Soc. Capital, excellent ; go on as you have begun, and have no shame ; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame : and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness ?
Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates ! a regular mob-orator.
Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought ; but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.
Cal. I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.
Soc. And if pleasantly, then also happily ?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head ? Shall I pursue the question ? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable ? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want ?
Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument ?
Soc. Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures ? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good ?
Cal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.
Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.
Cal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.
Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good ; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
Soc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying ?
Cal. Indeed I do.
Soc. Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument ?
Cal. By all means.
Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me : — There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge ?
Cal. There is.
Soc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge ?
Cal. I was.
Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another ?
Cal. Certainly I was.
Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same ?
Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.
Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure ?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same ; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say — does he assent to this, or not ?
Soc. He does not assent ; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly.