Platonismo

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===== 127D-135B — COMO REMEDIAR AO MAL QUE SOFRE A POLÍTICA? =====
Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Alcibiades : Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.

Socrates : But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight (127e) at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself ; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

Alcibiades : Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates ?

Socrates : Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades : only do that, and with Heaven’s favor — if we are to put any trust in my divination — you and I shall both be in better case.

Alcibiades : That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

Socrates : Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself” —  (128a) for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are — and when does a man actually do it ? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things ?

Alcibiades : I at least believe so.

Socrates : Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet ? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet ?

Alcibiades : I do not understand.

Socrates : Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand ? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger ?

Alcibiades : No, indeed.

Socrates : And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body ?

(128b) Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet ?

Alcibiades : I do not quite understand, Socrates.

Socrates : Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not ?

Alcibiades : I do.

Socrates : And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Then what art makes shoes better ?

Alcibiades : Shoe-making.

Socrates : So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes ?

(128c) Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And over our foot too by shoe-making ? Or by that art whereby we make feet better ?

Alcibiades : By that art.

Socrates : And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better ?

Alcibiades : I think so.

Socrates : And is not that gymnastic ?

Alcibiades : Certainly.

Socrates : So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot ?

Alcibiades : Quite so.

Socrates : And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving (128d) and the rest over what belongs to the body ?

Alcibiades : Absolutely so.

Socrates : Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.

Alcibiades : Apparently.

Socrates : So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.

Alcibiades : Not at all.

Socrates : For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.

Alcibiades : Apparently not.

Socrates : Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves ?

Alcibiades : I cannot say.

(128e) Socrates : Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so ?

Alcibiades : That is true.

Socrates : Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe ?

Alcibiades : Impossible.

Socrates : Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.

Alcibiades : True.

Socrates : Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves ?

(129a) Alcibiades : Impossible.

Socrates : Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi ; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody ?

Alcibiades : I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody ; but often, too, that it was very hard.

Socrates : But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same : if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves ; but if we have it not, we never can.

Alcibiades : That is so.

(129b) Socrates : Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered ? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves ; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

Alcibiades : Rightly spoken.

Socrates : Steady, then, in Heaven’s name ! To whom are you talking now ? To me, are you not ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And I in turn to you  ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Then the talker is Socrates ?

Alcibiades : To be sure.

Socrates : And the hearer, Alcibiades ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And Socrates uses speech in talking ?

(129c) Alcibiades : Of course.

Socrates : And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

Alcibiades : To be sure.

Socrates : But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not ?

Alcibiades : How do you mean ?

Socrates : For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting ?

Alcibiades : Of course.

Socrates : And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Well then, that is what I was asking just now — whether the user (129d) and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

Alcibiades : They are.

Socrates : Then what are we to say of the shoemaker ? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well ?

Alcibiades : With his hands as well.

Socrates : So he uses these also ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from (129e) the hands and eyes that they use for their work ?

Alcibiades : Apparently.

Socrates : And man uses his whole body too ?

Alcibiades : To be sure.

Socrates : And we said that the user and what he uses are different ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

Socrates : So man is different from his own body ?

Alcibiades : It seems so.

Socrates : Then whatever is man ?

Alcibiades : I cannot say.

Socrates : Oh, but you can — that he is the user of the body.

Alcibiades : Yes.

(130a) Socrates : And the user of it must be the soul ?

Alcibiades : It must.

Socrates : And ruler ?

Alcibiades : Yes.

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