Cal. How tyrannical you are, Socrates ! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.
Soc. But who else is willing ? — I want to finish the argument.
Cal. Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight : on, or questioning and answering yourself ?
Soc. Must I then say with Epicharmus, “Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough” ? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only, but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying ; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed ; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.
Gor. I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument ; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company ; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.
Soc. I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an “Amphion” in return for his “Zethus” ; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.
Cal. My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.
Soc. Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument : — Is the pleasant the same as the good ? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good ? or the good for the sake of the pleasant ? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good ? To be sure. And we — good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them ? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them : Am I not right ? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement ? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing ? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order ? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly ? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate ? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good ? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear ; have you any ?
Cal. Go on, my good fellow.