Tratado 43 (VI, 2, 9-12) — The Categories of Plotinos. (Guthrie)

WHY NOT ADD OTHERS SUCH AS UNITY, QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR RELATION?

9. These and similar (Platonic) arguments demonstrate that those are genuinely primary genera; but how are we to prove they are exclusive? Why, for example, should not unity, quantity, quality, relation, and further (Aristotelian) categories, be added thereto?

NEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR RELATIVE UNITY CAN BE A CATEGORY.

Unity (may mean two things). The absolute Unity, to which nothing may be added, neither Soul, nor Intelligence, nor anything else, cannot be predicated as attribute of anything, and therefore cannot be a genus. But if we are referring to the unity which we attribute to essence, when we say that essence is one, it is no longer the original Unity.” Besides, how could the absolute One, which within itself admits of no difference, beget species? If it cannot do this, it cannot be a genus. How indeed could you divide unity? By dividing it, you would multiply it; and thus Unity-in-itself would be manifold, and in aspiring to become a genus it would annihilate itself. Besides, in order to divide this unity into species, you would have to add something to unity, because it does not contain differences such as exist in being. Intelligence might well admit differences between essences, but this could not possibly be the case with unity. The moment you add a single difference, you posit duality, and consequently destroy unity; for everywhere the addition of a single unity causes any previously posited number to disappear.

UNITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ESSENCE.

It may be objected that the unity which is in essence, in movement, and the remainder of the genera, is common to all of them, and that one might therefore identify unity with essence. It must then be answered that, just as essence was not made a genus of other things because they were not what was essence, but that they were called essences in another sense, here likewise unity could not be a common attribute of other things, because there must be a primary Unity, and a unity taken in a secondary sense. If, on the other hand, it be said that unity should not be made a genus of all things, but something which exists in itself like the others, if afterwards unity be identified with essence, then, as essence has already been listed as one of the genera, we would be merely uselessly introducing a superfluous name. Distinguishing between unity and essence is an avowal that each has its separate nature; the addition of “something” to “one” makes a “certain one”; addition of nothing, on the other hand, allows unity to remain absolute, which cannot be predicated of anything. But why could this unity not be the First Unity, ignoring the absolute Unity? For we use “first Unity” as a designation of the essence which is beneath the “absolute Unity.” Because the Principle anterior to the first Essence (that is, the first and absolute Unity) is not essence; otherwise, the essence below Him would no longer be the first Essence; here, on the contrary, the unity which is above this unity is the absolute Unity. Besides, this unity which would be separated from essence only in thought, would not admit of any differences.

Besides, there are three alternatives. Either this unity alleged to inhere in essence will be, just like all other essences, a consequence of the existence of essence; and consequently, would be posterior to it. Or, it will be contemporaneous with essence and the other (categories) ; but a genus cannot be contemporaneous with the things of which it is the genus. The third possibility is that it may be anterior to essence; in which case its relation to Essence will be that of a principle, and no longer a genus containing it. If then unity be not a genus in respect to essence, neither can it be a genus in respect of other things; otherwise, we would have to say of essence also that it was a genus embracing everything else.

ESSENCE CANNOT BECOME A GENUS SO LONG AS IT REMAINS ONE.

Considering unity according to its essence, it seems to fuse and coincide with absolute Essence, for essence, so far as it trends towards unity, is a single essence; but in so far as it is posterior to unity, it becomes all things it can be, and becomes manifold. Now, so far as essence remains one and does not divide, it could not constitute a genus.

ELEMENTS OF ESSENCE CAN BE SAID TO BE ONE’ ONLY FIGURATIVELY.

10. In what sense, therefore, could each of the elements of essence be called “one”? In that it is something unitary, without being unity itself; for what is a “certain one” is already manifold. No species is “one” except figuratively; for in itself it is manifold. It is in the same sense that, in this sense-world, we say that an army, or a choric ballet, constitute a unity. Not in such things is absolute unity; and therefore it may not be said that unity is something common. Neither does unity reside in essence itself, nor in the individual essences; therefore, it is not a genus. When a genus is predicated of something, it is impossible to predicate of the same thing contrary properties; but of each of the elements of universal essence it is possible to assert both unity and its opposite. Consequently (if we have called unity a genus), after having predicated of some essence unity as a genus, we would have affirmed, of the same essence, that unity was not a genus. Unity, therefore, could not be considered one of the primary genera; for essence is no more one than it is manifold. As to the other genera, none of them is one without being manifold; much less could unity be predicated of the secondary genera of which each is quite manifold. Besides, no genus, considered in its totality, is unitary; so that if unity were a genus, it would merely thereby cease being unity; for unity is not a number, and nevertheless it would become a number in becoming a genus. Of course, numbers include an alleged unity, as soon as we try to erect it into a genus, it is no longer a unity, in a strict sense. Among numbers unity is not applied to them as would have been a genus; of such unity it is merely said that it is among numbers, not that it is a genus; likewise, if unity were among the essences, it would not be there as genus of essence, nor of anything else, nor of all things. Again, just as the simple is the principle of the composite without being considered a genus in respect to it — then it would be simultaneously simple and composite — so, if one were considered to be a principle, it could not be a genus in respect to things subsumed under it; and therefore will be a genus neither for essence, nor for other (categories or things).

VARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNITY AS A CATEGORY.

If unity were to be considered a genus, it could be that only in respect to the things of which each is said to be one; as if, for instance, one should, from “being,” deduce the unity contained within it. Unity would then be the genus of certain things; for just as essence is a genus, not in respect to all things, but in respect to those species that possess essence, so unity would be a genus in respect to the species that possess unity. This, however, is impossible; for things do not differ in respect to unity, as they do in respect to essence.

