====== Jowett: Alcibiades I 127d-135b — Como remediar ao mal que sofre a política? ====== Veja também: Coletânea de excertos da obra completa de Platão, na tradução de Jowett, indexados por termos relevantes Alcibiades : Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition. Socrates : But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight (127e) at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself ; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it. Alcibiades : Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates ? Socrates : Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades : only do that, and with Heaven’s favor — if we are to put any trust in my divination — you and I shall both be in better case. Alcibiades : That shall be, so far as my answering can avail. Socrates : Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself” — (128a) for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are — and when does a man actually do it ? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things ? Alcibiades : I at least believe so. Socrates : Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet ? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet ? Alcibiades : I do not understand. Socrates : Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand ? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger ? Alcibiades : No, indeed. Socrates : And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body ? (128b) Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet ? Alcibiades : I do not quite understand, Socrates. Socrates : Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not ? Alcibiades : I do. Socrates : And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Then what art makes shoes better ? Alcibiades : Shoe-making. Socrates : So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes ? (128c) Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And over our foot too by shoe-making ? Or by that art whereby we make feet better ? Alcibiades : By that art. Socrates : And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better ? Alcibiades : I think so. Socrates : And is not that gymnastic ? Alcibiades : Certainly. Socrates : So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot ? Alcibiades : Quite so. Socrates : And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving (128d) and the rest over what belongs to the body ? Alcibiades : Absolutely so. Socrates : Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts. Alcibiades : Apparently. Socrates : So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself. Alcibiades : Not at all. Socrates : For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same. Alcibiades : Apparently not. Socrates : Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves ? Alcibiades : I cannot say. (128e) Socrates : Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so ? Alcibiades : That is true. Socrates : Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe ? Alcibiades : Impossible. Socrates : Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring. Alcibiades : True. Socrates : Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves ? (129a) Alcibiades : Impossible. Socrates : Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi ; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody ? Alcibiades : I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody ; but often, too, that it was very hard. Socrates : But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same : if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves ; but if we have it not, we never can. Alcibiades : That is so. (129b) Socrates : Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered ? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves ; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail. Alcibiades : Rightly spoken. Socrates : Steady, then, in Heaven’s name ! To whom are you talking now ? To me, are you not ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And I in turn to you ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Then the talker is Socrates ? Alcibiades : To be sure. Socrates : And the hearer, Alcibiades ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And Socrates uses speech in talking ? (129c) Alcibiades : Of course. Socrates : And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose. Alcibiades : To be sure. Socrates : But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not ? Alcibiades : How do you mean ? Socrates : For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts. Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting ? Alcibiades : Of course. Socrates : And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Well then, that is what I was asking just now — whether the user (129d) and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things. Alcibiades : They are. Socrates : Then what are we to say of the shoemaker ? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well ? Alcibiades : With his hands as well. Socrates : So he uses these also ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from (129e) the hands and eyes that they use for their work ? Alcibiades : Apparently. Socrates : And man uses his whole body too ? Alcibiades : To be sure. Socrates : And we said that the user and what he uses are different ? Alcibiades : Yes. Socrates : So man is different from his own body ? Alcibiades : It seems so. Socrates : Then whatever is man ? Alcibiades : I cannot say. Socrates : Oh, but you can — that he is the user of the body. Alcibiades : Yes. (130a) Socrates : And the user of it must be the soul ? Alcibiades : It must. Socrates : And ruler ? Alcibiades : Yes.