Excertos da Introdução de Maria Helena da Rocha Pereira, à sua tradução da “República”
Seria o Livro I independente a princípio, e só mais tarde retocado para servir de proémio à República?
Justamente a palavra «proémio» aparece na primeira frase do Livro II, para classificar a conversa anterior. Esta forma um conjunto ordenado e completo, comparável aos chamados diálogos aporéticos, que se atribuem à primeira fase da obra do filósofo, e cujo esquema é fundamentalmente o mesmo: propõe-se uma definição de uma virtude, que vai sendo substituída por outras, à medida que Sócrates demonstra a sua insuficiência; de modo que, quando termina a discussão, a conclusão é negativa. Assim, o Lísis falha em definir a amizade, o Cármides a temperança (sophrosyne), o Laques a coragem, o Êutifron a piedade. A coragem, a temperança, a piedade formavam com a justiça o grupo das virtudes cardiais, já esboçado desde Ésquilo e Píndaro, pelo menos 1). Ora, definir a justiça é o que tenta fazer, sem o conseguir, o Livro I da República. Seria esse o livro que faltava, para completar o conjunto, pois não era de supor que Platão, que, durante o período dos diálogos aporéticos, investigou todas as outras virtudes, omitisse esta. O argumento é de um dos melhores especialistas, Paul Friedländer, e de uma obra recente, a última que escreveu 2). Mas desde 1891 que Dümmler 3) havia notado as relações deste livro com os primeiros diálogos e o denominou Trasímaco, do nome do Sofista que é o principal interlocutor de Sócrates 4). A hipótese de Dümmler continua a ter defensores, salvo quanto à suposição, que também formulou, de o livro se completar originàriamente com o mito terminal da obra — o que inutilizaria o argumento da antiguidade baseada no final apor ético 5). Aceita-a como provável um dos mais recentes e mais autorizados ensaios sobre a República 6). De qualquer modo, as diferenças de estilo 7) e de vocabulário em relação ao resto da obra são suficientes para levar os partidários da tese unitária a analisar a estrutura do «pretenso Trasímaco» junto com a dós primeiros diálogos 8). Mas temos de reconhecer que o Livro I desempenha admiràvelmente as funções de pórtico de um tão extenso tratado e que as potencialidades de dramaturgo, aqui tão exuberantemente reveladas, não o afastam das outras três obras-primas que, como já referimos, é costume considerar como compostas no mesmo período: o Banquete, o Fédon e o Fedro 9)).
Em qualquer caso, o Livro I corresponde a uma parte da obra que, além de ter a finalidade de apresentar as figuras e situar a discussão, fornece o tema da mesma — o que é a justiça — e refuta as definições propostas, a de Céfalo («dizer a verdade e restituir o que se tomou» — 331b), a de Polemarco («dar a cada um o que se lhe deve», segundo Simónides — 331e) e a de Trasímaco («o que está no interesse do mais forte» — 338c).
Introdução: Sócrates e Céfalo
Sócrates na festa de Bendidios
Conversação com o velho Cefalo sobre os incômodos da velhice
Mas (primeira opinião sobre ajustiça, Céfalo): a justiça consiste em “dizer a verdade e pagar suas dívidas”?
A) Crítica das definições correntes da justiça (331e-336a)
Primeira crítica (analogia justiça/arte): todas as técnicas são mais úteis que a justiça
Terceira definição: fazer o bem ao amigo e o mal ao inimigo mau
B) Discussão da tese de Thrasymaco: Thrasymaco intervém, revoltado contra o método seguido (336b)
Exposição da tese
Aquilo que os fortes instituem nem sempre é para eles vantajoso
Toda técnica é feita para vantagem daquilo que sobre o qual ela se exercita e que ela domina
Toda técnica busca a vantagem daquele que a exercita e redesenvolvimento da tese
Réplica
Distinção da função das artes enquanto artes e das vantagens buscadas por aqueles que as exercem
Thrasymaco classifica a injustiça junto com a virtude e a sabedoria
A justiça é mais bela que a injustiça
A justiça é mais forte
O injusto não é mais feliz que o justo
cada coisa tem sua virtude própria
Buscou-se qualificar a justiça
LIBRO I 328c Discusión preliminar sobre la vejez
Céfalo: el carácter, no la vejez, es la causa de los males de que se quejan los ancianos; la riqueza puede ayudar al hombre sensato a ser justo.