It might further be objected that if the same divisions which were applied to essence were applied to unity, and if essence be a genus because it divides itself, and manifests itself as the same in a number of things, why then should unity also not be a genus, since it appears in as many things as essence, and similarly divides itself? Mere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a genus; whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs, or to others. Merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes a genus. No one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for anything else, though points be found in all lines. As said, unity is found in every number, and nevertheless it is not a genus for any number, or for anything else. The formation of a genus demands that what is common to several things show specific differences, consituting species, and be predicated of what exists. But what are the specific differences within unity? What species does it form? If to this it be answered that it forms the same species as essence, then it blends with essence, and (unity) is (as said above), only another name for essence; and essence, as category, suffices.

GENUINE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITY AND ESSENCE.

11. The questions here to be solved are, how unity subsists within essence, how they both divide, and in general how any genera divide; and whether their two divisions be identical, or different. To solve these questions, we shall first have to ask how in general any thing whatever is said to be one, and is one; then, if it can be said in the same sense that essence is one, in what sense this is said. Evidently, unity is not the same for everything. It cannot even be understood in the same sense in respect to sense-things, and intelligible things; not any more than essence is identical for these two order of (beings), or even for sense-things compared to each other. The idea of unity is not the same in reference to a choric ballet, an army, a vessel or a house; it is even less so in respect of one of these things, and when it deals with continuous objects. And nevertheless, by their unity all theses things imitate the same archetype, some from far, some from near. Intelligence, surely, is assuredly that which most approaches absolute Unity; for although the soul already possess unity, Intelligence possesses it far more intensely; for it is the one essence.

UNITY REIGNS STILL MORE IN THE GOOD.

Is the expression of the essence of something simultaneously the expression of its unity, so that it possesses as much unity as it possesses essence? Or does this simultaneousness exist without any direct proportion between the amount of unity and essence? Yes; for it is possible that something have less unity without, on that account, having any the less essence; an army, a choric ballet have not less essence than a house, though far less unity. The unity present in each thing seems therefore to aspire to the Good, which has the most unity; for the closer something approaches the Good, the greater unity does it achieve; that is the criterion of greater or less unity. Indeed, every (being) desires not only merely to be (alive), but to enjoy the Good. That is why everything, so far as it can, hastens to become one, and those (benngs) which by nature possess unity naturally trend towards Him by desiring to unite with themselves. For every (being) hastens not to separate from others, but on the contrary their tendency is to tend towards each other and themselves. That is why all souls, while preserving their individual nature, would like to fuse into a single soul. The One reigns everywhere in the sense-world, as well as in the Intelligible. It is from Him that everything originates, it is towards Him that everything trends. In Him do all (beings) seek their principle and their goal; for only therein do they find their good; only by that does each (being) subsist, and occupies its place in the universe; once that it exists, no (being) could help trending towards the One. This occurs not only in nature, but even in the arts; where each art seeks, to the extent of its ability, to conform its works to unity, to the extent of its ability, and to the possibilities of its works. But that which succeeds best, is Essence itself, which is quite close to unity.

FURTHER REASONS WHY UNITY IS NOT A CATEGORY.

Consequently, in speaking of (beings) other than (essence itself), as, for instance, of man, we say simply “man” (without adding to it the idea of unity); if however we say “a man,” it is to distinguish him from two; if however we use the word one in still another sense, it is by adding to it “some” (as, “someone”). Not so is it with essence; we say, “being one,” conceiving of “being” (“essence”) and one, as if forming a single whole, and in positing essence as one, we emphasize its narrow affinity with the Good. Thus conceived, essence becomes one; and in the one finds its origin and goal. Nevertheless it is not one as unity itself, but rather in a different manner, in this sense that the (unity of essence) admits priority and posteriority. What then is (the unity of essence) ? Must it not then be considered similar in all the parts (of essence), as something common to all (and consequently, as forming a genus) ? But in the first place, the point is also something common to all the lines, and nevertheless it is not a genus; in the numbers, unity is something common to all, and is not any more of a genus. Indeed, the unity which is found in the monad, in the dyad (or pair), and in other numbers, cannot be confused with unity in itself. Then, nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior, and other posterior parts, both simple and compound ones (which would be impossible for the One in itself). Even if the unity found everywhere in all the parts of essence were everywhere identical, by the mere fact that it would offer no difference, it could not give rise to species, and consequently, it could not be a genus.

BY TENDING TOWARDS THE ONE, EVERYTHING TENDS TOWARDS THE GOOD.

12. We therefore assert (that by moving towards unity everything moves towards the Good). How can it be, however, that Goodness should consist in coming closer to unity, even for number, which is inanimate? This question might as well be asked about any inanimate object whatever. If we were told that such (beings) do not enjoy (existence), we might answer that we are here treating of beings according to their proximity to unity only. If, for instance, we were asked how a point can participate in the Good, we might answer by a retort, asking whether we are dealing with the Point in itself. Then we would answer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for all things of the same kind. If however we were pressed about the point considered as existing in some object, as, for instance, in the circle, we would answer that for such a point, the Good is the good of the circle (of which it forms part); that such is the Good towards which it aspires, and that it seeks that as far as possible through the intermediation of the circle.

THESE GENERA EXIST IN BOTH THE SUBORDINATE OBJECTS, AND THEMSELVES.

But how could we realize such genera? Are all these genera susceptible of division, or do they lie entire within each of the objects they comprehend? If so, how does this unity find itself? Unity exists therein as a genus, just as the whole exists within the plurality.

Does unity exist only in the objects that participate therein? Not only in these objects, but also in itself. This point will be studied later.