Pol. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not ; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no !
Soc. Justly or unjustly, do you mean ?
Pol. In either case is he not equally to be envied ?
Soc. Forbear, Polus !
Pol. Why “forbear” ?
Soc. Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.
Pol. And are those of whom spoke wretches ?
Soc. Yes, certainly they are.
Pol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched ?
Soc. No, I do not say that of him : but neither do I think that he is to be envied.
Pol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched ?
Soc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied ; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.
Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied ?
Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.
Pol. How can that be, Socrates ?
Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.
Pol. But is it the greatest ? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil ?
Soc. Certainly not.
Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice ?
Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.
Pol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant ?
Soc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
Pol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
Soc. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant ; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead ; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply : Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power — he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private — but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power ?
Pol. Certainly not such doing as this.
Soc. But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power ?
Pol. I can.
Soc. Why then ?
Pol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.
Soc. And punishment is an evil ?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power ; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power.