FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.
Psychological Questions.
A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL ?
- psychology obeys the precept “know thyself,” and shows how we are temples of the divinity.
- are individual souls emanations of the universal soul?
- conformity to the universal soul implies that they are not parts of her.
- limitations to the use of the term “parts,” in physical things.
- when applied to incorporeal things, “parts” have different senses.
- such mathematical senses cannot be applied to the soul.
- actual division into parts would be tantamount to a denial of the whole.
- nor is the soul a part in the sense that one proposition is a part of a science.
- the difference of functions of the world-soul and individual souls makes entire division between them impossible.
- are individual souls part of the world-soul as is the local consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness?
- study of the question by observation of the human organism.
- intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings.
- the healthy soul can work, the sick soul is devoted to her body.
- souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels.
- souls develop manifoldness just as intelligence does.
- why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human?
- the world-soul alone creates because she remains nearest the intelligible world.
- difference between individual and universal souls.
- sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source.
- difference between souls.
- like the divinity, the soul is always one.
- soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body.
B. WHY AND HOW DO SOULS DESCEND INTO BODIES?
- two kinds of transmigration.
- study of first incarnation.
- how the universe is animated by the world soul.
- the world-soul progressively informs all things.
- the universal soul as model of reason, as intermediary and interpreter.
- souls are not cut off from intelligence during their descent and ascent.
- why souls take on different kinds of bodies.
- how souls come to descend.
- by a pun on “world” and “adornment,” plotinos shows men add to the beauty of the world.
- by a pun on “prometheus” and “providence,” plotinos employs the myth of pandora.
- why many souls succumb to the law of the order of the universe.
- the significance of misfortunes and punishments.
- from the intelligible world, souls first go into heaven.
- the descending graduations of existence.
C. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE?
- the soul does not use discursive reason except while hindered by the obstacles of the body.
- the soul can reason intuitionally without ratiocination.
D. HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE?
- a decision will depend on the meaning of the terms.
- the body needs the soul for life.
- sense, growth and emotion tend towards divisibility.
- the soul as a whole of two distinct divisible and indivisible parts.
E. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY.
- if functions are not localized the soul will not seem entirely within us.
- space is corporeal; the body is within the soul.
- nor is the body a vase, for proximate transmission of the soul.
- many metaphysical objections to the conception of soul as localized.
- nor is the soul in the body as a quality in a substrate.
- nor is the soul in the body as a part in the whole.
- nor is the soul in the body as a whole in a part.
- nor will the soul be in the body as form in matter.
- the soul is said to be in the body because the body alone is visible.
- this leaves the question of the manner of the soul’s presence.
- the soul in a body as a pilot in a ship.
- the soul present in the body as light in air.
- while the soul-power is everywhere, the principle of action is localized in the special organ.
- reason is in the head, but not in the brain, which is the seat of the intermediary, the power of sensation.
- growth is localized in the liver, anger in the heart.
F. WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH?
- the soul after death goes to the place suited to it by retribution.
- pure incorporeal souls dwell within intelligence in divinity.
G. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE OPERATION OF MEMORY AND IMAGINATION?
- cosmic questions about memory depend on exact definition of what memory is.
- memory inapplicable except to beings subject to limitations of time.
- there is a timeless memory consisting of self-consciousness.
- definition of memory depends on whether it belongs to the soul or organism.
- the psychology of sensation.
- in any case memory is peculiar to the soul and body
- memory belongs to the soul alone.
- memory belongs both to the divine soul, and to that derived from the world-soul.
- what the rational soul, if separated, would remember of life.
- memory does not belong to appetite, because it may be reduced to sensation.
- what appetite keeps is an affection, but not a memory.
- memory does not belong to the faculty of sensation.
- memory does not belong exclusively to the power of perception.
- memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning.
- memory belongs to imagination.
- intellectual conceptions are not entirely preserved by imagination.
- the two kinds of memory imply two kinds of imagination.
- of the two imaginations one always predominates or overshadows the other.
- partition of the fund of memory between the two souls.
GUTHRIE, K. S. Plotinus: Complete Works: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods. [single Volume, Unabridged]. [s.l.] CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 25) – COSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY IS (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 26) – THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 27) – MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE WORLD-SOUL (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 28) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 29) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 30) – INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 31) – THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9-17) – Descida das Almas aos Corpos (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9) – TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION (Guthrie)