Soc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states ? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this ?
Cal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts ; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience ; but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he ?
Cal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.
Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches ? for, indeed, I do not know of such a man.
Cal. What ! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself ?
Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others ; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them — can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them ?
Cal. No, indeed, I cannot.
Soc. Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random ; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it ? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole ; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body : do you deny this ?
Cal. No ; I am ready to admit it.
Soc. Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good, that in which there is disorder, evil ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the same is true of a ship ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the same may be said of the human body ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And what would you say of the soul ? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order ?
Cal. The latter follows from our previous admissions.
Soc. What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body ?
Cal. I suppose that you mean health and strength ?
Soc. Yes, I do ; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul ? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.
Cal. Why not give the name yourself, Socrates ?
Soc. Well, if you had rather that I should, I will ; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. “Healthy,” as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence : is that true or not ?
Cal. True.
Soc. And “lawful” and “law” are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly : — and so we have temperance and justice : have we not ?
Cal. Granted.
Soc. And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away ? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens mind take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice ? Do you not agree ?
Cal. I agree.
Soc. For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true ?
Cal. I will not say No to it.
Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his body is in an evil plight — in that case his life also is evil : am I not right ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all : even you will admit that ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir ? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Such treatment will be better for the soul herself ? Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring ?
Cal. I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does.
Soc. Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or : to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks !
Cal. I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.
Soc. What are we to do, then ? Shall we break off in the middle ?
Cal. You shall judge for yourself.
Soc. Well, but people say that “a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,” and I should not like to have the argument going about without a head ; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.