Platonismo

This page is read only. You can view the source, but not change it. Ask your administrator if you think this is wrong.
===== JOWETT: PHILEBUS 36C-42C — PRAZERES VERDADEIROS E PRAZERES FALSOS =====
Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Soc. Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question ?

Pro. What question ?

Soc. Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false ? or some true and some false ?

Pro. But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains ?

Soc. And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions ?

Pro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.

Soc. What do you mean ? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.

Pro. There I agree.

Soc. And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus’ boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.

Pro. Surely.

Soc. No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed ; what is said should be pertinent.

Pro. Right.

Soc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

Pro. How so ?

Soc. Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true ?

Pro. To be sure I do.

Soc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic ?

Pro. So we have always held, Socrates.

Soc. But were you right ? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion ?

Pro. I think that we should.

Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And such a thing as pleasure ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And an opinion must of something ?

Pro. True.

Soc. And a man must be pleased by something ?

Pro. Quite correct.

Soc. And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference ; it will still be an opinion ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not will always have a real feeling of pleasure ?

Pro. Yes ; that is also quite true.

Soc. Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real ?

Pro. Yes ; that is the question.

Soc. You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality ; and this is what you think should be examined ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality ?

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity ; as was indeed said long ago by us.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure ?

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure ; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name ?

Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken ; how could we ?

Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false ?

Pro. Certainly it does ; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.

Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure !

Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.

Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance ?

Pro. There must be a very great difference, between them.

Soc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.

Pro. Lead, and I will follow.

Soc. Well, then, my view is —

Pro. What is it ?

Soc. We agree — do we not ? — that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these upon true and false opinion, I mean.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature ?

Pro. Of what nature ?

Soc. An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.

Pro. Very likely.

Soc. Soon he begins to interrogate himself.

Pro. In what manner ?

Soc. He asks himself — “What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree ?” This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance.

Pro. True.

Soc. To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself — “It is a man.”

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say — “No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.”

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Well, now, I wonder whether, you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon.

Pro. What is your explanation ?

Soc. I think that the soul at such times is like a book.

Pro. How so ?

Soc. Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls — but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false.

Pro. I quite assent and agree to your statement their

Soc. I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.

Pro. Who is he ?

Soc. The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which he has described.

Pro. But when and how does he do this ?

Soc. When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them ; — is not this a very common mental phenomenom ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false ; are they not ?

Pro. They are.

Soc. If we are right so far, there arises a further question.

Pro. What is it ?

Soc. Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also ?

Pro. I should say in relation to all times alike.

Soc. Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones ; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future ?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the future ?

Pro. To the future, very much.

Soc. When you say, “Very much,” you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled with, hopes in every stage of existence ?

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. Answer me another question.

Pro. What question ?

Soc. A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods ; is he not ?

Pro. Certainly he is.

Soc. And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse ?

Pro. True.

Soc. And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us ; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

Pro. True.

Soc. And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good ; but I presume that they are false pleasures.

Pro. They are.

Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures ?

Pro. Doubtless.

Soc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character ?

Pro. There are.

Soc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future ?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opining ; am I not right ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character ?

Pro. How do you mean ?

Soc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure ; who is pleased with anything or anyhow ; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.

Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like ; are they not often false ?

Pro. Quite so.

Soc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false ?

Pro. In no other way.

Soc. Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false.

Pro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth ; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.

Soc. Well, of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry ; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.

Pro. Very true ; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.

Soc. I think that there are, Protarchus ; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul — do you remember ?

Pro. Yes, I remember that you said so.

Soc. And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.

Pro. What am I to infer ?

Soc. That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously ; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. And there is another point to which we have agreed.

Pro. What is it ?

Soc. That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.

Pro. Certainly, we said so.

Soc. But how can we rightly judge of them ?

Pro. How can we ?

Soc. It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure ?

Pro. Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.

Soc. Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely ; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains ?

Pro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

Pro. What was that ?

Soc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison ; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.

Pro. Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.

Soc. And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are : you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.

Pro. Certainly not.

{{indexmenu>.#1|skipns=/^playground|^wiki/ nsonly}}