Platonismo

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====== Jowett: Gorgias 476a-481b — Expiar sua falta ao invés de não expiá-la ======




Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question ; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider : — You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong ?

Pol. I should.

Soc. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just ? Please to reflect, and, tell me your opinion.

Pol. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

Soc. Consider again : — Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient ?

Pol. I should say so.

Soc. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action ? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will he struck violently or quickly ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way ?

Pol. Truly.

Soc. And if he cuts, the same argument holds — there will be something cut ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature ?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting : that the affection of the patient answers to the affection of the agent ?

Pol. I agree.

Soc. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting ?

Pol. Suffering, Socrates ; there can be no doubt of that.

Soc. And suffering implies an agent ?

Pol. Certainly, Socrates ; and he is the punisher.

Soc. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And therefore he acts justly ?

Pol. Justly.

Soc. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly ?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good ?

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Then he is benefited ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term “benefited” ? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.

Pol. Surely.

Soc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil ? Look at the matter in this way : — In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty ?

Pol. There is no greater evil.

Soc. Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity ?

Pol. I should.

Soc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own ?

Pol. Of course.

Soc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils — injustice, disease, poverty ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful ? — Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul ?

Pol. By far the most.

Soc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst ?

Pol. What do you mean, Socrates ?

Soc. I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by to be most disgraceful ?

Pol. It has been admitted.

Soc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick ?

Pol. Nay, Socrates ; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.

Soc. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful ; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils !

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty ? Does not the art of making money ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And what art frees us from disease ? Does not the art of medicine ?

Pol. Very true.

Soc. And what from vice and injustice ? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

Pol. To the physicians, Socrates.

Soc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate ?

Pol. To the judges, you mean.

Soc. — Who are to punish them ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice ?

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty ; medicine from disease ; and justice from intemperance and injustice ?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Which, then, is the best of these three ?

Pol. Will you enumerate them ?

Soc. Money-making, medicine, and justice.

Pol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

Soc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased ?

Pol. I think not.

Soc. A useful thing, then ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil ; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain — that you get well ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health ?

Pol. Clearly he who was never out of health.

Soc. Yes ; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

Pol. True.

Soc. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil — which of them is the most miserable ?

Pol. Clearly he who is not healed.

Soc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice ?

Pol. True. Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul ; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice ?

Pol. True.

Soc. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment ; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates ?

Pol. True.

Soc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut : — Is not that a parallel case ?

Pol. Yes, truly.

Soc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour ; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body ; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils ; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form ?

Pol. If you please.

Soc. Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils ?

Pol. That is quite clear.

Soc. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils ; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all ?

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend ? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished : I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men ; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer ; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers. — Was not that what I said ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And it has been proved to be true ?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric ? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil ?

Pol. True.

Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished ; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul ; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand : — is any other inference consistent with them ?

Pol. To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.

Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country ; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse — himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong ; he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole ; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable ; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say “Yes” or “No” to that ?

Pol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.

Soc. Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven ?

Pol. Yes ; it certainly is.

Soc. And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not — I except the case of self-defence — then I have to be upon my guard — but if my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge ; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment : if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice ; and if he has done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness ; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice ; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

Cal. Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking ?