Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science ?
You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike ; but they are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of themselves ; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware : and that you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argument.
And what if I am ? How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself ? which motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind ?
Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.
Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted ; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of the refutation.
I think that you are right, he replied ; and I will do as you say.
Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.
I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself as well as of the other sciences.
But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence of science.
Very true, he said.
Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and think that they know and do really know ; and what they do not know, and fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge — for a man to know what he knows, and what he does not know. That is your meaning ?
Yes, he said.
Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, whether it is or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and does not know what he knows and does not know ; and in the second place, whether, if perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use.
That is what we have to consider, he said.
And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out of a difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty ?
By all means, he replied.
Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this : that there must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science ?
Yes.
But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend : in any parallel case, the impossibility will be transparent to you.
How is that ? and in what cases do you mean ?
In such cases as this : Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but only itself and other sorts of vision : Do you think that there is such a kind of vision ?
Certainly not.
Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them ?
There is not.
Or take all the senses : can you imagine that there is any sense of itself and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses ?
I think not.
Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires ?
Certainly not.
Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes ?
I should answer, No.
Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves ?
I should not.
Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear ?
I never did, he said.
Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general ?
Certainly not.
But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences ?
Yes, that is what is affirmed.
But how strange is this, if it be indeed true : must not however as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science ; let us rather consider the matter.
You are quite right.
Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something ?
Yes.
Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else ?
Yes.
Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater ?
To be sure.
And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself ?
That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.
Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves ; for the double is relative to the half ?
That is true.
And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger : and the same of other things ; that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object : I mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true ?
Yes.
Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice ; for there is no other way of hearing.
Certainly.
And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.
No.
Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible — inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like ?
Very true.
But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some things only and not others ; and whether in this class of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters : I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all ; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not do us any good ; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science ; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.
Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty ; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at issue ; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then Critias, if you like, let us assume that there is this science of science ; whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom : so we were saying ?
Yes, Socrates, he said ; and that I think is certainly true : for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know himself.
I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge : but what necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know ?
Because, Socrates, they are the same.
Very likely, I said ; but I remain as stupid as ever ; for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.
What do you mean ? he said.
This is what I mean, I replied : I will admit that there is a science of science ; — can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge ?
No, just that.
But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice ?
Certainly not.
The one is medicine, and the other is politics ; whereas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.
Very true.
And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men.
True.
Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows ? Say that he knows health ; — not wisdom or temperance, but the art of medicine has taught it to him ; and he has learned harmony from the art of music, and building from the art of building, neither, from wisdom or temperance : and the same of other things.
That is evident.
How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building ?
It is impossible.
Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows ?
True.
Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not know ?
That is the inference.
Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows : he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind ; but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is ?
Plainly not.
Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way : If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed ? He will not talk to him about medicine ; and that, as we were saying, is the only thing which the physician understands.
True.
And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.
True.
And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not know anything of medicine.
Exactly.
Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge ; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter ? For the several sciences are distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the nature of their subjects. Is not that true ?
Quite true.
And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject-matter of health and disease ?
Yes.
And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous ?
True.
And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these ?
He will.
He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease ?
He will.
But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a of medicine ?
He cannot.
No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this knowledge ; and therefore not the wise man ; he would have to be a physician as well as a wise man.
Very true.
Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all ; like any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.
That is evident, he said.
But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom ? If, indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise ; for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us ; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them ; nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge ; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered ; for truth guiding, and error having been eliminated, in all their doings, men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom to know what is known and what is unknown to us ?
Very true, he said.
And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere.
I perceive, he said.
May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage : — that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns ; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself ; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight ? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom ? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her ?
That is very likely, he said.