331c Céfalo: la justicia es la devolución de lo que se debe
Sócrates: pero se puede devolver lo que se debe con justicia o no.
332d Polemarco: es el beneficio a amigos y perjuicio a enemigos
Sócrates: pero si se perjudica a un caballo; se le vuelve peor respecto de su excelencia (areté); dado que la justicia es la excelencia del hombre, al perjudicar a un hombre se lo vuelve más injusto, y así se haría justicia produciendo injusticia.
338c Trasímaco: es lo que conviene al más fuerte
Sócrates: pero así como un médico dispone no lo que le conviene a él sino lo que conviene al enfermo, el gobernante debe disponer lo que conviene a los gobernados. Cada arte aporta un beneficio particular: el del médico, la salud, el del mercenario el salario. Si el médico gana dinero al curar, no se beneficia con el arte médico sino con el arte del mercenario que añade al suyo. Así el que gobierna no obtiene ningún beneficio de su arte, sino de uno adicional.
348c Trasímaco: la injusticia es excelencia y sabiduría
Sócrates: pero en cualquier arte el sabio no trata de aventajar a otro que lo conoce, sino al que lo desconoce. Y el justo no quiere aventajar al justo, sino al no-justo. Por lo tanto es el justo quien se parece al sabio y bueno, no el injusto.
352d La justicia es la excelencia del alma
Cada cosa tiene una función (érgon) que sólo ella cumple o que ella es la que la cumple mejor. Las funciones del alma son atender, deliberar, etc., y su excelencia es la justicia, de modo que el alma justa cumplirá su función y vivirá bien, no así el alma injusta.
The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene—a festival in honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is added the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another; this we learn from the first words of the Timaeus.
Republic I. When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor is the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of the numerous company, three only take any serious part in the discussion; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the Jowett1892: 327conversation has arisen is described as follows:—Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and with playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only Jowett1892: 328the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus’ father, now in extreme old age, who is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. ‘You should come to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for conversation.’ Socrates asks him what he thinks of Jowett1892: 329age, to which the old man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. ‘And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as they Jowett1892: 330imagine—as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, “Neither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Scriphian, would ever have been famous,” I might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.’ Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, a quality which he ascribes to his having inherited, not acquired them, and would like to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon you, and Jowett1892: 331then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, and never to have deceived any one, are felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his right mind? ‘There must be exceptions.’ ‘And yet,’ says Polemarchus, ‘the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.’ Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the possession of the argument to his heir, Polemarchus. . . . . .
Introduction. The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning ‘who is a just man.’ The first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.
Analysis. Jowett1892: 332. . . . . He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? ‘No, not in that case, not if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.’ Every act does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way good or harm? ‘In making alliances with the one, and going to war with the other.’ Then in time of peace what is the Jowett1892: 333good of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man? ‘When you want to have money safely kept and not used.’ Then justice will be useful when money is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice, like the art of war or any other art, must be of Jowett1892: 334opposites, good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then justice is a thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, who was ‘excellent above all men in theft and perjury’—to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted Jowett1892: 335as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our seeming and real evil enemies—good to the good, evil to the evil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will only make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, Jowett1892: 336Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about b.c. 398-381). . . . .
Le livre I, qui se présente à bien des égards comme un dialogue séparé, porte sur les conceptions traditionnelles de la justice. On se trouve alors non pas à Athènes, mais au Pirée, le port de la cité, dans la maison de Céphale, riche métèque d’origine syracusaine, fabricant d’armes et père de Lysias, l’orateur dont Phèdre est l’élève. La discussion s’engage entre Socrate et Céphale pour qui la justice consiste à dire la vérité et à rendre ce qu’on a reçu. Socrate montre rapidement les contradictions dans lesquelles s’empêtre cette définition sommaire. Puis intervient Polémarque, un autre fils de Céphale. La discussion s’achève sur une série de difficultés qui exaspèrent le rhéteur Thrasymaque, lequel propose cette définition : « La justice est l’intérêt du plus fort. » S’engage alors un débat tumultueux qui se termine brutalement, car Thrasymaque est excédé par la thèse de Socrate, suivant laquelle le juste est toujours préférable à l’injuste.