gr. ηδονή, hêdoné: prazer. Não há em Platão condenação dos prazeres, mas uma reflexão sobre a maneira pela qual se pode dominá-los, quer dizer deles fazer uso. Os prazeres do corpo como os prazeres da alma devem ser ordenados a seus usos.
Pleasure ought not to be treated like desire as necessarily implying a lack. But Plato does so treat it when he defines pleasure, or records its definition, as a process of restoring the natural condition, Philebus 31B-32A, 53C, and similar definitions are given by Plotinus 4.4 [28] 19 (1-5) and Proclus in Tim. 3.287,17-20. Aristotle replies that pleasure is not a process moving towards completion, EN 1152b13ff.; 1174a19-b9. It is rather an activity already complete, the unimpeded activity of the natural state, 1153a9-15, or an activity which supervenes on some distinct activity and perfects it, 1174b14-1175b1; 1175b32-5.
On the Platonic account, it is hard to see how the intellect’s activity of contemplating what it already knows can give pleasure, since it involves no lack. Yet Plato does think that pleasure and desire are involved. Plato does not address this problem (although he does suggest in Philebus 21D-22C, 32E-33B that the gods do not gain pleasure from intellection. Gerd van Riel has shown that Plotinus and Proclus tend to describe intellection in terms other than pleasure, Proclus (e.g. in Remp. 1.131,14-16; 2.303,1-4) using the Stoic terms for equanimous states, eupatheia, euphrosune, which, however, had already been relevantly used by Plato Rep. 10, 615A3; Phaedr. 247D4; Tim. 80B5-8. Damascius switches to the Aristotelian definitions of pleasure (see below in Phileb. 87,1-4; 190). This makes it all the easier to describe the activity of intellect as being a pleasure as well as a eupatheia, involving only shocks, or (in Phileb. 145; 190) not even shocks. [SorabjiPC1:294-295]
L’extase ne s’accompagne pas simplement de joie, comme pour le sage stoïcien réalisant pleinement l’accord de son âme au monde, mais aussi de plaisir. Il y a littéralement un « hédonisme » plotinien ; voir 38 (VI, 7), 27, 24-28 et J. Laurent, « Plotin et le plaisir de vivre ». [->art1233]
[…] ἡδονή, a determinate mode of being-in-the-world, of “one’swell-being.” “It is established for us that something’s well-being is a certain movement of the being of the living in its world, and indeed κατάστασις ἁθρóα, a transposing-of-oneself-all-at-once εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, into the genuinely available possibility of the being-there in question, in such a way that it is thereby perceived.” This κατάστασις refers to nothing other than well-being: being-uplifted in one fell swoop, a specific lightness of being-in-the-world that lies in joy. [Heidegger, GA18:48]
Ad 1. The consideration of ἡδονή is kept short since it is clear without qualification that such an ἀγαθóν steers being-there away from itself and turns it toward the world. In ἡδονή, being-there does not come to itself; life is lived by the world in which it moves, fully dependent on the world, not living its own being. [Heidegger, GA18:77]
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