Jowett: HMEN 372a-376b: A ciência socrática

Hippias : That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance ; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design.

Socrates : You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.

[371a] Hippias : Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer ?

Socrates : That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it ; at any rate Odysseus does not appear [371b] to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.

Hippias : What is this that you say, Socrates ?

Socrates : Don’t you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different ?

Hippias : Where, pray ?

Socrates : Where he says :

For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam’s son, [371c] the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt.

[371d] Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood ?

Hippias : No, I do not agree, Socrates ; [371e] but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus ; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise.

Socrates : Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles.

Hippias : Not in the least, Socrates.

Socrates : How is that ? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily ?

Hippias : And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong [372a] and voluntarily and designedly do harm be better than those who do so involuntarily ? And there seems to be good reason to forgive a man who unwittingly does wrong or speaks falsehood or does any other evil. And the laws surely are much more severe towards those who do evil and tell falsehoods voluntarily, than towards those who do so involuntarily.

Socrates : Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth [372b] when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men ? And this is probably the only good thing about me, as I am otherwise quite worthless ; for I am all wrong about facts, and do not know the truth about them. And it is to me sufficient proof of the truth of this, that when I come into contact with one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am found to know nothing ; [372c] for there is hardly a single thing about which you and I have the same opinion ; and yet what greater proof of ignorance is there than when one disagrees with a wise man ? But I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation ; for I am not afraid to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers, and I never failed in gratitude to anyone ; for when I have learned anything I have never denied it, pretending that the information was a discovery of my own ; but I praise the wisdom of him who instructed me and proclaim what I learned from him. And so now I do not agree with what you say, [372d] but disagree very strongly ; and I know very well that this is my own fault, because I am the sort of man I am — not to give myself any greater title. For my opinion, Hippias, is the exact opposite of what you say ; I think that those who injure people and do wrong and speak falsehood and cheat and err voluntarily, not involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. Sometimes, however, the opposite of this seems to me to be the case, and I am all astray about these matters, [372e] evidently because I am ignorant ; but now at the present moment a sort of paroxysm of my disease has come upon me, and those who err in respect to anything voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. And I lay the blame for my present condition upon our previous argument, which causes those who do any of these things involuntarily to appear to me at this moment worse than those who do them voluntarily. So please do me a favour and do not refuse to cure my soul ; for you will be doing me much more good if you cure my soul of ignorance, than if you were to cure my body of disease. [373a] Now if you choose to deliver a long speech, I tell you beforehand that you would not cure me — for I could not follow you — but if you are willing to answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I think you yourself will not be injured, either. And I might fairly call upon you also, son of Apemantus, for help ; for you stirred me up to converse with Hippias ; so now, if Hippias is unwilling to answer me, ask him in my behalf to do so.

Eudicus : Well, Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need no asking from us ; [373b] for that is not what he announced ; he announced that he would not avoid the questioning of any man. How is that, Hippias ? Is not that what you said ?

Hippias : Yes, I did ; but Socrates, Eudicus, always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to want to make trouble.

Socrates : Most excellent Hippias, I do not do these voluntarily at all — for then I should be wise and clever, according to you — but involuntarily, so forgive me ; for you say, too, that he who does evil involuntarily ought to be forgiven.

[373c] Eudicus : And do not refuse, Hippias ; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you.

Hippias : Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like.