Platonismo

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===== JOWETT: PARMÊNIDES 165E-166C — RETORNO À NEGAÇÃO ABSOLUTA. NONA HIPÓTESE: O UNO NÃO É ABSOLUTAMENTE... =====
Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes

Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.

Let us ask that question.

In the first place, the others will not be one ?

Impossible.

Nor will they be many ; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

They are not.

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why not ?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others ; for that which is not has no parts.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others either as one or many ; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one is not, there is no conception of can be conceived to be either one or many ?

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike ?

No.

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be ; — the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not ?

True.

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly : If one is not, then nothing is ?

Certainly.

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