SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS.
5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such a doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that the soul of Socrates would be alive while being in a certain body, while she would be annihilated (by losing herself within the universal Soul) at the very moment when (as a result of separation of the body) she had come into what was best (in the intelligible world). No, none of the true beings perishes. Not even the intelligences lose themselves up there (in the divine Intelligence), because they are not divided as are bodies, and each subsists in her own characteristics, to their differences joining that identity which constitutes “being.” Being located below the individual intelligences to which they are attached, individual souls are the “reasons” (born) of the intelligences, or more developed intelligences; from being but slightly manifold, they become very much so, while remaining in communion with the slightly manifold beings. As however they tend to introduce separation in these less divisible beings (that is, intelligences), and as nevertheless they cannot attain the last limits of division, they simultaneously preserve both their identity and difference. Each one remains single, and all together form a unity.
SOULS DEVELOP MANIFOLDNESS JUST AS INTELLIGENCE DOES.
We have thus succeeded in establishing the most important point of the discussion, namely, that all souls proceed from a single Soul, that from being one they become manifold, as is the case with the intelligences, divided in the same way, and similarly undivided. The Soul that dwells in the intelligible world is the one and indivisible reason (born) of intelligence, and from this Soul proceed the particular immaterial “reasons,” in the same manner as on high (the individual intelligences proceed from the one and absolute Intelligence).
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 25) – COSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY IS (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 26) – THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 27) – MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE WORLD-SOUL (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 28) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 29) – MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 30) – INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 31) – THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human? (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9-17) – Descida das Almas aos Corpos (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9) – TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION (Guthrie)
- Tratado 27 (IV, 3) – Psychological Questions. (Guthrie)