Platonismo

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===== JOWETT: PARMÊNIDES 159B-160B — RETORNO À POSIÇÃO ABSOLUTA. QUINTA HIPÓTESE: O UNO É ABSOLUTAMENTE =====
Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others ?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one ?

Why so ?

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them ; for the expression “one and the others” includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist ?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same ?

True.

Then they are separated from each other ?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts ?

Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts ?

Impossible.

Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part ?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity ?

There is not.

Nor are the others many ; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole ; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

True.

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one ?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them ; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible ?

Impossible.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort ; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

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