FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.
Psychological Questions.
A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL ?
- psychology obeys the precept “know thyself,” and shows how we are temples of the divinity.
- are individual souls emanations of the universal soul?
- conformity to the universal soul implies that they are not parts of her.
- limitations to the use of the term “parts,” in physical things.
- when applied to incorporeal things, “parts” have different senses.
- such mathematical senses cannot be applied to the soul.
- actual division into parts would be tantamount to a denial of the whole.
- nor is the soul a part in the sense that one proposition is a part of a science.
- the difference of functions of the world-soul and individual souls makes entire division between them impossible.
- are individual souls part of the world-soul as is the local consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness?
- study of the question by observation of the human organism.
- intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings.
- the healthy soul can work, the sick soul is devoted to her body.
- souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels.
- souls develop manifoldness just as intelligence does.
- why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human?
- the world-soul alone creates because she remains nearest the intelligible world.
- difference between individual and universal souls.
- sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source.
- difference between souls.
- like the divinity, the soul is always one.
- soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body.
GUTHRIE, K. S. Plotinus: Complete Works: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods. [single Volume, Unabridged]. [s.l.] CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 26) – THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 27) – MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE WORLD-SOUL (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 28) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 29) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 30) – INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 31) – THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9-17) – Descida das Almas aos Corpos (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9) – TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3) – Psychological Questions. (Guthrie)