antiguidade:plotino:tratados_-_eneadas:tratado_27_iv3:guthrie-tractate-27-25a31
Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 25-31) — What are the conditions of the operation of memory and imagination? (Guthrie)
G. What are the conditions of the operation of memory and imagination?
- cosmic questions about memory depend on exact definition of what memory is.
- memory inapplicable except to beings subject to limitations of time.
- there is a timeless memory consisting of self-consciousness.
- definition of memory depends on whether it belongs to the soul or organism.
- the psychology of sensation.
- in any case memory is peculiar to the soul and body
- that the soul is incarnate is not the cause of her possessing memory.
- memory belongs to the soul alone.
- memory belongs both to the divine soul, and to that derived from the world-soul.
- what the rational soul, if separated, would remember of life.
- memory does not belong to appetite, because it may be reduced to sensation.
- what appetite keeps is an affection, but not a memory.
- memory does not belong to the faculty of sensation.
- memory does not belong exclusively to the power of perception.
- memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning.
- memory belongs to imagination.
- intellectual conceptions are not entirely preserved by imagination.
- the two kinds of memory imply two kinds of imagination.
- of the two imaginations one always predominates or overshadows the other.
- partition of the fund of memory between the two souls.
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