THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION.
31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both the rational and irrational souls possess memory, we will have two kinds of imagination (intellectual and sensual); and if both souls are separate, each of them will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of two kinds of imagination within us in the same principle would not account for there being two kinds of imagination; and it would leave unsolved the question to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong to both kinds of imagination, there will always be two kinds of imagination — for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible things belongs to the one, and that of sense-things to the other; otherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common. If then memory equally belong to both imaginations, what difference is there between them ? Besides, why do we not notice this difference? Here is the cause.
OF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PREDOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE OTHER.
When both kinds of imagination harmonize, they co-operate (in the production of a single act). The most powerful dominates, and only a single image is produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger, as the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the contrary, when both kinds of imagination disagree and struggle, then only one of them manifests, and the other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore that we have two souls; for both souls are melted into a single one, and the one serves as vehicle for the other. The one sees all, but preserves only certain memories when she leaves the body, and leaves in oblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other. Likewise, after we have established relations with friends of an inferior order, we may acquire more distinguished friendships, and we remember the former but very little, though we remember the latter very distinctly.
PARTITION OF THE FUND OF MEMORY BETWEEN THE TWO SOULS.
What about (the memory) of friends, of parents, of a wife, of the fatherland, and of all that a virtuous man may properly remember? In the image of the soul (the irrational soul) these memories will be accompanied by a passive affection; but in the man (the rational soul) they will not be so accompanied. The affections exist since the beginning in the inferior soul; in the superior soul, as a result of her dealings with the other, there are also some affections, but only proper affections. The inferior soul may well seek to remember the actions of the superior soul, especially when she herself has been properly cultivated; for she can become better from her very principle up, and through the education she receives from the other. The higher soul must willingly forget what comes to her from the inferior soul. When she is good, she can, besides, by her power contain the subordinate soul. The more she desires to approach the intelligible world, the more she must forget the things from here below, unless the whole life she has led here below be such that she has entrusted to her memory none but praiseworthy things. Even in our own world, indeed, it is a fine thing to release oneself from human preoccupations. It would therefore be still finer to forget them all. In this sense we might well say that the virtuous soul should be forgetful. She thus escapes manifoldness, reduces manifoldness to unity, and abandons the indeterminate. She therefore ceases to live with manifoldness, lightens her burdens, and lives for herself. Indeed, while remaining here below, she desires to live in the intelligible world, and neglects all that is foreign to her nature. She therefore retains but few earthly things when she has arrived to the intelligible world; she has more of them when she inhabits the heavens. Hercules (in heaven) may well vaunt his valor; but even this valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at a region still holier than heaven, when he dwells in the intelligible world, when he has risen over Hercules himself by the force manifested in those struggles which are characteristic of veritable sages.
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 1-8) – Alma do Mundo e Alma Individual (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 10) – THE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL THINGS (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 11) – THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AS MODEL OF REASON (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 12) – SOULS ARE NOT CUT OFF FROM INTELLIGENCE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 13) – HOW SOULS COME TO DESCEND (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 14) – PLOTINOS SHOWS MEN ADD TO THE BEAUTY OF THE WORLD (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 15) – WHY MANY SOULS SUCCUMB TO THE LAW OF THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 16) – THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 17) – FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, SOULS FIRST GO INTO HEAVEN (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 18) – DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 19) – HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 20-23) – Relations between soul and body (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 20) – IF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN US (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 21) – THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF THE SOUL’S PRESENCE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 22) – THE SOUL PRESENT IN THE BODY AS LIGHT IN AIR (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 23) – WHILE THE SOUL-POWER IS EVERYWHERE… (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 24) — WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 25-31) — What are the conditions of the operation of memory and imagination? (Guthrie)