THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF THE SOUL’S PRESENCE.
21. How would we answer a person who, without himself making any statements in regard to the matter, should ask us how the soul is present to the body; whether the whole soul is present to the body in the same manner, or whether one of her parts is present in one way, and another in some other way?
THE SOUL IN A BODY AS A PILOT IN A SHIP.
Since none of the comparisons that we have formerly examined seems to express the relation of the soul to the body, properly we might say that the soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship. This illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the soul’s being separable from the body; but it does not properly indicate the presence of the soul in the body. If the soul be present in the body as a passenger in a ship, it would be there only by accident, and the illustration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot’s presence in the ship he is steering; for the pilot is not present to the whole of the ship as the whole soul is in the body. One might illustrate the soul’s presence in the body as an art inheres in its instruments; as, for instance, in the helm, which might be supposed to be alive, containing the power of steering the ship skilfully. This is still unsatisfactory, because such an art comes from without. The soul might indeed be compared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm; and the soul might be in the body as in some natural instrument, so that the soul would move it at pleasure. This however might still fail to explain the manner in which the soul would exist in her instrument. Therefore, though the latter illustration is an improvement on the former, we must still seek one which closer approaches reality.
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 26) – THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 27) – MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE WORLD-SOUL (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 28) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 29) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 30) – INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 31) – THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9-17) – Descida das Almas aos Corpos (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9) – TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3) – Psychological Questions. (Guthrie)