Soc. A great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old ; about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them ; “after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly perish” — so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie ; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist ; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly ; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them ? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this ? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer.
Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer ?
Soc. I suppose that I can ; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad ?
Cal. Yes, it appears so to me.
Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner ?
Cal. Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing ?
Soc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city : — do you think that there is any difference between one and the other ? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same ; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, sophistry a thing to be despised ; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact ?
Cal. Certainly it is.
Soc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed ; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.
Cal. Very true.
Soc. And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly : he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good — am I not right ?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art ?
Cal. Yes, we have found the reason.
Soc. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable ?
Cal. True.
Soc. And why ? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return ; otherwise not. Is this true ?
Cal. It is.
Soc. Then to which service of the State do you invite me ? determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible ; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State ? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.
Cal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.
Soc. The flatterer ? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.
Cal. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be —
Soc. Do not repeat the old story — that he who likes will kill me and get my money ; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.
Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm ! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.
Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial — of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this ?
Cal. By all means.
Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics ; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus : — I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What Would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you : he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do ; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you !” What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament ? If he told the truth he could only say, “All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,” and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that ? How they would cry out !
Cal. I dare say.
Soc. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply ?
Cal. He certainly would.
Soc. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might : — “All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.
Cal. And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position ?
Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have — if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men ; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.
Cal. Very well, proceed ; and then we shall have done.