first needs of the human race (974e) are about the most necessary and truly the first, yet he who acquires a knowledge of them, though in the beginning he may have been regarded as wise in some sort, is now not reputed wise at all, but rather incurs reproach (975a) by the knowledge he has got. Now we must mention what they are, and that almost everyone who makes it his aim to be thought likely to prove himself in the end as good a man as possible avoids them, in order to gain the acquirements of understanding and study. So first let us take the practice among animate beings of eating each other, which, as the story goes, has made us refrain entirely from some, while it has settled us in the lawful eating of others. May the men of old time be gracious to us, as they are : for we must take our leave of whatever men were the first of those we were just mentioning ; but at any rate (975b) the making of barley-meal and flour, with the sustenance thereof, is noble and good indeed, yet it is never like to produce a perfectly wise man. For this very name of making must produce an irksomeness in the actual things that are made. Nor can it well be husbandry of land in general : for it is not by art but by a natural gift from Heaven, it seems, that we all have the earth put into our hands. Nor again is it the fabrication of dwellings and building in general, nor the production of all sorts of appliances — smiths’ work, (975c) and the supply of carpenters’, moulders’, plaiters’, and, in fine, all kinds of implements ; for this is of advantage to the public, but is not accounted for virtue. Nor again the whole practice of hunting, which although grown extensive and a matter of skilled art, gives no return of magnificence with its wisdom. Nor surely can it be divination or interpretation as a whole ; for these only know what is said, but have not learnt whether it be true.

And now that we see that the acquisition of necessaries (975d) is achieved by means of art, but that no such art makes any man wise, there may be some diversion remaining after this — imitative for the most part, but in no way serious. For they imitate with many instruments, and with many imitative acts, not altogether seemly, of their very bodies, in performances both of speech and of every Muse, and in those whereof painting is mother, and whereby many and most various designs are elaborated in many sorts, moist and dry ; and though a man ply his craft in these with the greatest zeal, in nothing is he rendered wise by imitation.

(975e) And when all these have been performed, there may yet remain assistance, in countless forms and countless cases : the greatest and most useful is called warfare, the art of generalship ; most glorified in time of need, requiring most good fortune, and assigned rather to a natural valor than to wisdom.

(976a) And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these is of high repute for the truest wisdom : for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors alike as giving assistance : yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all ; for a man cannot know (976b) the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law suits by their powers of speech, men who by memory and exercise of opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just.