This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous ? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils ? And will not worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends ? — and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil ; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil ; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles ?
Cal. Yes, quite right.
Soc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice — and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil — by what devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice ? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them ? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power ?
Cal. He must have provided himself with the power ; that is clear.
Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice ? Is the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art ; and if he has not studied and practised, will he be unjust still ? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will ?
Cal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.
Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice ?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible ? I want to know whether you agree with me ; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.
Cal. Well said, Socrates ; and please to observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.
Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine : To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to him — like to like, as ancient sages say : Would you not agree to this ?
Cal. I should.
Soc. But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.
Cal. That is true.
Soc. Neither will he be the friend of any one who greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.
Cal. That again is true.
Soc. Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him ; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity : — is not that so ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and formidable, this would seem to be the way — he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on, the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends would. say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury ?
Cal. Very true.
Soc. But will he also escape from doing injury ? Must not the very opposite be true, — if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him ? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished ?
Cal. True.
Soc. And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the greatest evil to him ?
Cal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything : do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods ?
Soc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind — the bad man will kill the good and true.
Cal. And is not that just the provoking thing ?
Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows : do you think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always ; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to cultivate ?
Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.
Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming ; is that an art of any great pretensions ?
Cal. No, indeed.
Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming : it has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus — this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon ; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls ; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him ; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer — and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well.
And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader ? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about ; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal ? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning ? I know that you will say, “I am better, better born.” But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved : — May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time ? — he knows, as women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term — whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in the state ; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us — I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callides ; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator : for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say ?